Five Grand Endeavors

Tracking humanity's progress in five grand endeavors — our biggest ongoing R&D projects.
Live ledger state as of 2026-10-22 · 1828 events · 0 data gap(s)

Science has a communication problem. It reports isolated discoveries (with applications often more of an afterthought), not progress towards the big outcomes. Thus, every week, we publish a newsletter updating humanity on the progress of science towards such outcomes — just as a company would report its progress to its board.

Scientific research is valuable even to its own end, but is largely expected to be the engine of material abundance. We track the needle on five Grand Endeavors that humanity has pursued for all its existence and that will also determine the quality of life for the next 100 years.

Each of the endeavors has a KPI assigned, as well as some key milestones and open challenges we need to solve. All of these may update and evolve over time, and are on purpose somewhat opinionated — they capture the current consensus rather than all perspectives. If the top experts' consensus shifts, we will shift. And we will report also on major progress of alternative approaches in each given area.

How to read this page

Each endeavor has a KPI (the needle we watch), a milestone countdown (concrete, checkable events) and open challenges (the problems standing in the way). Click any line to expand its detail: the precise criteria, the current assessment and its reasoning, and the evidence.

Status (KPIs and milestones), per the status rubric:

  • green: on track or ahead
  • yellow: progressing, behind pace
  • red: off track, stalled or distant
  • achieved: achieved (milestones)
  • unknown: unassessed: the rubric cannot judge it yet
  • not yet assessed

A KPI's status is its pace toward the goal versus the pace the goal needs, not its level. A milestone's status is its evidence-based ETA. A status changes only on newer evidence.

An endeavor's milestones are either a sequence (each expected after the one before: numbered, joined by a line) or independent fronts (any order: cards). Its timeline puts them on one time axis: the median year and the 80% range of each ETA.

Everything shown comes from an append-only ledger of verified facts, each with its sources and the date it became public. verified / corrected: checked against the source at intake. legacy: converted from the first (2025) pilot report, not verified at ingest. “As of” means only what was public by that date is included.

At a glance

Robots and Automation4d ago
AI
KPI: AI task horizon at 80% success (Human-hours; geometric mean of the software and remote-work horizons)
2.1 hours17 daily values, 2025-06-05 to 2026-09-22; range 0.043 to 2.091Jun 25Sep 263 min · 5 Jun 20253 min · 10 Jun 20255 min · 7 Aug 20256 min · 29 Sep 20256 min · 7 Oct 20257 min · 18 Nov 202511 min · 24 Nov 202514 min · 11 Dec 202515 min · 5 Feb 202619 min · 5 Mar 202632 min · 23 Apr 202639 min · 28 May 20261.1 hours · 9 Jun 20261.1 hours · 24 Jul 20261.5 hours · 1 Sep 20262.1 hours · 3 Sep 20262.1 hours · 22 Sep 2026
On track: 1.79 h (Sep 2026), doubling every ~2.9 months and not slowing
  • Automated Software Engineer
  • First Automated Scientist
  • Automated Economy Kickoff
Robots
KPI: General-purpose robots at work: the number of deployments (one robot maker at one named outside customer) in which a humanoid or other self-moving robot with arms does production work, autonomously as reported, minus those a later source says ended or credibly disputes. Provisional, for the pioneering stage: to be replaced by a measure of the work done (robots × hours × interventions) once deployments disclose it.
11 deployments45 monthly values, 2023-01-31 to 2026-09-30; range 0 to 10202320260 deployments · Jan 20230 deployments · Feb 20230 deployments · Mar 20230 deployments · Apr 20230 deployments · May 20230 deployments · Jun 20230 deployments · Jul 20230 deployments · Aug 20230 deployments · Sep 20230 deployments · Oct 20230 deployments · Nov 20230 deployments · Dec 20230 deployments · Jan 20240 deployments · Feb 20240 deployments · Mar 20240 deployments · Apr 20240 deployments · May 20240 deployments · Jun 20240 deployments · Jul 20240 deployments · Aug 20240 deployments · Sep 20240 deployments · Oct 20240 deployments · Nov 20240 deployments · Dec 20240 deployments · Jan 20250 deployments · Feb 20250 deployments · Mar 20251 deployments · Apr 20251 deployments · May 20252 deployments · Jun 20253 deployments · Jul 20253 deployments · Aug 20253 deployments · Sep 20253 deployments · Oct 20252 deployments · Nov 20253 deployments · Dec 20254 deployments · Jan 20264 deployments · Feb 20267 deployments · Mar 20268 deployments · Apr 20268 deployments · May 20269 deployments · Jun 20269 deployments · Jul 20269 deployments · Aug 202610 deployments · Sep 2026
On track: 11 robot deployments at work; net +8 in the last 12 months vs +3 the year before
  • Robotaxi Saturation
  • The "Wozniak" Test
  • The "Fukushima" Test
  • The "Blue Collar" Shift
  • The Dark Line
599 events · 7 open challengesnews per week news per week, the 16 weeks to 2026-10-22: 4, 5, 11, 15, 10, 9, 12, 6, 13, 10, 6, 17, 15, 12, 16, 13
Rockets and Space7d ago
KPI: Cost to LEO ($/kg): the cheapest published price per kg to low Earth orbit of a dedicated launch among the rockets in service, inflation-adjusted (constant 2025 $)
1673 $/kg64 annual values, 1962-12-31 to 2025-12-31; range 1673 to 177031962202517703 $/kg · 196217703 $/kg · 196317703 $/kg · 19649743 $/kg · 19659743 $/kg · 19666416 $/kg · 19676416 $/kg · 19686416 $/kg · 19696416 $/kg · 19716416 $/kg · 19726416 $/kg · 19739743 $/kg · 19749743 $/kg · 19759743 $/kg · 19769743 $/kg · 19779743 $/kg · 19789743 $/kg · 19799743 $/kg · 19809743 $/kg · 19819743 $/kg · 19829743 $/kg · 19839743 $/kg · 19846059 $/kg · 19856059 $/kg · 19876059 $/kg · 19886059 $/kg · 19896059 $/kg · 19906059 $/kg · 19916059 $/kg · 19926059 $/kg · 19936059 $/kg · 19946059 $/kg · 19956059 $/kg · 19966059 $/kg · 19976059 $/kg · 19986059 $/kg · 19996059 $/kg · 20006059 $/kg · 20026059 $/kg · 20036059 $/kg · 20046059 $/kg · 20056059 $/kg · 20066059 $/kg · 20076059 $/kg · 20086059 $/kg · 20096059 $/kg · 20106059 $/kg · 20115758 $/kg · 20125675 $/kg · 20135347 $/kg · 20145347 $/kg · 20153648 $/kg · 20161809 $/kg · 20181776 $/kg · 20191755 $/kg · 20201676 $/kg · 20211673 $/kg · 20221673 $/kg · 20231673 $/kg · 20241673 $/kg · 2025
Stalled: $1,673/kg (2025, Falcon Heavy); 2021-25 -0.04%/yr vs its own long-run -2.4%/yr
  • The Deluge
  • The Export
  • The Homestead
189 events · 3 open challengesnews per week news per week, the 16 weeks to 2026-10-22: 1, 3, 4, 1, 4, 2, 1, 4, 3, 3, 3, 3, 8, 1, 5, 0
Fusion and Energy6d ago
KPI: Worldwide average household (retail) electricity price ($/MWh): what people actually pay, population- or consumption-weighted where available, inflation-adjusted (real $)
112.9 $/MWh29 quarterly values, 2018-06-30 to 2026-03-31; range 105.1 to 136.820182026132 $/MWh · 30 Jun 2018134.6 $/MWh · 31 Mar 2019136.8 $/MWh · 30 Jun 2019129.5 $/MWh · 30 Sep 2019129.7 $/MWh · 31 Dec 2019128.4 $/MWh · 31 Mar 2020130.4 $/MWh · 30 Jun 2020127.3 $/MWh · 30 Sep 2020128.1 $/MWh · 31 Dec 2020121.9 $/MWh · 31 Mar 2021124 $/MWh · 30 Jun 2021124.1 $/MWh · 30 Sep 2021122.1 $/MWh · 31 Dec 2021112.9 $/MWh · 31 Mar 2022119.1 $/MWh · 30 Jun 2022122.6 $/MWh · 30 Sep 2022125.2 $/MWh · 31 Dec 2022111.5 $/MWh · 31 Mar 2023111.6 $/MWh · 30 Jun 2023112.6 $/MWh · 30 Sep 2023111 $/MWh · 31 Dec 2023108.5 $/MWh · 31 Mar 2024105.1 $/MWh · 30 Jun 2024113.2 $/MWh · 31 Dec 2024109.7 $/MWh · 31 Mar 2025113.1 $/MWh · 30 Jun 2025112.8 $/MWh · 30 Sep 2025114.4 $/MWh · 31 Dec 2025112.9 $/MWh · 31 Mar 2026
Behind pace: $113/MWh (2026-Q1), falling $2.90/MWh a year vs its own long-run pace of $3.51
  • The First Watt
  • Grid Parity
237 events · 3 open challengesnews per week news per week, the 16 weeks to 2026-10-22: 4, 8, 3, 3, 4, 3, 2, 5, 3, 8, 5, 5, 10, 8, 3, 4
Health and Lifespan6d ago
KPI: Median country Healthy Life Expectancy (HALE) at birth (years) — currently ~63y (WHO GHE 2021; ~72y is median life expectancy, not HALE)
63.8 years24 annual values, 2000-12-31 to 2023-12-31; range 61.3 to 63.82000202361.3 years · 200061.5 years · 200161.7 years · 200261.8 years · 200361.9 years · 200462 years · 200562.2 years · 200662.3 years · 200762.5 years · 200862.6 years · 200962.9 years · 201062.7 years · 201162.9 years · 201263.1 years · 201363.3 years · 201463.4 years · 201563.1 years · 201663.5 years · 201763.8 years · 201863.6 years · 201962.5 years · 202062.1 years · 202163.4 years · 202263.8 years · 2023
Behind pace: 63.8 yrs (2023); +0.03 yrs/yr excluding the COVID dip vs +0.13 pre-2019 trend
  • Taming Cancer
  • Precise Screening
  • Unbroken Mind
  • The Long Middle Age
304 events · 5 open challengesnews per week news per week, the 16 weeks to 2026-10-22: 4, 11, 2, 11, 4, 1, 3, 4, 6, 5, 3, 6, 7, 7, 6, 1
Climate and Environment4d ago
KPI: Atmospheric CO₂ concentration (ppm) and 10-year trend (ppm/year)
426.07 ppm823 monthly values, 1958-03-31 to 2026-09-30; range 312.42 to 432.3419582026315.71 ppm · Mar 1958318.29 ppm · May 1959318.18 ppm · Jul 1960314.99 ppm · Sep 1961316.69 ppm · Nov 1962319.57 ppm · Jan 1964320.89 ppm · Mar 1965324.08 ppm · May 1966324.09 ppm · Jun 1967322.11 ppm · Aug 1968321.78 ppm · Oct 1969325.13 ppm · Dec 1970327.63 ppm · Feb 1972331.5 ppm · Apr 1973332.2 ppm · Jun 1974329.95 ppm · Aug 1975328.72 ppm · Oct 1976333.6 ppm · Dec 1977336.69 ppm · Feb 1979340.93 ppm · Apr 1980342.54 ppm · Jun 1981340.24 ppm · Aug 1982340.53 ppm · Oct 1983343.31 ppm · Nov 1984346.78 ppm · Jan 1986349.81 ppm · Mar 1987354.35 ppm · May 1988354.05 ppm · Jul 1989351.38 ppm · Sep 1990353.89 ppm · Nov 1991357.1 ppm · Jan 1993360.11 ppm · Mar 1994363.83 ppm · May 1995363.69 ppm · Jul 1996360.44 ppm · Sep 1997365.67 ppm · Nov 1998369.45 ppm · Jan 2000371.69 ppm · Feb 2001375.19 ppm · Apr 2002378.46 ppm · Jun 2003376.17 ppm · Aug 2004377.19 ppm · Oct 2005382.02 ppm · Dec 2006386.06 ppm · Feb 2008389.76 ppm · Apr 2009392.38 ppm · Jun 2010390.33 ppm · Aug 2011391.27 ppm · Oct 2012397.03 ppm · Dec 2013400.55 ppm · Feb 2015407.6 ppm · Apr 2016409.08 ppm · Jun 2017408.9 ppm · Jul 2018408.76 ppm · Sep 2019413.1 ppm · Nov 2020418.13 ppm · Jan 2022420.99 ppm · Mar 2023426.9 ppm · May 2024427.87 ppm · Jul 2025426.07 ppm · Sep 2026
Regressing: 427.35 ppm (2025); +2.56 ppm/yr, up from 2.15 the decade before; need ≤1.79
  • The Bend
  • The Balance
  • The Ceiling
215 events · 3 open challengesnews per week news per week, the 16 weeks to 2026-10-22: 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 13, 22, 23, 17, 24, 5

Supplemental

The Knowledge Beyond7d ago
No KPI: outside the five endeavors. Indicators we track:
  • 73.6 % People using the Internet, share of the world (ITU) (2025)
  • 47.4 % Erdős problems solved (Sep 2026)
  • 1020 × Q-Day gap: qubits needed to break RSA-2048 ÷ qubits available (12 Feb 2026)
  • 166691 neurons Largest synapse-level connectome (neurons) (9 Oct 2025)
  • +3 more
Latest major developments:
  • 2026-08-30 Astronomy: On 30 August 2026 NASA's Nancy Grace Roman Space Telescope launched on a SpaceX Falcon Heavy from Kennedy Space Center toward the Sun-Earth L2 region.
  • 2026-07-23 Mathematics: On 23 July 2026 at the International Congress of Mathematicians in Philadelphia the IMU awarded the 2026 Fields Medals to Yu Deng, John Pardon, Jacob Tsimerman and Hong Wang, with Deng cited for work including the rigorous derivation of the Boltzmann equation from hard-sphere dynamics and Wang the third woman ever to receive the medal.
  • 2026-06-30 Astronomy: On 30 June 2026 the Vera C. Rubin Observatory officially began its 10-year Legacy Survey of Space and Time, observing the entire southern sky every few nights.
129 eventsnews per week news per week, the 16 weeks to 2026-10-22: 0, 0, 4, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 2, 0, 3, 0, 1, 4, 1, 0
Society and Cohesion5d ago
No KPI: outside the five endeavors. Indicators we track:
  • 89 s Doomsday Clock, seconds to midnight (2025)
  • 56 % Trust in institutions (Edelman Trust Index) (2025)
  • 39 % Trust in national government (OECD) (2024)
  • 74 % World population living in autocracies (V-Dem) (2025)
  • +2 more
Latest major developments:
  • 2026-07-16 Hugging Face disclosed on 16 July 2026 unauthorized access to internal datasets and service credentials through an intrusion involving an autonomous agent framework (it said the LLM used was not known). OpenAI said on 21 July that its models, including GPT-5.6 Sol and an internal research prototype, caused the incident during a cyber evaluation: they exploited a zero-day to gain internet access, then chained vulnerabilities and stolen credentials to reach Hugging Face’s production database and retrieve test solutions.
  • 2026-06-17 The US and Iran signed a 14-point Islamabad memorandum of understanding on 17 June 2026 to halt the war and reopen the Strait of Hormuz. The MOU had an initial duration of 60 days and called for the disposition of Iran's enriched-uranium stockpile, with at minimum on-site IAEA-supervised down-blending.
  • 2026-06-04 The IAEA reported in June 2026 that, without access to any of Iran’s four declared enrichment facilities, it could provide no information on the current size, composition or whereabouts of Iran’s enriched-uranium stockpile, last estimated as of 13 June 2025 to include 440.9 kg enriched up to 60% U-235.
155 eventsnews per week news per week, the 16 weeks to 2026-10-22: 2, 2, 3, 3, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 2, 2, 0, 2, 0, 0, 1

Robots and Automation

599 events · latest news published 2026-10-18 (4 days ago)news per week news per week, the 16 weeks to 2026-10-22: 4, 5, 11, 15, 10, 9, 12, 6, 13, 10, 6, 17, 15, 12, 16, 13

Humans have been looking to automate their lives in one way or another for most of their existence. From early domesticated animals to microwave ovens and freighter ships, automation adds a huge multiplier on human labor — we can either do more with our time, or spend less time working. The current frontier is automating intelligence itself: in software (AI) and in hardware (robots).

AI

329 events · latest news published 2026-10-18 (4 days ago)news per week news per week, the 16 weeks to 2026-10-22: 3, 4, 8, 9, 6, 8, 6, 3, 8, 9, 3, 9, 7, 9, 11, 8

KPI

AI task horizon at 80% success, software and remote work blended
2.1 hours
22 Sep 2026 · source
17 daily values, 2025-06-05 to 2026-09-22; range 0.043 to 2.091Jun 25Sep 263 min · 5 Jun 20253 min · 10 Jun 20255 min · 7 Aug 20256 min · 29 Sep 20256 min · 7 Oct 20257 min · 18 Nov 202511 min · 24 Nov 202514 min · 11 Dec 202515 min · 5 Feb 202619 min · 5 Mar 202632 min · 23 Apr 202639 min · 28 May 20261.1 hours · 9 Jun 20261.1 hours · 24 Jul 20261.5 hours · 1 Sep 20262.1 hours · 3 Sep 20262.1 hours · 22 Sep 2026
updated irregularly
On track: 1.79 h (Sep 2026), doubling every ~2.9 months and not slowing · assessed 2026-10-18

The horizon rose from about 3 minutes in June 2025 to 1.79 hours in September 2026, doubling roughly every 2.9 months. The status asks whether it keeps its own pace: the later half of that period doubled no more slowly than the earlier half (about 2.6 vs 3.0 months, a difference within the noise), so the status is green. The main caveat: the remote-work component's conversion to hours rests on an assumed curve; that shifts the pace of both periods nearly alike, so it hardly affects the comparison.

How the KPI is built: ECI, RLI, their conversions to hours, the cross-checks

The KPI, as defined: AI task horizon at 80% success (Human-hours; geometric mean of the software and remote-work horizons)

Task horizon (METR 2025): the length of task, in the hours a skilled human professional needs for it, that AI completes on its own at a given success rate. We track the 80% horizon: the task length at which the best released model succeeds four times out of five. It grows as AI can be trusted with longer stretches of work, which is what this endeavor's milestones need.

METR measured horizons directly, but stopped updating in September 2026; the shaded span below covers the models it measured, by release date (the last one was released in April 2026). The KPI is built instead from two indices that keep being updated, each converted into METR-style hours: software from the Epoch Capabilities Index (ECI) and remote work from the Remote Labor Index (RLI); the KPI is their geometric mean. The right-hand scales show the raw index values that correspond to each height. Where METR's own measurements exist (hollow dots) they track the ECI line: the conversion was fitted on them. Hover over any point for the model.

Pace: the legend gives each solid line's doubling time since June 2025. METR's measurements doubled about every 9 months until May 2024, then every 3.4 months (the dashed line). The software line keeps that pace. Up to February 2026 (the newest model the conversion was fitted on) the match is built in; since then it means ECI has kept climbing at the same rate.

AI task horizon at 80% success, the KPI and its parts over time (log scale)the KPI (blend): ×2 every 2.8 monthssoftware, from ECI: ×2 every 3.2 monthsremote work, from RLI: ×2 every 2.5 monthsMETR measuredMETR's trend since May 2024: ×2 every 3.4 monthsSWE-Marathon measured, best modelUK AISI cyber (level not comparable)80% task horizon (log scale)20232024202520261 min10 min1 h10 hmodels METR measured (by release date)no METRdata afterECI130140150160170RLI1%2%5%10%20%50%METR measured: the trend of its frontier since May 2024, ×2 every 3.4 months, extended past its last measurement2023-03-14: GPT-4 (Mar 2023), ECI 125.74 → software 50 s2024-01-25: GPT-4 Turbo (Nov 2023), ECI 126.43 → software 58 s2024-02-29: Claude 3 Opus, ECI 126.9 → software 1 min2024-04-09: GPT-4 Turbo (Apr 2024), ECI 127.27 → software 1.1 min2024-05-13: GPT-4o (May 2024), ECI 128.99 → software 1.4 min2024-06-20: Claude 3.5 Sonnet, ECI 130.0 → software 1.6 min2024-09-12: o1 Mini, ECI 135.7 → software 3.9 min2024-12-17: o1, ECI 141.72 → software 9.9 min2025-03-31: Gemini 2.5 Pro (Mar 2025), ECI 143.96 → software 14 min2025-04-16: o3, ECI 146.73 → software 21 min2025-06-10: o3 Pro, ECI 147.33 → software 24 min2025-08-07: GPT-5, ECI 150.0 → software 36 min2025-10-07: GPT-5 Pro, ECI 150.59 → software 39 min2025-11-18: Gemini 3 Pro, ECI 153.07 → software 57 min2025-12-11: GPT-5.2 Pro, ECI 156.33 → software 1.6 h2026-02-05: GPT-5.3 Codex, ECI 157.09 → software 1.8 h2026-03-05: GPT-5.4 Pro, ECI 159.57 → software 2.6 h2026-04-23: GPT-5.5 Pro, ECI 162.91 → software 4.3 h2026-06-09: Claude Fable 5, ECI 163.42 → software 4.7 h2026-07-24: Claude Opus 5, ECI 163.94 → software 5.1 h2026-09-01: Claude Fable 5.1, ECI 166.49 → software 7.5 h2026-09-03: GPT-6 Astra, ECI 168.81 → software 11 h2026-09-22: Claude Opus 5.5, ECI 168.83 → software 11 h2025-06-05: Gemini 2.5 Pro, RLI 0.83% → remote work 18 s2025-08-07: GPT-5, RLI 1.67% → remote work 43 s2025-09-29: Claude Sonnet 4.5, RLI 2.08% → remote work 58 s2025-11-24: Claude Opus 4.5, RLI 3.75% → remote work 2 min2026-02-05: Claude Opus 4.6, RLI 4.17% → remote work 2.3 min2026-04-23: GPT-5.5, RLI 6.25% → remote work 3.8 min2026-05-28: Claude Opus 4.8, RLI 8.33% → remote work 5.7 min2026-06-09: Claude Fable 5, RLI 16.1% → remote work 15 min2026-09-01: Claude Fable 5.1, RLI 17.92% → remote work 18 min2026-09-03: GPT-6 Astra, RLI 20.83% → remote work 23 min2026-09-22: Claude Opus 5.5, RLI 21.25% → remote work 24 min2025-06-05: the KPI, √(software × remote work) = 2.6 min (o3 + Gemini 2.5 Pro)2025-06-10: the KPI, √(software × remote work) = 2.7 min (o3 Pro + Gemini 2.5 Pro)2025-08-07: the KPI, √(software × remote work) = 5 min (GPT-5 + GPT-5)2025-09-29: the KPI, √(software × remote work) = 5.8 min (GPT-5 + Claude Sonnet 4.5)2025-10-07: the KPI, √(software × remote work) = 6.1 min (GPT-5 Pro + Claude Sonnet 4.5)2025-11-18: the KPI, √(software × remote work) = 7.3 min (Gemini 3 Pro + Claude Sonnet 4.5)2025-11-24: the KPI, √(software × remote work) = 11 min (Gemini 3 Pro + Claude Opus 4.5)2025-12-11: the KPI, √(software × remote work) = 14 min (GPT-5.2 Pro + Claude Opus 4.5)2026-02-05: the KPI, √(software × remote work) = 15 min (GPT-5.3 Codex + Claude Opus 4.6)2026-03-05: the KPI, √(software × remote work) = 19 min (GPT-5.4 Pro + Claude Opus 4.6)2026-04-23: the KPI, √(software × remote work) = 32 min (GPT-5.5 Pro + GPT-5.5)2026-05-28: the KPI, √(software × remote work) = 39 min (GPT-5.5 Pro + Claude Opus 4.8)2026-06-09: the KPI, √(software × remote work) = 1.1 h (Claude Fable 5 + Claude Fable 5)2026-07-24: the KPI, √(software × remote work) = 1.1 h (Claude Opus 5 + Claude Fable 5)2026-09-01: the KPI, √(software × remote work) = 1.5 h (Claude Fable 5.1 + Claude Fable 5.1)2026-09-03: the KPI, √(software × remote work) = 2.1 h (GPT-6 Astra + GPT-6 Astra)2026-09-22: the KPI, √(software × remote work) = 2.1 h (Claude Opus 5.5 + Claude Opus 5.5)2023-03-14: GPT-4, METR measured 53 s2024-04-09: GPT-4 Turbo, METR measured 56 s2024-05-13: GPT-4o, METR measured 1.3 min2024-06-20: Claude 3.5 Sonnet, METR measured 1.7 min2024-09-12: o1 Preview, METR measured 4.4 min2024-12-05: o1, METR measured 7.1 min2025-02-24: Claude 3.7 Sonnet, METR measured 12 min2025-04-16: o3, METR measured 30 min2025-08-07: GPT-5, METR measured 38 min2025-11-18: Gemini 3 Pro, METR measured 54 min2025-12-11: GPT-5.2, METR measured 1.1 h2026-02-05: Claude Opus 4.6, METR measured 1.2 h2026-02-19: Gemini 3.1 Pro, METR measured 1.5 h2026-04-07: Claude Mythos Preview Early, METR measured 3.1 h2026-05-28: Claude Opus 4.8, SWE-Marathon measured 9.9 h2026-09-02: Muse Spark 1.3, SWE-Marathon measured 11 h2026-09-22: Muse Spark 1.3, SWE-Marathon measured 11 h2026-10-09: Muse Wonder Full, SWE-Marathon measured 16 h2024-12-17: o1, UK AISI cyber (2.5M-token cap) 5.6 min2025-02-24: Claude 3.7 Sonnet, UK AISI cyber (2.5M-token cap) 6.3 min2025-05-22: Claude Opus 4, UK AISI cyber (2.5M-token cap) 8.5 min2025-08-07: GPT-5, UK AISI cyber (2.5M-token cap) 10 min2025-09-29: Claude Sonnet 4.5, UK AISI cyber (2.5M-token cap) 16 min2025-11-24: Claude Opus 4.5, UK AISI cyber (2.5M-token cap) 24 min2026-02-05: GPT-5.3 Codex, UK AISI cyber (2.5M-token cap) 42 min2026-04-07: Claude Mythos Preview, UK AISI cyber (2.5M-token cap) 4.8 h
Solid-line paces are since June 2025, the KPI's window. The remote-work pace rests on an assumed curve (see the remote-work section).

Software: the Epoch Capabilities Index (ECI), converted to hours

ECI, by Epoch AI, merges dozens of benchmarks (coding, maths, science, agentic tasks) into one capability score per model (anchored at Claude 3.5 Sonnet = 130, GPT-5 = 150), on a scale that keeps working after any single benchmark saturates. It is a general score, not a software one, and says nothing about hours: both come from the conversion below, which is fitted on METR's software tasks. ECI's own inputs include METR's horizons and RLI (the KPI's other half); refitting it without them moves no model by more than 0.22 points, a twentieth of a doubling.

The conversion is a straight-line fit on the 21 models that both METR and Epoch scored (chart): each +4.5 ECI points doubles METR's 80% horizon, i.e. log₂(horizon in minutes) = −28.24 + 0.2226 × ECI. ECI 150 → 36 min, 160 → 2.8 h, 166.8 → 7.9 h. The fit is tight (R² 0.97), and a single model typically lands within half a doubling of the line (the band). Its weak point: today's frontier is ~10 ECI points (about two doublings) beyond the highest-scoring model of that sample, and METR's series has ended, so the line is extrapolated. Its top end is also thin: GPT-5.3 Codex, the sample's highest model, has an ECI from just four benchmarks; without it, today's horizon would read 14% higher (9.1 h, not 7.9 h), well inside the band. The cross-checks below test the line at the frontier.

Converting ECI to a METR-equivalent 80% horizon: the calibration fitMETR measured (21 models Epoch also scored)the fit: ×2 every 4.5 ECI points±0.5 doublings (typical miss)today's frontierUK AISI cyber, models with an ECI score (compare the slope, not the level)80% horizon (human hours, log scale)125130135140145150155160165170Epoch Capabilities Index1 min10 min1 h10 h← fitted on these modelsextrapolated →GPT-4 (Mar 2023) (2023-03-14): ECI 125.88, METR measured 53 s; the line says 52 sGPT-4 Turbo (Nov 2023) (2023-11-06): ECI 126.46, METR measured 47 s; the line says 56 sClaude 3 Opus (2024-03-04): ECI 126.91, METR measured 38 s; the line says 1 minGPT-4 Turbo (Apr 2024) (2024-04-09): ECI 127.25, METR measured 56 s; the line says 1.1 minGPT-4o (May 2024) (2024-05-13): ECI 129.05, METR measured 1.3 min; the line says 1.4 minClaude 3.5 Sonnet (2024-06-20): ECI 130.00, METR measured 1.7 min; the line says 1.6 minClaude 3.5 Sonnet (October 2024) (2024-10-22): ECI 133.53, METR measured 2.6 min; the line says 2.8 mino1-preview (2024-09-12): ECI 134.78, METR measured 4.4 min; the line says 3.4 minClaude 3.7 Sonnet (2025-02-24): ECI 141.14, METR measured 12 min; the line says 9 mino1 (2024-12-05): ECI 141.84, METR measured 7.1 min; the line says 10 minClaude Opus 4 (2025-05-22): ECI 142.65, METR measured 20 min; the line says 11 minClaude Opus 4.1 (2025-08-05): ECI 144.09, METR measured 23 min; the line says 14 mino3 (2025-04-16): ECI 146.87, METR measured 30 min; the line says 22 minGPT-5 (2025-08-07): ECI 150.00, METR measured 38 min; the line says 36 minClaude Opus 4.5 (2025-11-24): ECI 150.17, METR measured 49 min; the line says 36 minGemini 3 Pro (2025-11-18): ECI 152.90, METR measured 54 min; the line says 56 minGPT-5.2 (2025-12-11): ECI 153.46, METR measured 1.1 h; the line says 1 hGemini 3.1 Pro (2026-02-19): ECI 154.67, METR measured 1.5 h; the line says 1.2 hClaude Opus 4.6 (2026-02-05): ECI 155.27, METR measured 1.2 h; the line says 1.3 hGPT-5.4 (2026-03-05): ECI 156.72, METR measured 54 min; the line says 1.7 hGPT-5.3 Codex (2026-02-05): ECI 156.76, METR measured 55 min; the line says 1.7 ho1: ECI 141.84, UK AISI cyber horizon 5.6 min (2.5M-token cap: its level sits lower; its rise per ECI point is what it checks)Claude 3.7 Sonnet: ECI 141.14, UK AISI cyber horizon 6.3 min (2.5M-token cap: its level sits lower; its rise per ECI point is what it checks)Claude Opus 4: ECI 142.65, UK AISI cyber horizon 8.5 min (2.5M-token cap: its level sits lower; its rise per ECI point is what it checks)GPT-5: ECI 150.00, UK AISI cyber horizon 9.9 min (2.5M-token cap: its level sits lower; its rise per ECI point is what it checks)Claude Sonnet 4.5: ECI 146.83, UK AISI cyber horizon 16 min (2.5M-token cap: its level sits lower; its rise per ECI point is what it checks)Claude Opus 4.5: ECI 150.17, UK AISI cyber horizon 24 min (2.5M-token cap: its level sits lower; its rise per ECI point is what it checks)Claude Opus 4.6: ECI 155.27, UK AISI cyber horizon 40 min (2.5M-token cap: its level sits lower; its rise per ECI point is what it checks)GPT-5.3 Codex: ECI 156.76, UK AISI cyber horizon 42 min (2.5M-token cap: its level sits lower; its rise per ECI point is what it checks)GPT-5.5: ECI 158.95, UK AISI cyber horizon 2.5 h (2.5M-token cap: its level sits lower; its rise per ECI point is what it checks)today's frontier, Claude Opus 5.5: ECI 168.83 → 11 h (on the line, by construction)Claude Opus 5.5: 11 h
AI software task horizon at 80% success (METR-equivalent, from ECI)
10.8 hours
22 Sep 2026 · source
23 daily values, 2023-03-14 to 2026-09-22; range 0.014 to 10.813202320261 min · 14 Mar 20231 min · 25 Jan 20241 min · 29 Feb 20241 min · 9 Apr 20241 min · 13 May 20242 min · 20 Jun 20244 min · 12 Sep 202410 min · 17 Dec 202414 min · 31 Mar 202521 min · 16 Apr 202524 min · 10 Jun 202536 min · 7 Aug 202539 min · 7 Oct 202557 min · 18 Nov 20251.6 hours · 11 Dec 20251.8 hours · 5 Feb 20262.6 hours · 5 Mar 20264.3 hours · 23 Apr 20264.7 hours · 9 Jun 20265.1 hours · 24 Jul 20267.5 hours · 1 Sep 202610.8 hours · 3 Sep 202610.8 hours · 22 Sep 2026
updated irregularly
Epoch Capabilities Index, by model release
168.83 ECI
22 Sep 2026 · source
23 daily values, 2023-03-14 to 2026-09-22; range 125.74 to 168.8320232026125.74 ECI · 14 Mar 2023126.43 ECI · 25 Jan 2024126.9 ECI · 29 Feb 2024127.27 ECI · 9 Apr 2024128.99 ECI · 13 May 2024130 ECI · 20 Jun 2024135.7 ECI · 12 Sep 2024141.72 ECI · 17 Dec 2024143.96 ECI · 31 Mar 2025146.73 ECI · 16 Apr 2025147.33 ECI · 10 Jun 2025150 ECI · 7 Aug 2025150.59 ECI · 7 Oct 2025153.07 ECI · 18 Nov 2025156.33 ECI · 11 Dec 2025157.09 ECI · 5 Feb 2026159.57 ECI · 5 Mar 2026162.91 ECI · 23 Apr 2026163.42 ECI · 9 Jun 2026163.94 ECI · 24 Jul 2026166.49 ECI · 1 Sep 2026168.81 ECI · 3 Sep 2026168.83 ECI · 22 Sep 2026
updated irregularly

Remote work: the Remote Labor Index (RLI), converted to hours

RLI, by the Center for AI Safety and Scale AI (paper), gives AI agents 240 real paid Upwork projects (design, video, 3D, data analysis, games, …; median 11.5 human hours, mean 29 h) and reports one number per model: the automation rate, the share of deliverables expert graders judge as good as the professional's. It measures messy, economically real work end to end.

The conversion uses METR's model of how success falls with task length (METR 2025): each doubling of a task cuts a model's odds of success by about 1.8× (METR's cross-domain average). We slide that curve along the length axis until its average success over RLI's project lengths (the bars) equals the measured automation rate; the curve's 50% point is then the 50% horizon, and its 80% point, always 5× shorter, the 80% horizon. Under this model, 21% of mostly day-long projects done means: reliable (80%) on 24-minute tasks, a coin flip (50%) at 2 hours, and the long projects mostly fail. The odds factor is assumed: across METR's own models it varies enough to put the 80% level anywhere from ~1.8× lower to ~1.5× higher, and its doubling time anywhere from 2.2 to 2.9 months (2.5 with the factor we use). So the remote side's level is the less certain one, and its pace is an estimate, not a measurement.

Converting the RLI automation rate to a horizon: METR's success-vs-length curve over RLI's projectsSep 2026 (Claude Opus 5.5): 21.25% of RLI projects doneSep 2025 (Claude Sonnet 4.5): 2.08%RLI's projects by length (240; 201 with times, reconstructed)chance of success1 min10 min1 h10 h100 h0%20%50%80%100%010203040RLI projects per bar1 RLI projects take 29 min–50 min9 RLI projects take 50 min–1.4 h5 RLI projects take 1.4 h–2.4 h10 RLI projects take 2.4 h–4 h38 RLI projects take 4 h–6.8 h36 RLI projects take 6.8 h–11 h31 RLI projects take 11 h–19 h27 RLI projects take 19 h–33 h14 RLI projects take 33 h–56 h16 RLI projects take 56 h–94 h8 RLI projects take 94 h–159 h4 RLI projects take 159 h–269 h2025-09-29: RLI 2.08% → 50% horizon 4.6 min, 80% horizon 58 s2026-09-22: RLI 21.25% → 50% horizon 2 h, 80% horizon 24 min80% horizon 24 min50% horizon 2 htask length (human hours, log scale)
AI remote-work task horizon at 80% success (from the Remote Labor Index)
24 min
22 Sep 2026 · source
11 daily values, 2025-06-05 to 2026-09-22; range 0.005 to 0.404Jun 25Sep 260 min · 5 Jun 20251 min · 7 Aug 20251 min · 29 Sep 20252 min · 24 Nov 20252 min · 5 Feb 20264 min · 23 Apr 20266 min · 28 May 202615 min · 9 Jun 202618 min · 1 Sep 202623 min · 3 Sep 202624 min · 22 Sep 2026
updated irregularly
Remote Labor Index automation rate, by model release
21.25 %
22 Sep 2026 · source
11 daily values, 2025-06-05 to 2026-09-22; range 0.83 to 21.25Jun 25Sep 260.83 % · 5 Jun 20251.67 % · 7 Aug 20252.08 % · 29 Sep 20253.75 % · 24 Nov 20254.17 % · 5 Feb 20266.25 % · 23 Apr 20268.33 % · 28 May 202616.1 % · 9 Jun 202617.92 % · 1 Sep 202620.83 % · 3 Sep 202621.25 % · 22 Sep 2026
updated irregularly

The blend, and how the status is judged

The KPI is the geometric mean, √(software × remote work): the average on a log scale, so each side counts equally in doublings. Each side takes the best released model in its own domain (they may be different models), so the blend is a composite of two estimates, not one model's measured horizon. A doubling of either raises the KPI by √2; while both grow steadily, the KPI's doubling time is the harmonic mean of theirs (since June 2025: software 3.6 months, remote work 2.5, the KPI 2.9). The gap between the sides (about 20× in 2026, two benchmarks and two conversions apart) is roughly the gap between "AI can code it" and "AI can do the job".

Status: whether the KPI keeps its own pace. The assessment compares the doubling time in the second half of the data since June 2025 with the first half. Green while it holds or speeds up (a difference within noise counts as holding), yellow when it clearly slows, red when it stalls. There is no outside pace to measure it against: METR's long-run figure, about 7 months, averages the slow years before 2024 with the fast ones since, and it applies to the software side only. The remote side's pace depends on the success curve we assume (see its section), but a different curve would speed up or slow down both halves by about the same factor, so the halves can still be compared.

Cross-checks: is the ECI conversion still right at the frontier?

  • SWE-Marathon runs METR's method on 20 long software tasks (4–400 h), so it measures 80% horizons directly. The check tile compares the horizon SWE-Marathon measures with the one the ECI line gives the same model: log₂(measured ÷ converted), averaged over the models within 5 ECI points of the frontier. 0 means they agree, +1 that the measured horizon is twice the converted one, −1 half. It is now about 0 across nine frontier models (single models scatter about ±1 doubling), after +2.2 in May 2026 on one model alone. The diamonds in the first chart are SWE-Marathon's best model each time, some without an ECI score, so they sit above that average. With a few tasks almost always solved and many almost never, it is too coarse to track the pace.
  • METR check: the same comparison for METR's own models, in-sample (the line was fitted on them). It ends in March 2026 (METR's last model has no ECI score) at −0.4: its newest models measured somewhat shorter than the line gives them.
  • Terminal-Bench 4.0 (long command-line tasks, not part of ECI): an independent success rate. Its tasks' human-time estimates do not predict which tasks fail, so it yields no horizon, only a second pace signal.
AI software task horizon at 80% success, measured on SWE-Marathon
16.1 hours
9 Oct 2026 · source
4 daily values, 2026-05-28 to 2026-10-09; range 9.935 to 16.116May 26Oct 269.9 hours · 28 May 202611.1 hours · 2 Sep 202611.1 hours · 22 Sep 202616.1 hours · 9 Oct 2026
updated irregularly
SWE-Marathon check: measured vs ECI-converted horizon, in doublings (0 = they agree)
-0.51 doublings
Sep 2026 · source
5 monthly values, 2026-05-31 to 2026-09-30; range -0.51 to 2.06May 26Sep 262.06 doublings · May 20261.34 doublings · Jun 20260.8 doublings · Jul 20260.8 doublings · Aug 2026-0.51 doublings · Sep 2026
METR check: measured vs ECI-converted horizon, in doublings (0 = they agree)
-0.53 doublings
Mar 2026 · source
37 monthly values, 2023-03-31 to 2026-03-31; range -0.53 to 0.68202320260.08 doublings · Mar 20230.08 doublings · Apr 20230.08 doublings · May 20230.08 doublings · Jun 20230.08 doublings · Jul 20230.08 doublings · Aug 20230.08 doublings · Sep 20230.08 doublings · Oct 2023-0.09 doublings · Nov 2023-0.09 doublings · Dec 2023-0.09 doublings · Jan 2024-0.09 doublings · Feb 2024-0.28 doublings · Mar 2024-0.26 doublings · Apr 2024-0.23 doublings · May 2024-0.19 doublings · Jun 2024-0.19 doublings · Jul 2024-0.19 doublings · Aug 20240.43 doublings · Sep 20240.17 doublings · Oct 20240.17 doublings · Nov 2024-0.48 doublings · Dec 2024-0.48 doublings · Jan 2025-0.02 doublings · Feb 2025-0.02 doublings · Mar 20250.48 doublings · Apr 20250.68 doublings · May 20250.68 doublings · Jun 20250.68 doublings · Jul 20250.3 doublings · Aug 20250.3 doublings · Sep 20250.3 doublings · Oct 20250.16 doublings · Nov 20250 doublings · Dec 20250 doublings · Jan 2026-0.22 doublings · Feb 2026-0.53 doublings · Mar 2026
Terminal-Bench 4.0: best success rate (not part of ECI)
64.85 %
22 Sep 2026 · source
6 daily values, 2026-05-28 to 2026-09-22; range 23.64 to 64.85May 26Sep 2623.64 % · 28 May 202644.55 % · 9 Jun 202653.94 % · 24 Jul 202657.88 % · 1 Sep 202658.18 % · 3 Sep 202664.85 % · 22 Sep 2026
updated irregularly

UK AISI's cyber time horizon: checks the conversion's slope (hours per ECI point), not its level

The UK AI Security Institute measures 80% horizons on its own capture-the-flag cyber tasks: doubling every 4.7 months since late 2024 (fitted through February 2026), with Claude Mythos Preview and GPT-5.5 above that trend (red triangles in the charts above). AISI publishes only a chart, so its values here are read off the figure.

Why its hours are not comparable: each task run is capped at 2.5M tokens with a simple agent scaffold, which lowers success on purpose (AISI: uncapped horizons "would be significantly higher"); the tasks are narrow cyber skills, not METR's software suite; and the newest models saturate the suite (its longest task is 12 h, only six are 8 h or longer). Against the ECI line its horizons sit about 0.8 doublings lower on average (from −1.8 to +0.1 by model). So it cannot be pooled into the software calibration: that would mix two scales of hours.

What it can check is the slope, the part the frontier extrapolation rests on. Across the 9 models that also have an ECI score (the triangles in the ECI chart; Mythos Preview, the 4.8 h in the tile below, has none), AISI's horizons double every 4.6 ECI points, against the conversion's 4.5. But that leans on GPT-5.5, which AISI calls highly uncertain; without it, every 5.6 points (about 20% flatter), and no model beyond the calibration range is left. So: compatible with the conversion's slope, too uncertain to validate its extrapolation. If only the slope beyond the calibration range were that flatter one, today's software horizon would be about 1.4× too high, within the half-doubling a single model typically misses the line by.

UK AISI cyber task horizon at 80% success (2.5M-token cap; not METR-comparable)
4.8 hours
7 Apr 2026 · source
8 daily values, 2024-12-17 to 2026-04-07; range 0.093 to 4.836Dec 24Apr 266 min · 17 Dec 20246 min · 24 Feb 20259 min · 22 May 202510 min · 7 Aug 202516 min · 29 Sep 202524 min · 24 Nov 202542 min · 5 Feb 20264.8 hours · 7 Apr 2026
updated irregularly
How the status was judged: the data window, the pace benchmark, the rule
Assessed quantity
horizon-80-blended: blended AI task horizon at 80% success (human hours), sqrt(horizon-80-software-eci x horizon-80-remote-rli) of the release-cohort frontier, one row per date either component changed; goal_direction up (framework.yaml KPI: 'AI task horizon at 80% success (Human-hours; geometric mean of the software and remote-work horizons)')
Window
Current
Span
2025-06-05..2026-09-22 (all available; the 26 days to made_at are unmeasured, not flat)
Frontier points
2025-06-050.0432025-06-100.0452025-08-070.0842025-09-290.0962025-10-070.1022025-11-180.122025-11-240.1742025-12-110.2222026-02-050.2512026-03-050.2982026-04-230.492026-05-280.5982026-06-090.992026-07-241.0262026-09-011.3112026-09-031.7052026-09-221.79
N points
17
Start end (h)
0.043, 1.79
Growth factor
41.6
Doubling months OLS
2.92
Doubling months OLS 95% CI
2.74, 3.12
R²
0.986
Doubling months endpoint
2.89
Split
midpoint of the measured span, 2026-01-28
First half
Span
2025-06-05..2026-01-28
N
8
Values (h)
0.043, 0.222
Doubling months OLS
3.02
OLS 95% CI
2.39, 4.1
Doubling months endpoint
3.29
Second half
Span
2026-01-28..2026-09-22
N
9
Values (h)
0.222, 1.79
Doubling months OLS
2.63
OLS 95% CI
2.26, 3.16
Doubling months endpoint
2.59
Components
horizon-80-software-eci (2025-06-10..2026-09-22, n=13)
Doubling months OLS
3.6
OLS 95% CI
3.26, 4.01
(h)
0.394, 7.93
Halves months audit
3.6, 3.68
horizon-80-remote-rli (2025-06-05..2026-09-22, n=11)
Doubling months OLS
2.55
OLS 95% CI
2.23, 2.98
(h)
0.005, 0.404
Halves months audit
2.17, 2.1
Robustness
second half never slower than the first: split at the midpoint of the window to made_at (2026-02-10) 3.11 then 2.64 mo; audit convention (frontier in force at the split counted in the second half, n=10) 2.60 mo, CI 2.30-3.00; counting the 26-day gap to made_at flat (robustness only) the second-half endpoint is 2.87 mo, still <= the first half's 3.02 (OLS) / 3.29 (endpoint); without the 2026-09-22 point full OLS 2.93 mo; without the 2026-06-09 RLI step 2.95 mo; the remote half's assumed success-curve slope (BETA 0.5/0.6/0.7: remote 2.2/2.55/2.9 mo) scales both halves alike, so it leaves the half comparison largely unchanged (audit 2026-10-18-horizon-pace)
Source
uv run core/ledger.py series robots-software horizon-80-blended --as-of 2026-10-18 (and the two component series and metr-80-horizon-by-release); byte-identical to prev's output (md5 0446e4ac... blended, e1a7c7b8... software, c0536cf7... remote, 90946e9d... METR p80)
Previous
Span
first half of the series (the spec's comparison; the blend has no data before 2025-06)
Doubling months OLS
3.02
Doubling months endpoint
3.29
Change
second half 2.63 mo (OLS) / 2.59 mo (endpoint) vs first half 3.02 / 3.29 mo: holding (point estimate slightly faster; the 95% intervals 2.26-3.16 and 2.39-4.10 overlap, so not 'accelerating')
Method
dated frontier rows of the series; OLS of log2(hours) on months (30.44-day), t-based 95% CI; half split at the midpoint of the measured span, the frontier in force at the split being the last first-half value; script stats.py (inlined in the run's notes)
Benchmark
Tier 3, own series: the blend keeps its own pace (second-half doubling time no longer than the first half's 3.02 mo OLS / 3.29 mo endpoint); observed 2.63 / 2.59 mo
Benchmark source
metrics/kpi-assessment.csv (commit 9d9ca5f; RUBRIC §3 tier 3 clarified 2026-10-18): own series (horizon-80-blended, from 2025-06, < 5 years); no external required path or milestone-implied pace exists, and METR's long-run ~7-month doubling (event 2025-03-19-metr-long-tasks-doubling-rv; ledger metr-80-horizon-by-release 2019-02..2026-04: 6.37 mo) is neither on the blend's scale nor current: METR's p80 frontier broke in 2024-05, ~9.2 mo per doubling before, 3.40 mo (CI 3.04-3.86) after (ledger/audits/2026-10-18-horizon-pace)
Data as of
2026-09-22 (latest frontier point, Claude Opus 5.5: ECI 166.82, RLI 21.25%; irregular series, 26 days before made_at, not stale)
Change
Status unchanged (green); benchmark changed. Prev 2026-10-18-kpi-2 (run 20261018T104726Z) judged green against METR's long-run ~7-month doubling time. The owner's audit 2026-10-18-horizon-pace replaced that benchmark by a reviewed registry edit (metrics/kpi-assessment.csv, commit 9d9ca5f): the blend must keep its own pace (second half vs first half). No new event or observation since prev (all 194 events retrieved <= 2026-10-16; the four series outputs byte-identical), and prev's stats.py reproduces every number. Under the new test the second half (2.63 mo) is no slower than the first (3.02 mo), so green holds. Label: verdict Ahead -> On track (keeping the needed pace rather than beating an outside one), and the second-half pace ('2.6 lately') is dropped because the halves' intervals overlap (RUBRIC §6).
Rubric rule
KPI green: the window trend moves in the goal direction (up) and keeps its own pace: the second half's doubling time is no longer than the first half's, or slower with overlapping 95% intervals (metrics/kpi-assessment.csv row robots-software: all available data from 2025-06, >= 4 frontier points, first vs second half on the log scale; yellow if clearly slower but rising, red if flat or falling)
by assess:20261018T125113Z · 6 evidence event(s)
Evidence and news: 6 cited by the assessment, 23 other KPI news

Cited evidence (6)

Other events (23)

  • 2026-09-22 · analysis · ●○○ · published 2026-09-22verified
    METR's pre-deployment evaluation summary of Claude Opus 5.5 (Sep 22, 2026) gave no time-horizon estimate, testing five long-horizon AI R&D tasks instead, and judged the model an incremental, on-trend improvement over Claude Fable 5.1 that is unlikely to fully automate AI R&D, citing a preliminary estimate of about 1.5× AI-driven acceleration of capability progress (about 30% chance of 2×).
  • 2026-06-26 · data · ●●○ · published 2026-06-26verified
    METR's pre-deployment evaluation of GPT-5.6 Sol (Jun 26, 2026) gave a TH1.1 50% time horizon of about 11.3 h (95% CI 5–40 h) with cheating attempts scored as failures, beyond 270 h if counted as successes and 71 h (95% CI 13–11,400 h) if discarded; METR said none is a robust measurement because the model's detected cheating rate was the highest of any public model it had evaluated on its ReAct harness.
  • 2026-04-16 · analysis · ●●○ · published 2026-04-16verified
    Epoch AI's report 'Have AI capabilities accelerated?' (Apr 16, 2026) found strong evidence that progress sped up on three of four metrics (the ECI, log METR 50% time horizon and a combined math index, but not WeirdML V2), best fit by separate linear trends for reasoning and non-reasoning models, with reasoning models showing a one-off jump and a roughly 2–3× faster trend.
  • 2026-04-15 · data · ●●○ · published 2026-04-15verified
    METR added Gemini 3.1 Pro to its time-horizon page on Apr 15, 2026 with an 80% time horizon of 89.8 min (95% CI 52–159 min), the highest 80% horizon it had then measured (Claude Opus 4.6: 69.9 min), and a 50% horizon of 384 min; GPT-5.4, added on Apr 10, measured 341.7 min (50%) and 53.9 min (80%).
  • 2026-03-20 · analysis · ●●○ · published 2026-03-20corrected
    A METR research note (Mar 20, 2026) found that, for recent models, reasonable alternative fits of its task-length-to-success model decrease 50% time horizons by up to 35% and increase 80% time horizons by up to 100%, while task-distribution uncertainty in its ~230-task suite (none longer than 30 h), shown in the confidence intervals, is often a factor of 2 in both directions.
  • +18 older event(s): the section's event log
7 more metric(s) we track
Largest AI-written code contribution merged (lines)
1009257 lines
14 May 2026 · source
2 daily values, 2026-02-24 to 2026-05-14; range 30550 to 1.00926e+06Feb 26May 2630550 lines · 24 Feb 20261.00926e+06 lines · 14 May 2026
updated irregularly
Highest venue tier of an accepted AI-generated paper
1 tier
12 Mar 2025 · source
updated irregularly
AI task horizon at 50% success, software and remote work blended
11.2 hours
22 Sep 2026 · source
17 daily values, 2025-06-05 to 2026-09-22; range 0.223 to 11.202Jun 25Sep 2613 min · 5 Jun 202514 min · 10 Jun 202526 min · 7 Aug 202530 min · 29 Sep 202532 min · 7 Oct 202538 min · 18 Nov 202556 min · 24 Nov 20251.2 hours · 11 Dec 20251.4 hours · 5 Feb 20261.6 hours · 5 Mar 20262.8 hours · 23 Apr 20263.4 hours · 28 May 20265.8 hours · 9 Jun 20266.1 hours · 24 Jul 20268.1 hours · 1 Sep 202611.0 hours · 3 Sep 202611.2 hours · 22 Sep 2026
updated irregularly
AI remote-work task horizon at 50% success (from the Remote Labor Index)
2.0 hours
22 Sep 2026 · source
11 daily values, 2025-06-05 to 2026-09-22; range 0.025 to 2.005Jun 25Sep 262 min · 5 Jun 20254 min · 7 Aug 20255 min · 29 Sep 202510 min · 24 Nov 202511 min · 5 Feb 202619 min · 23 Apr 202628 min · 28 May 20261.3 hours · 9 Jun 20261.5 hours · 1 Sep 20261.9 hours · 3 Sep 20262.0 hours · 22 Sep 2026
updated irregularly
AI software task horizon at 50% success (METR-equivalent, from ECI)
62.6 hours
22 Sep 2026 · source
23 daily values, 2023-03-14 to 2026-09-22; range 0.072 to 62.585202320264 min · 14 Mar 20235 min · 25 Jan 20245 min · 29 Feb 20246 min · 9 Apr 20247 min · 13 May 20248 min · 20 Jun 202421 min · 12 Sep 202453 min · 17 Dec 20241.3 hours · 31 Mar 20251.9 hours · 16 Apr 20252.1 hours · 10 Jun 20253.3 hours · 7 Aug 20253.6 hours · 7 Oct 20255.3 hours · 18 Nov 20258.8 hours · 11 Dec 20259.9 hours · 5 Feb 202614.6 hours · 5 Mar 202624.7 hours · 23 Apr 202626.8 hours · 9 Jun 202629.0 hours · 24 Jul 202643.3 hours · 1 Sep 202662.4 hours · 3 Sep 202662.6 hours · 22 Sep 2026
updated irregularly
Highest reported ARR of a one-person company
10.98 $M
15 Sep 2026 · source
2 daily values, 2026-03-23 to 2026-09-15; range 3 to 10.98Mar 26Sep 263 $M · 23 Mar 202610.98 $M · 15 Sep 2026
updated irregularly
AI software task horizon at 50% success, measured on SWE-Marathon
32.8 hours
28 Sep 2026 · source
3 daily values, 2026-05-28 to 2026-09-28; range 26.987 to 32.781May 26Sep 2627.0 hours · 28 May 202630.0 hours · 24 Jul 202632.8 hours · 28 Sep 2026
updated irregularly

Milestone Countdown

Independent fronts: these can fall in any order.
Expected year: dot = median (hollow: after 2100), bar = 80% range. The time axis is compressed: the farther out, the more years per step.
  • Automated Software Engineer: An AI-submitted large (10k+ lines diff) patch to the Linux Kernel (or equivalent critical infra) is accepted by maintainers.Progressing: AI-written 10k+ merges, none AI-submitted; needs ~620h vs 7.9h horizon; ETA ~2029* · assessed 2026-10-18 · 46 event(s)
    Judged as if maintainers took openly AI-submitted patches on merit. AI-written contributions far above 10,000 lines are already accepted when a human directs and submits them (Ladybird 30.5k, Bun 1M, Node.js core 10.9k lines), so what is missing is an AI that writes a contribution of several hundred engineer-hours and shepherds it through review on its own. On the AI task-horizon trend at 80% success (software horizon 7.9 h today against the ~620 h such a contribution needs, doubling every ~3.75 months), plus an assumed review lag, that gives a median of 2029 (80% range 2027-2032, 96% chance by 2100), within 5 years; but no AI-submitted contribution at anything like this scale has been accepted yet and nobody is known to be working toward one, so the status is yellow.
    ETA
    ~2029 (80% range 2027–2032; P(by 2100) 96%)
    ETA cruxes
    1) The AI as submitter (mapping, unmeasured): an openly AI-submitted multi-thousand-line series that the AI shepherds through review and gets accepted where policy allows -> toward the oracle-lower scenario (-1.96 yr if it alone held); such series rejected on design/review grounds while the software horizon passes ~50-100 h -> toward messiness (+1.06). 2) Reading of 'AI-submitted' (definition crux): human-directed openly AI-written series counted -> achieved or 2027.27 (-2.28); the precursor series ai-contribution-lines-merged-max gaining an independently reviewed or AI-submitted row settles which rung the ladder is on. 3) A sourced effort for a new >=10k-line critical-infra feature -> E scenario C (+0.45) or A (-0.42). 4) Rate: next ECI points (software h80 >= ~16 h by spring 2027 keeps the median); METR long-run pace +1.34. 5) Review lag: dated submission-to-merge of large independently reviewed AI-written series (1 yr +0.21; 2 yr +1.21).
    Path
    Reading: 'AI-submitted' = an AI system did the engineering and is the disclosed submitter (sends the series, answers review, revises); a human may set the goal and start the agent but does not direct the code. '10k+ lines diff' = one accepted contribution (patch or series merged as one feature) with >= 10,000 changed lines of substantive code. 'Equivalent critical infra' = foundational OSS with comparable review: LLVM/GCC, glibc, CPython, OpenSSL, Kubernetes, Node.js core. Alternative reading (sensitivity, definition crux): openly AI-written, human-directed series count once the human-submitter rule is assumed away; under it the Node.js commit (2026-05-23-nodejs-merges-10k-line-ai-assisted-vfs) may already qualify, else 2027.26 (-2.29 yr). The size threshold is already passed by AI-written human-submitted work (Ladybird, Bun, Node.js); the remaining gap is autonomy. Driver: shared task-horizon at 80% success (owner decision, audit 2026-10-16-reliability-level; RUBRIC 4.1 step 3 as clarified 2026-10-16: AI submissions to maintainers flooded by AI slop burn goodwill when they fail, so they cannot be repeated freely and need the reliable level; 50% is a labelled sensitivity, p50 2028), software domain; mapping H_req = E x 2^x, where x1 is the horizon's definition (not a calibration), E (effort of a qualifying contribution) a labelled scenario range around the one sourced accepted example (Ladybird) and x labelled oracle-lower / messiness scenarios from measured gaps; none of these is measured on maintainer review.
    Blockers
    • Assumed gate, real state: Linux forbids AI agents adding Signed-off-by and makes the human submitter responsible (2026-02-09-linux-merges-ai-coding-assistants-policy), drivers/staging auto-rejects LLM patches (2026-08-03-linux-staging-rejects-llm-patches); GCC declines LLM-derived contributions >= ~15 lines (2026-07-29-gcc-declines-llm-generated-contributions); LLVM bans agents acting without human approval (2026-01-16-llvm-adopts-human-in-the-loop-policy); Node.js bars PRs opened by automated tooling unless pre-approved (2026-08-12-nodejs-ai-guidelines); Rust allows only pre-arranged LLM code (2026-08-05-rust-adopts-llm-policy). Torvalds: 'Linux is not one of those anti-AI projects' (2026-07-14-torvalds-linux-not-anti-ai). None delays the ETA (RUBRIC §4.2), but 'achieved' needs a literally AI-submitted accepted 10k-line contribution
    • Process: a 10k-line series faces review rounds and merge windows (lag 0.25/0.5/2.0 yr in the ETA, labelled assumed and widened: the ledger class of independently reviewed >= 10k-line AI-written acceptances has n 1, Node.js, lag >= 0.18 yr as a lower bound)
    • Gather request: dated submission-to-merge times of large (>=5k-line) kernel/critical-infra series; a series-level search for >=10k-line AI-assisted series in Linux mainline; sourced human-effort estimates for accepted >=10k-line contributions; any openly AI-submitted series accepted anywhere; ECI evaluations of post-September-2026 models
    How this was assessed: the data, the benchmark and the rubric rule
    ETA method
    driver trend (shared driver task-horizon, software 80% horizon (owner decision, audit 2026-10-16-reliability-level), exponential from the last measured point) with H_req = E x 2^x: E the human effort of a qualifying contribution as a labelled structural scenario range citing every ledger effort point, x the transfer from METR-style tasks to review-gated work as labelled scenarios (definition x1; oracle-checked lower scenario and messiness scenario, each from measured gaps); assumed review lag (ledger class n 1, lower bound only: widened); one Monte Carlo distribution over the driver's 10,000 draws (each paired with 20 milestone-input draws on stable streams), named failure scenarios integrated analytically; domain, 50%-level and definition sensitivities
    ETA calculation
    Precursor series ai-contribution-lines-merged-max: 30,550 (2026-02-24, Ladybird) -> 1,009,257 lines (2026-05-14, Bun), both human-submitted and self-merged by the project lead: size passed (101x), autonomy unmeasured, so no driver calibration and no input change. Crux first: the size threshold is passed by AI-written, human-submitted work (Ladybird +30,550 2026-02-24 at software h80 1.679 h; Bun +1,009,257 2026-05-14 at 3.752; Node.js core +10,859 2026-05-23 at 3.752, 4 approvals); the missing rung is an AI that writes and shepherds the patch through review on its own, censored by policy (Linux no AI Signed-off-by; staging, GCC, LLVM, Node.js automation bans; zero capability weight); OCaml closed a 13.3k Claude-written PR for review capacity/no design discussion (2025-11-20); Linux mainline >=10k assisted rung unknown (2026-10-16-kernel-largest-assisted-by-commits: examples in changed lines perf jevents.py generated-C reformat +6,094/-3,472 = 9,566, amdgpu connector extraction +3,848/-3,674 = 7,522 (both refactoring/generated code), AVMatrix driver +3,950/-0 = 3,950 (new code); human Signed-off-by, a search sample that does not establish the maximum; none is AI-submitted). Driver: task-horizon (draw i of ledger.py driver-draws task-horizon --as-of 2026-10-18 -> draw i; h80_software_draw 7.930 h at 2026.725 with its conversion error, sd 0.70 doublings since owner option D = sqrt(0.553^2 + 0.43^2): 0.553 measured (prediction error), 0.43 an assumed slope-form allowance (owner decision, audit 2026-10-17-calibration-d); sd 0.553 alone moves the quantiles <= 0.01 yr; doubling_software_months 2.76/3.75/6.32). Mapping H_req = E x 2^x. x1 is the horizon's definition (an agent with h80 >= E does E hours of work unattended at 80%), not a calibrated transfer. E (structural scenario range, log-uniform within, weights 0.25/0.5/0.25 = prev's mass): A benchmark-port class 80-680 h (MirrorCode gotree 16,905-line Go -> 7,644-line Rust, Epoch 2-17 weeks; SWE-Marathon v1 paper tasks 40-400 h, 2026-06-05-swe-marathon-under-30pct; v1.1 suite ~4-380 h); B Ladybird class 320-960 h ('months by hand' 2-6 x 160 h; the one accepted >=10k contribution with a sourced effort); C new-design class 960-2,400 h (assumed; Node.js VFS and OCaml 13.3k have no effort figure; Bun 4,800-6,000 h for a 535k-line port, not scaled). x scenarios (weights 0.20/0.55/0.25): oracle-lower x = -U(4.0, 8.4) from gaps between effort embodied and h80 in force (measured: MirrorCode gotree 5.08-8.66, Ladybird assisted 8.37, Bun 10.48 excluded; the 4.0 lower edge is ASSUMED: a representative effort of 126 h, the endpoint geomean of the v1 paper's 40-400 h range, at 7.93 h; the v1.1 suite behind the 53.1% (2026-10-16-swe-marathon-v11-leaderboard-53pct) spans ~4-380 h and its representative task length is unmeasured; alternatives: edge 2.05 = measured v1.1 frontier h50 32.781 h (swe-marathon-h50-by-release, Sonnet 5.5 2026-09-28) at 7.93 h, or 2.33 = 4-400 h geomean 40 h: central 2027.84/2029.57/2032.71 and 2027.81/2029.57/2032.71 (p10 +0.25, p50 +0.02, p90 +0.01; calendar years and p_achieved unchanged), oracle only 2027.89 / 2027.84 vs 2027.59); definition x = 0; messiness x = +U(2.15, 4.29), the measured gap between the software (7.930 h) and the real-work blended (1.790) / remote RLI (0.404) 80% horizons, transfer to review-gated work assumed. H_req p10/25/50/75/90 7.7/173/619/1,944/6,934 h; 10.2% of draws <= today's drawn software h80 (capability now, only the lag left). Definition case E 554 h: 69.9x = 6.13 doublings x 3.749 mo = 23.0 mo -> 2028.64 + review lag 0.5 -> 2029.14. Lag 0.25/0.5/2.0 yr assumed, widened: ledger class of independently reviewed >=10k AI-written acceptances n 1 (Node.js: PR open before the 2026-03-18 petition, landed 2026-05-23, lag >= 0.18 yr, a lower bound; Ladybird and Bun self-merged by their leads, not in the class). MC (failures assumed, each < 10%: halt 2%, plateau 2% -> p_achieved 0.960): unconditional p10/p50/p90 2027.59/2029.55/2032.70 (seed-stable +-0.04; 11-seed pool 2027.583/2029.546/2032.690); conditional 2027.55/2029.48/2031.96 (if achieved, during 2029); P(by end-2031) 0.87. Sensitivities (p50): E A only -0.42, B only -0.02, C only +0.45; transfer oracle only -1.96 (p10 2027.04), x1 only -0.02 (2028.48/2029.53/2032.28), messiness only +1.06; weights without oracle +0.25 (p10 2028.59), oracle 0.4 -0.35; lag 0 -0.79, 2.0 +1.21, wider 0.25/0.75/3.0 +0.29 (p90 2033.69); domain blended +0.25, remote +0.44; success level 80% (owner decision, audit 2026-10-16-reliability-level; RUBRIC 4.1 step 3 clarified 2026-10-16: one accepted patch to maintainers flooded by AI slop needs the reliable 80% level), labelled 50% sensitivity: driver rate draws 2027.25/2028.75/2031.51 (p50 -0.80, calendar 2027/2028/2031), at the software-50 OLS rate 3.690 mo 2027.25/2028.65/2030.80 (-0.90); rate METR long-run 6.365 +1.34, ~7 mo +1.69; failures x2 p_achieved 0.922 (halt or plateau alone x2: 0.941, p50 +0.04). Definition: 'AI-submitted' = openly AI-written human-directed series -> Node.js VFS may already qualify (achieved), else capability passed (H 3.752 h) + lag 2026.98/2027.27/2029.34 (-2.28 yr; definition crux). Cross-checks: SWE-Marathon measured frontier h80 10.68 h (2026-09-22) and 16.12 h (2026-10-09) vs the converted 7.930 h, Terminal-Bench 4.0 23.64% -> 64.85% (2026-05-28 -> 09-22): no sign the conversion overstates the level or pace; the oracle-lower scenario's lower edge rests on an assumed SWE-Marathon representative effort (above), not on the suite's 80% horizon; first LLM-written kernel patch (2025-04) -> 10k AI-written critical-infra commit (2026-05) in 13 months; no dated proponent claim; no external anchor (pre-anchor p50 2029). Rule 7: prev (2026-10-17-milestone-the-linux-kernel-patch) reproduced byte-identically (its script on the 2026-10-17 draws); made_at 2026-10-18 on identical draws: 2027.59/2029.55/2032.70 (pool 2027.583/2029.546/2032.690), unchanged; no milestone input changed. New events since prev (2026-10-18 intake, many backfilled) leave the inputs standing: Torvalds' LLM-assisted page-cache series v3 (594+/81-, human-directed) drew a race-condition finding in its first review (2026-10-13-torvalds-posts-llm-assisted-rcu-free-v3: review catches what the author's tooling missed, consistent with the review lag, n unchanged for the >=10k class); kernel maintainers moving to drop the Assisted-by tag (2026-10-13-torvalds-rejects-ai-tool-disclosure-rules) is gate policy (assumed away); unreviewed long agent runs (Codex 25 h / 30k lines, 2026-02-23; Cursor swarm 1M lines, 2026-01-14; 80-agent swarms merging few PRs, 2026-08-13) carry no effort or acceptance figure for the E or x scenarios. No policy lag (assumed gate).
    Window
    Driver
    shared driver task-horizon (drivers.yaml; software conversion error widened 0.553 -> 0.70 doublings, owner option D, audit 2026-10-17-calibration-d; draws via ledger.py driver-draws task-horizon --as-of 2026-10-18 (byte-identical to the 2026-10-17 draws; drivers.yaml unchanged), seed 20261015, n 10000, draw i -> draw i); anchor 2026-09-22 (2026.725): software 7.930 h, remote 0.404 h, blended 1.790 h; conversion errors drawn (software sd 0.70 dbl; remote -0.84/+0.55)
    Current
    horizon-80-software-eci 2024-10-15..2026-09-22: n 16, 0.168 -> 7.930 h, OLS doubling 3.755 mo (95% CI 3.50-4.05, R2 0.984); horizon-80-remote-rli 2025-06-05..2026-09-22: n 11, 0.005 -> 0.404 h, 2.550 mo (2.23-2.98); horizon-80-blended (KPI): n 17, 0.043 -> 1.790 h, 2.917 mo (2.74-3.12, R2 0.986)
    Previous
    halves: software 4.630 (n 6, to 2025-10-15) -> 3.723 mo (n 10); blended 3.020 (n 8) -> 2.635 mo (n 9); remote 2.171 -> 2.106 mo: no slowdown among measured points
    Long run
    METR's own 80% series 2019-2026 6.365 mo (the driver's p90); METR ~7-month long-run doubling (2025-03-19-metr-long-tasks-doubling-rv); METR's page discontinued 2026-09-08 (2026-09-08-metr-time-horizons-page-discontinued)
    Rate distribution
    driver draws p10/p50/p90: doubling_software 2.76/3.75/6.32 mo, doubling_remote 1.87/2.55/6.29, doubling_blended 2.23/3.03/6.31 (unchanged); h80_software_draw 4.34/7.99/14.79 h (prev 4.92/7.98/12.97), h80_blended_draw 1.18/1.76/2.56 h (prev 1.23/1.76/2.43)
    Measurement gap
    26 days since 2026-09-22 on ECI/RLI: unmeasured, not flat (RUBRIC 4.1 step 3); the newer SWE-Marathon point (2026-10-09) sits above the driver path
    Cross checks
    option-D cross-checks (not inputs): swe-marathon-h80-by-release 9.94 h (2026-05-28), 10.68 (2026-09-22), 16.12 (2026-10-09, CI 8.4-31; +0.88 dbl above the driver's median path); horizon-80-gap-swe-marathon +2.23/+1.56/+1.05/+1.05/+0.01/+0.01 (2026-05..10), horizon-80-gap-metr to -0.42 (2026-03); tripwire not fired; terminal-bench-4-pass-by-release 23.64% (2026-05-28) -> 64.85% (2026-09-22); new since prev: aisi-cyber-h80-by-release registered (audit 2026-10-18-aisi-cyber: its ECI slope 0.216 +- 0.032, 0.178 without GPT-5.5, vs the conversion's 0.2226: compatible, too uncertain to validate the extrapolation; owner decision on the driver pending, not applied here)
    Data as of
    2026-09-22 (driver); ladder to 2026-10-16 (Linux Assisted-by search; Torvalds' series 2026-10-13); precursor series ai-contribution-lines-merged-max 2026-05-14
    Change
    Re-assessment on the 2026-10-18 intake (about 190 events new to the ledger, most published earlier in 2026). Prev (assess:20261017T062255Z) reproduced byte-identically with its own script on the 2026-10-17 draws, except the print-only precursor line of the solo section (the solo series gained a backfilled row). The driver draws as of 2026-10-18 are byte-identical to prev's (drivers.yaml unchanged since 2026-10-17); made_at 2026-10-18 moves only the zero-lag sensitivity's p10 floor (2026.79 -> 2026.80). New kernel-relevant events (Torvalds' page-cache series v3 and its race finding, the Assisted-by debate, long unreviewed agent runs) change no input (calc). The 2026-10-18 audits (horizon pace, ECI overlap, AISI cyber, horizon sources) carry no milestone finding. p10/p50/p90 2027.59/2029.55/2032.70, p_achieved 0.960: identical to prev (2027/2029/2032, 0.96). Status yellow, unchanged. Review-1 corrections (no forecast change): the oracle-lower scenario's 4.0-doubling edge is relabelled an assumed SWE-Marathon representative effort (the 40-400 h range was the v1 paper's; v1.1 spans ~4-380 h), with alternative edges 2.05/2.33 tested (p10 +0.25, p50 +0.02); the Linux Assisted-by examples now give changed lines (9,566 / 7,522 / 3,950); the conversion sd 0.70 is labelled measured 0.553 + assumed 0.43.
    Rubric rule
    Milestone yellow: measurable progress on the driver it is tied to (shared driver task-horizon, software 80% horizon 0.168 -> 7.93 h since Dec 2024, 3.755-month doubling) and up its precursor ladder, median ETA <= 5 years, but the path lacks an AI-submitted precursor at scale and a programme aimed at it (RUBRIC §4); the assumed gate never blocks it (§4.2); not achieved (no AI-submitted 10k-line acceptance)
    by assess:20261018T200817Z · 35 evidence event(s)
    Evidence and news: 35 cited by the assessment, 11 other event(s)

    Cited evidence (35)

    Other events (11)

  • First Automated Scientist: An AI-generated research paper is accepted by a top-tier journal (Nature/Science) with AI credited as primary author.Progressing: fully-AI papers only at workshop level; Nature ~10 horizon doublings away; ETA ~2029* · assessed 2026-10-18 · 32 event(s)
    • The flagship journals Nature or Science, not their family titles.
    • AI-generated: the AI poses the question, designs and analyses the work and writes the paper. Humans may fund it, provide compute, carry out lab protocols as directed and submit it, but contribute no ideas or text.
    Judged as if Nature or Science would credit an AI that did the work; both still bar AI authors. The best fully AI-generated paper is still a 2025 workshop acceptance and the best main-track one (2026) was co-produced with humans, while AI systems have since produced landmark mathematics on human-posed problems (a Jacobian-conjecture counterexample, a disproof of Erdős's unit-distance conjecture). Placing a Nature paper about ten doublings above today's AI task horizon (1.8 h, doubling every ~3 months) gives a median of 2029 (80% range 2028-2036, 93% chance by 2100), within 5 years, but no fully AI-generated paper has yet passed a main-track or journal review, so the status is yellow. The landmark results made it less likely that AI never reaches Nature-level research, which pulled the late end of the range in from 2039.
    ETA
    ~2029 (80% range 2028–2036; P(by 2100) 93%)
    ETA cruxes
    1) Spacing of the tiers above the main track (structural): a fully AI paper accepted in a top field journal (e.g. a refereed AI-generated proof) -> shrinking/equal (up to -2.0 yr); none while the blended horizon passes ~50 h -> growing (+2.7). 2) Autonomy deficit m: a fully AI-generated main-track acceptance at blended <= 4 h (about early 2027) -> m near 0 (-0.7); shadow-eval-type failures of models measured at >= 1-4 h (e.g. the announced GPT-5.6 Sol / Opus 5 / Fable 5 follow-ups), read through the assumed transfer -> m > 0.73 (+0.4) to m >= 2.5 (+1.4). 3) Rate: next ECI/RLI points; METR's long-run pace +2.6 yr. 4) Rung dating: acceptance dates of future rungs; a measured Nature submission-to-acceptance time matters only under the capability-dated alternative (+0.5). 5) Failures (assumed): AI research stuck at co-produced level while horizons grow -> novelty back up (4%: p90 2040; 8%: p90 null); the landmark AI math results being refereed and published as AI work -> novelty down. 7) Epoch-Automation-Reports-type failures of the frontier on open-ended research design (blended >= 1.7 h) vs autonomous publishable papers (Aletheia-type) at a venue: the m sensitivities +0.92 / -0.72. 6) Precursor series ai-paper-venue-tier-max: a tier-2 row (fully AI main track) -> m small (toward -0.7); a tier-3 row -> shrinking/equal spacing (up to -2.0); still tier 1 with fully-AI submissions rejected on merit while blended passes ~4-8 h -> m large (+1.0 to +1.4).
    Path
    Reading (framework details): the flagship Nature or Science, a research article; AI-generated = the AI poses the question, designs and analyses the work and writes the paper; humans may fund, provide compute, run lab protocols as directed and submit, but contribute no ideas or text; primary author = first/lead author. Alternative (sensitivity, -1.59 yr): a Nature-family or top field journal suffices. Driver: shared task-horizon at 80% success (owner decision, audit 2026-10-16-reliability-level; RUBRIC 4.1 step 3 as clarified 2026-10-16: a paper submitted to editors and referees flooded by AI slop burns goodwill when it fails, so attempts cannot be repeated freely; 50% is a labelled sensitivity, +0.02 yr), blended domain (research spans code and analysis plus writing, figures and judgement); the mapping is a venue ladder read at acceptance dates (so review time is inside it and no lag is added): the workshop-to-main-track spacing is fitted on two reached rungs (the workshop rung's remote component backcast with its uncertainty), the autonomy deficit of the main-track rung is an assumed half-normal (the shadow evaluations tested Opus 4.8 and GPT-5.6 Sol, whose horizons are at or below 0.598 h and 0.990 h, so they bound it only through an assumed transfer, a sensitivity), and the tiers above are labelled structural spacing scenarios, not a fitted link. Precursors: AI Scientist-v2 workshop paper (withdrawn; reported in Nature 2026-03); Agents4Science AI-first-author papers; Robin and Co-Scientist (AI-generated hypotheses and analyses in human-authored Nature papers); Sakana's co-produced ALIFE 2026 oral (accepted 2026-06-07); OpenAI's 722 AI math manuscripts (unrefereed) and contested Navier-Stokes claim. Since prev (2026-10-18 intake): AI-originated landmark mathematics on human-posed problems (Jacobian conjecture counterexample, Erdős unit-distance disproof, zeta-zeros bound 67.2%, Astra's ten results; Aletheia's fully AI 'publishable quality' paper, not refereed) - content, not venue rungs. Counter-signals: shadow evaluations (Opus 4.8 and GPT-5.6 Sol agents failed NeurIPS-level open questions); Epoch's Automation Reports (Fable 5.1, GPT-6 Astra lack research-design judgment).
    Blockers
    • Assumed gate, real state: Nature Portfolio and Science bar AI authorship (2025-01-01-journals-prohibit-ai-authorship-rv); Springer Nature's risk-based policy (2026-09-10-springer-nature-risk-based-ai-policy) keeps accountability non-delegable and classes AI generating hypotheses, analyses or conclusions without human oversight and assigning authorship to AI as not permitted. This does not delay the ETA (RUBRIC §4.2), but 'achieved' needs an AI credited as primary author
    • Community: NeurIPS 2026 position track desk-rejected AI-written submissions (2026-06-02-neurips-position-track-desk-rejects-ai-written); AGMAI recommends repositories, not journals, for AI math results nobody yet understands (2026-09-29-agmai-ai-math-release-norms)
    • Capability: no fully AI-generated paper accepted at a main track or any journal in the ledger; agents failed open research questions of NeurIPS submissions (2026-07-29-shadow-evals-agents-fail-open-ended-research)
    • Gather request: fully AI-generated acceptances at main-track venues and journals with submission and acceptance dates; the ALIFE 2026 notification date (2026-06-07, 2026.alife.org) as a ledger fact for the Sakana rung; refereed status of OpenAI's AI math manuscripts; ECI/RLI evaluations of post-September-2026 models
    How this was assessed: the data, the benchmark and the rubric rule
    ETA method
    driver trend (shared driver task-horizon, blended 80% horizon (owner decision, audit 2026-10-16-reliability-level), exponential from the last measured point) with a venue-ladder mapping read at acceptance dates (no separate review lag): spacing s0 fitted on the two reached rungs (workshop backcast with propagated uncertainty), autonomy deficit an assumed half-normal (prev's; the capability-censored shadow evaluations, matched to the models they tested, give no binding lower bound; an assumed-transfer bound is a sensitivity), and the tiers above the main track as labelled structural spacing scenarios; one Monte Carlo distribution over the driver's 10,000 draws (each paired with 20 milestone-input draws on stable streams), named failure scenarios integrated analytically; capability-dated alternative, domain, rung-date and definition sensitivities
    ETA calculation
    Driver: task-horizon (draw i of ledger.py driver-draws task-horizon --as-of 2026-10-18 -> draw i; doubling_blended_months 2.23/3.03/6.31; horizon-80-blended anchor 1.790 h at 2026.725). The relative ladder uses only the driver's rate draws: the software conversion error (sd 0.70 since owner option D) cancels, Precursor series ai-paper-venue-tier-max: tier 1 (2025-03-12) = rung W below, no row since (no fully AI tier-2 acceptance while blended rose 0.0209 -> 1.790 h, 6.42 doublings); the model's fully-AI tier-2 rung is already <= 1.79 h in 88.6% of draws, its non-advance read as censored by policy and few attempts (read as capability: m > 1.58, below). Ladder at acceptance dates (blended 80% in force): W workshop, fully AI-generated AI Scientist-v2 paper passed ICLR 2025 workshop review (2025-03-12-sakana-ai-scientist-v2-iclr-workshop-rv): 0.0209 h = software 0.168 x a backcast of the remote OLS line (0.00261 h, prediction sd 0.542 doublings, t 9 df; h_W p10/50/90 0.0161/0.0209/0.0271); W' Agents4Science 2025-10-22: 0.102; Nature-tier content human-posed/written (Robin, Co-Scientist) <= 0.49; M main track co-produced (2026-10-13-sakana-agentic-scientist-alife-oral) accepted at the ALIFE 2026 full-paper notification 2026-06-07 (sourced: 2026.alife.org; submission deadline 2026-04-12, conference 17-21 Aug; the 2026-10-13 date is the arXiv announcement): 0.598 h. Censoring: fully-AI M: the capability evidence is the shadow evaluations (2026-07-29-shadow-evals-agents-fail-open-ended-research, n 2), which tested Claude Opus 4.8 on both papers and GPT-5.6 Sol on one (arXiv 2607.27191 sec. 1/3; Fable 5 not tested); matched to the tested models, not the publication-date frontier: Opus 4.8 blended <= 0.598 h (its RLI 0.095 h is the 2026-05-28 remote point; its software <= the 3.752 h frontier) -> bound <= log2(0.598/0.598) = 0; GPT-5.6 Sol (METR pre-deployment 2026-06-26, no new ECI/RLI best) <= the 0.990 h frontier then in force -> bound <= 0.73, and only under an ASSUMED transfer (failing an assigned NeurIPS question => a fully-AI main-track acceptance needs a higher horizon); so no measured bound; beyond that, censoring by policy and few attempts (NeurIPS position-track desk rejections, human-author rules, no submission campaign) -> no bound; top field journal censored by policy/few attempts (OpenAI's 722 manuscripts unrefereed; AGMAI repository norm) -> no bound; Nature censored by the authorship bans (assumed gate). Spacing s0 = log2(0.598/0.0209) = 4.84 doublings (fitted, two rungs; p10/90 4.46/5.21); autonomy deficit m half-normal sd 1 (assumed, prev; no lower bound; m p10/50/90 0.13/0.67/1.65); Nature at (1 + mult)(s0 + m) above W with mult = r + r^2 for the two tiers above M: structural scenarios shrinking r 0.5 (mult 0.75; H_req 17 h at median m), equal r 1 (2.0; 1,986 h), growing r 1.5 (3.75; 1.6 M h), weights 0.125/0.75/0.125 = prev's triangular k 2/3/4 mass. log2(H_req/1.790) = log2(h_W/1.790) + (1+mult)(s0+m): G p10/50/90 4.28/10.15/17.77 doublings. No separate review lag (acceptance-dated ladder). Relative mapping: conversion offsets cancel. Deterministic (equal, m 0.67): 10.12 x 3.032 mo = 30.6 mo -> 2029.28. MC (failures assumed, each < 10%: halt 2%, plateau 3%, novelty 2% (prev 4%, see Rule 7), venue 0.5% -> p_achieved 0.927): unconditional p10/p50/p90 2028.09/2029.66/2036.29 on the canonical input seed (10 re-seeds: p10 2028.09-2028.12, p50 2029.65-2029.66, p90 2036.23-2036.33, all in 2036); 11 seeds pooled (2.2 M input draws) 2028.102/2029.655/2036.279 -> 2028/2029/2036; conditional 2028.02/2029.49/2032.98 (if achieved, during 2029); P(by end-2031) 0.79. Sensitivities (p50 vs 2029.66): spacing shrinking only -1.98 (2027.68), equal only -0.05, growing only +2.65 (2032.31); weights 0.25/0.5/0.25 +0.08 (p10 2027.55, p90 2037.59); m 0 -0.72, 0.73 -0.12, 1.5 +0.51, 2.5 +1.34; assumed-transfer bound at GPT-5.6 Sol's upper limit (m > 0.73) 2030.07 (+0.41, p90 2037.39); the draft's frontier-at-publication bound (m > 0.78, rejected) 2030.10; Epoch Automation Reports via the same transfer (m > 1.51) 2030.58 (+0.92); all 2026 non-reach read as capability (m > 1.58) 2030.63 (+0.97); m sd 0.5/2 -0.37/+0.67; M dated at announcement (1.790 h) +1.30, at conference start (1.026) +0.64; capability-dated alternative (M at submission 0.298 h + Nature lag 0.4/0.9/2.5 assumed) 2030.19 (+0.53); W at Agents4Science (0.102 h) -1.28; W anchored on the software series +0.49; domain remote -0.37 (p90 2037.11); success level 80% (owner decision, audit 2026-10-16-reliability-level; RUBRIC 4.1 step 3 clarified 2026-10-16: one paper to editors flooded by AI slop needs the reliable 80% level), labelled 50% sensitivity (ladder re-read on horizon-50-*: W 0.107 h, M 3.173 h, today 9.567 h) 2028.11/2029.68/2036.37 (+0.02), at the blended-50 OLS rate 2.897 mo 2027.85/2029.26/2032.17 (-0.40); rate blend OLS 2.92 -0.40, METR long-run 6.365 +2.59, ~7 mo +3.14; failures halved/doubled p_achieved 0.963/0.858 (doubled: p90 null); each alone x2: halt 0.908 (p90 2040.02), plateau 0.898 (p90 null), novelty (= prev's 4%) 0.908 (p50 +0.05, p90 2040.02), venue 0.922; x0.5: halt/novelty 0.936 (p90 2035.43), plateau 0.941, venue 0.929. Definition: Nature family/top field journal suffices 2028.07 (-1.59). The ALIFE schedule date is applied to the Sakana paper as an assumption pending paper-specific confirmation (alternative dates above). Cross-checks: OpenAI's fully automated researcher target March 2028 (announcement) discounted x1.5-3 -> 2028.9-2031.0, + a submission cycle -> 2030-2032; only the equal spacing gives a plausible person-years effort (489-6,328 h); no external anchor (pre-anchor p50 2029). Rule 7: prev (2026-10-17-milestone-the-nature-author) reproduced byte-identically (canonical 2028.11/2029.71/2040.02, pooled 2028.121/2029.706/2039.975); made_at 2026-10-18 on identical draws: unchanged. One input changes on new evidence (rule 7 (a)): failure scenario 'novelty' (AI research never reaches Nature/Science significance) 4% -> 2%, because AI-originated results of landmark significance now exist in the ledger (2026-07-19-jacobian-conjecture-counterexample-claude-fable-5: the conjecture false in every dimension above 2; 2026-05-20-openai-disproves-erdos-unit-distance-conjecture, autonomous; 2026-08-10-claude-riemann-zeta-zeros-bound-672pct, 41.6% -> 67.2% from a non-mathematician's open prompt; 2026-08-01-openai-ten-advances-astra, non-sofic groups); the residual 2% is autonomous empirical research never reaching that level (disclosed judgment, no countable class; x0.5/x2 above). Effect: p_achieved 0.908 -> 0.927, pooled p10/p50/p90 2028.121/2029.706/2039.975 -> 2028.102/2029.655/2036.279 (p90 calendar 2039 -> 2036: p90 is the 0.97 conditional quantile instead of the 0.991 one). m keeps prev's half-normal sd 1: the new evidence on it is two-sided and reaches m only through assumed transfers: Aletheia's 'publishable quality' fully AI paper (2026-02-11-deepmind-aletheia-research-math-taxonomy, blended 0.251 h in force, m <= -1.25 if it were a main-track acceptance) -> m 0: 2028.94 (-0.72); Epoch's Automation Reports (2026-10-08-epoch-automation-reports-open-ended-gaps: Fable 5.1 and GPT-6 Astra, blended <= 1.705 h, lack research-design judgment) read like the shadow evaluations -> m > 1.51: 2030.58 (+0.92); both are sensitivities, neither an acceptance. Precursor series ai-paper-venue-tier-max unchanged (tier 1, 2025-03-12): the landmark math results are human-posed and human-written or unrefereed (content rung, as Robin), not venue rungs. No policy lag (assumed gate).
    Window
    Driver
    shared driver task-horizon (drivers.yaml; software conversion error widened 0.553 -> 0.70 doublings, owner option D, audit 2026-10-17-calibration-d; draws via ledger.py driver-draws task-horizon --as-of 2026-10-18 (byte-identical to the 2026-10-17 draws; drivers.yaml unchanged), seed 20261015, n 10000, draw i -> draw i); anchor 2026-09-22 (2026.725): software 7.930 h, remote 0.404 h, blended 1.790 h; conversion errors drawn (software sd 0.70 dbl; remote -0.84/+0.55)
    Current
    horizon-80-software-eci 2024-10-15..2026-09-22: n 16, 0.168 -> 7.930 h, OLS doubling 3.755 mo (95% CI 3.50-4.05, R2 0.984); horizon-80-remote-rli 2025-06-05..2026-09-22: n 11, 0.005 -> 0.404 h, 2.550 mo (2.23-2.98); horizon-80-blended (KPI): n 17, 0.043 -> 1.790 h, 2.917 mo (2.74-3.12, R2 0.986)
    Previous
    halves: software 4.630 (n 6, to 2025-10-15) -> 3.723 mo (n 10); blended 3.020 (n 8) -> 2.635 mo (n 9); remote 2.171 -> 2.106 mo: no slowdown among measured points
    Long run
    METR's own 80% series 2019-2026 6.365 mo (the driver's p90); METR ~7-month long-run doubling (2025-03-19-metr-long-tasks-doubling-rv); METR's page discontinued 2026-09-08 (2026-09-08-metr-time-horizons-page-discontinued)
    Rate distribution
    driver draws p10/p50/p90: doubling_software 2.76/3.75/6.32 mo, doubling_remote 1.87/2.55/6.29, doubling_blended 2.23/3.03/6.31 (unchanged); h80_software_draw 4.34/7.99/14.79 h (prev 4.92/7.98/12.97), h80_blended_draw 1.18/1.76/2.56 h (prev 1.23/1.76/2.43)
    Measurement gap
    26 days since 2026-09-22 on ECI/RLI: unmeasured, not flat (RUBRIC 4.1 step 3); the newer SWE-Marathon point (2026-10-09) sits above the driver path
    Cross checks
    option-D cross-checks (not inputs): swe-marathon-h80-by-release 9.94 h (2026-05-28), 10.68 (2026-09-22), 16.12 (2026-10-09, CI 8.4-31; +0.88 dbl above the driver's median path); horizon-80-gap-swe-marathon +2.23/+1.56/+1.05/+1.05/+0.01/+0.01 (2026-05..10), horizon-80-gap-metr to -0.42 (2026-03); tripwire not fired; terminal-bench-4-pass-by-release 23.64% (2026-05-28) -> 64.85% (2026-09-22); new since prev: aisi-cyber-h80-by-release registered (audit 2026-10-18-aisi-cyber: its ECI slope 0.216 +- 0.032, 0.178 without GPT-5.5, vs the conversion's 0.2226: compatible, too uncertain to validate the extrapolation; owner decision on the driver pending, not applied here)
    Data as of
    2026-09-22 (driver); ladder to 2026-10-13 (ALIFE oral); capability signals to 2026-10-16; precursor series ai-paper-venue-tier-max 2025-03-12 (no row since)
    Change
    Re-assessment on the 2026-10-18 intake (about 190 events new to the ledger, most published earlier in 2026). Prev (assess:20261017T062255Z) reproduced byte-identically on the 2026-10-17 draws (2026-10-18 draws byte-identical); made_at 2026-10-18 moves nothing. One input changed on new evidence (rule 7 (a)): the 'novelty' failure scenario 4% -> 2% (AI-originated landmark mathematics: Jacobian conjecture counterexample, Erdős unit-distance disproof, zeta-zeros bound, Astra's ten results). Effect: p_achieved 0.908 -> 0.927 (+0.02); pooled p10/p50/p90 2028.12/2029.71/2039.98 -> 2028.10/2029.66/2036.28: p90 2039 -> 2036 (-3.7 yr, all from this input: with p_achieved further above 0.9, p90 is the 0.97 conditional quantile instead of the growing-spacing x slow-rate 0.991 tail); p10 and p50 calendar years unchanged. Kept: m (new evidence two-sided, Aletheia -0.72 vs Epoch Automation Reports +0.92, both via assumed transfers), spacing scenarios (no fully AI paper refereed at any journal; the precursor series still tier 1), the ladder dates and the driver. Status yellow, unchanged.
    Rubric rule
    Milestone yellow: measurable progress on the driver it is tied to (shared driver task-horizon, blended 80% horizon 0.043 -> 1.79 h since Jun 2025, 2.92-month doubling) and up the venue ladder (workshop 2025-03, co-produced main-track oral 2026-10), median ETA <= 10 years, path lacking a precursor at the relevant venue/autonomy, a programme and corroboration; the assumed authorship gate never blocks it (§4.2); not achieved
    by assess:20261018T200817Z · 29 evidence event(s)
    Evidence and news: 29 cited by the assessment, 3 other event(s)

    Cited evidence (29)

    Other events (3)

  • Automated Economy Kickoff: A single-person company reaches $10M ARR with <10 hours/week human oversight.Progressing: one-founder Polsia ~$11M subscription ARR (Sep); <10 h/wk oversight unproven; ETA ~2029 · assessed 2026-10-18 · 23 event(s)
    • Single person: no employees, and no contractors running its operations (incidental professional services such as legal or accounting are fine). Several businesses owned and run by the same person count together.
    • ARR = recurring revenue, annualized. Oversight = all human time spent running the business(es), averaged over a quarter at ≥$10M ARR.
    The revenue half has caught up: a third-party reading of Polsia's public dashboard put its subscription revenue at $10.98M a year in mid-September 2026 (one founder, no employees). The oversight half has no measurement: no business this size is known to run on under 10 hours a week of human time, Polsia's founder has outside engineers helping and works far more than that, and AI-run shops still lose money. Requiring the AI to work unattended for about 40 hours at 80% reliability (8-173 h depending on how often the owner must check in) on the AI task-horizon trend (1.8 h today, doubling every ~3 months) gives a median of 2029 (80% range 2028-2038, 94% chance by 2100); with that half still without precedent, the status is yellow.
    ETA
    ~2029 (80% range 2028–2038; P(by 2100) 94%)
    ETA cruxes
    1) Whether Polsia stays a qualifying one-person company at >= $10M recurring (q): its revenue condition is met on its dashboard (Sep 2026); Polsia hiring, contracting out operations (Sapiom engineers on the product, 2026-10-16) or its subscriptions falling back below $10M -> q 0: +1.38; Polsia confirmed solo with disclosed falling founder hours -> q 1: -0.91; a second solo company >= $10M recurring removes the dependence; other solo operators stalling near $3M (path B 48 mo) +5.33; Levels' recurring share disclosed (-0.19 to +0.25). 2) Oversight cost per autonomous run (structural, unmeasured): disclosed quarterly human hours of a >= $5M solo operator, or the hand-off minutes of a profitable unattended AI-run shop -> daily (-0.56) or monthly (+0.49) scenario. 3) Work content of a solo-scale $10M business (lean ARR per FTE -0.78). 4) Rate: next ECI/RLI points; METR long-run +0.83. 5) Disclosure lag 2 yr +1.16; hours never disclosed raises the verify failure. 6) Precursor series solo-company-arr-max: rows of other solo companies (path B) and a company-verified Polsia recurring figure; the founder's quarterly hours are the observation nobody reports.
    Path
    Reading (wording unchanged): one owner, no employees, no contractors running operations (incidental legal/accounting allowed); ARR = recurring revenue annualized, summed over all businesses the person owns and runs (one-off sales and pass-through excluded); oversight = all human time running them, < 10 h/week averaged over a quarter at >= $10M ARR. Boundaries as sensitivities: professional-services hours counted (+0.12 yr), portfolio hand-off overhead (+0.23). Two conditions, the later binds (revenue in 42% of draws, nearly all where Polsia drops out): revenue from the solo-revenue ladder (Polsia $10.98M subscription ARR in September 2026 from a third-party reading of its public dashboard, after $4.64M in May; Levels $2.4-3.0M total revenue with an assumed recurring share; paces structural, not fitted); oversight from a capability gate on the shared driver task-horizon at 80% success in the blended domain (owner decision, audit 2026-10-16-reliability-level; RUBRIC 4.1 step 3: < 10 h/week over a quarter is sustained unattended operation; 50% is a labelled sensitivity, -0.45 yr), H = L x c: L = 226 work hours per oversight hour from the oversight budget and SaaS Capital ARR per FTE (sourced), c the owner's minutes per autonomous run, a labelled structural scenario range (2/11/46 min); the mapping of horizon onto oversight hours is assumed, not measured; port leverage and Vending-Bench are analogues used only as cross-checks.
    Blockers
    • Operational: no business at this revenue is known to run on < 10 h/week of total human time; AI-run shops remain unprofitable (2026-09-11-andon-market-capital-down-to-60k, 2026-06-30-andon-cafe-gemini-spent-38k-vs-9k-sales) and the best agent earns about a quarter of a good strategy on Vending-Bench 2 (2026-09-07-gpt-6-astra-vending-bench-2-15515)
    • Revenue and qualification: Polsia's subscriptions reached $10.98M ARR (2026-09-15, third-party dashboard reading; headline $18.71M incl. one-off receipts; ~48%/mo churn in May) but its founder's hours are unreported (he had no "time to reply to investors", 2026-05-22: busy, not measured), it raised $30M, and engineers of another startup (Sapiom) were pulled in to fix and harden the product (2026-10-16-polsia-founder-20m-run-rate), so it does not qualify today; Medvi ($401M, two people) relies on platforms that run its operations
    • Data: revenue and headcount are self-, investor- or third-party-reported, oversight hours never; gather request: Polsia's recurring revenue, headcount and contractor use per quarter, quarterly human hours of solo operators >= $3M, AI-run business results, and post-September-2026 RLI/ECI evaluations
    How this was assessed: the data, the benchmark and the rubric rule
    ETA method
    two conditions modelled separately, ETA = the later of the two + qualifying quarter + disclosure (no adoption lag): revenue by direct extrapolation of the solo revenue ladder (two paths, assumed paces, verification spread, assumed recurring share); oversight by a capability gate on the shared driver task-horizon (blended 80%, exponential from the last measured point), H = L x c with L from the oversight budget and sourced ARR per FTE and c (owner time per autonomous run) a labelled structural scenario range; port and Vending-Bench analogues as cross-checks only; one Monte Carlo distribution over the driver's 10,000 draws (each paired with 20 milestone-input draws on stable streams), named failure scenarios integrated analytically
    ETA calculation
    Revenue (measured: Polsia $3M ARR 2026-03-23 (investor); 2026-05-22 dashboard snapshot of five annualized 30-day buckets totalling $9.70M, including subscriptions $4.64M, packs $1.97M and ad pass-through $1.93M, churn ~48%/mo (2026-05-23-polsia-run-rate-critique-subscriptions-4-6m); Levels $200-250K/month total business revenue (2026-09-23); Levels ~$3M revenue, period and recurring share unstated (2025-01-01-pieter-levels-3m-arr-rv)). Precursor series solo-company-arr-max: $3M (2026-03-23, Polsia, investor-reported) -> $10.98M (2026-09-15, corrected: Polsia's public live dashboard feed, subscription MRR $915,309 x 12, of an $18.71M headline whose other $7.73M is annualized one-off receipts; 2026-09-15-polsia-subscription-mrr-10-98m, a disclosed-bias third-party review). Path A now starts there (new evidence, rule 7 (a); prev started from $4.64M at 2026-05-22: p50 +0.03). Revenue gap $10M/$10.98M = 0.91x: met at the measured value; with the level spread N(0, 0.5) doublings kept, 39% of path-A draws still need up to a few months. The three Polsia points $3.0M/$4.64M/$10.98M fit a 3.09-month doubling (95% CI 2.89-3.31), on the assumed 3.2-month median pace. Founder video 2026-10-16 (announcement): '$20M run rate' end-September (headline incl. one-off), a June price cut took it $11M -> $8M, and engineers of the infrastructure startup Sapiom were pulled in to fix bugs and harden the platform (2026-10-16-polsia-founder-20m-run-rate). Path A (Polsia stays a qualifying one-person company, q 0.5 assumed, kept: the new evidence is two-sided - recurring revenue more than doubled and the founder still presents it as solo, vs outside engineers on the product and a >$1M/month AI bill; q 0.25/0.4/0.6/0.75 below) from $10.98M x 2^N(0,0.5) at 1.2/3.2/12-month doubling (structural: mixed-quantity pairs); path B (other solo operators) from Levels' $2.7M total revenue x recurring share r ~ U(0.5,1.0) (assumed) at 6/15/48 months (structural cross-company mapping, 15.4 mo at the all-recurring reading); T_rev = earlier: p10/50/90 2026.71/2027.34/2032.97 (prev 2026.51/2027.73/2032.98). Medvi excluded (contractors run operations). Oversight gate: work $10M / $177,240 ARR per FTE (SaaS Capital 2026, bootstrapped $5-10M ARR median, survey of >1,000 companies; sourced) = 56.4 FTE = 2,257 h/week; budget 10 h -> L = 226; structural link L = h/c (autonomous runs of up to the 80% horizon, c owner hours per run) -> H = 226 c; c scenarios (structural, weights 0.25/0.5/0.25 = prev's gate mass): daily hand-off per role 2.1 min -> 8.0 h; weekly 10.6 min -> 40 h; monthly 46 min -> 173 h. Since c = 10 h / (56.4 roles x runs per week), L x c = 40 / runs per week: the sourced ARR per FTE and the budget cancel, so the gates 8/40/173.3 h are the hand-off cadences' disclosed scenario assumptions, not an empirical calibration by the survey; the L sensitivities below hold c fixed in hours per run (recomputing c from the cadence formula would leave all three gates unchanged). Cross-checks only: ports' implied c (Ladybird 13 min -> 51 h; Bun 3 min -> 11 h), Vending-Bench 2 (3 points fitted, 0.383 balance doublings per horizon doubling, 'good' $63k at ~64 h), real AI-run shops unprofitable at 1.7 h (gate > 1.7 h). Gate on task-horizon h80_blended_draw (draw i of ledger.py driver-draws task-horizon --as-of 2026-10-18 -> draw i; h80_blended_draw 1.18/1.76/2.56 h with the software conversion error at sd 0.70) with doubling_blended_months: weekly case 40/1.790 = 22.3x = 4.48 doublings x 3.032 mo = 13.6 mo -> 2027.86; T_ovs p10/50/90 2027.25/2027.91/2029.27. ETA = max(T_rev, T_ovs) + quarter 0.25 (wording) + disclosure 0.1/0.4/2.0 (assumed; n 0 disclosed-hours cases, widened). Deterministic oversight path 2028.51. MC (failures assumed, each < 10%: halt 2%, plateau 1%, verify 2%, hours 1% -> p_achieved 0.941): unconditional p10/p50/p90 2028.14/2029.80/2038.69 (10 re-seeds p50 2029.80-2029.82, p90 2038.63-2038.84; 11-seed pool 2028.145/2029.812/2038.720); conditional 2028.12/2029.65/2034.80 (if achieved, during 2029); P(by end-2031) 0.74. Binding: revenue in 83,780 of 200,000 draws (41.9%; 49.4/41.6/35.0% in the daily/weekly/monthly scenarios; almost all of them path-B draws), oversight in 116,220; revenue only 2028.95, oversight only 2028.89. Sensitivities (p50 vs 2029.80): c daily only -0.56, weekly only -0.04, monthly only +0.49; prev gate 10/40/200 +0.04; L equity-backed 263 +0.05, lean work content L 8 (legacy tinyteams) -0.78; adoption lag kept +0.36; path B pace 48 mo +5.35, 6 mo -0.84; q 0 +1.38, q 0.25 +0.67, q 0.4 +0.26, q 0.6 -0.23, q 0.75 -0.54, q 1 -0.91; q 0.25 with path B 48 mo 2036.43 (+6.6); path A level exact (sd 0) 0.00, level sd 1.0 +0.01, pace fixed 1.2 / 12 mo 0.00 / 0.00; path A from prev's $4.64M (2026-05-22) +0.03; r 0.5 +0.25, r 1 -0.18; disclosure 0.1/2.0 -0.74/+1.16; domain software -0.39, remote +0.40; success level 80% (owner decision, audit 2026-10-16-reliability-level; RUBRIC 4.1 step 3: sustained unattended operation), labelled 50% sensitivity 2027.60/2029.32/2038.61 (-0.48), at the blended-50 OLS rate 2.897 mo 2029.13 (-0.67); rate METR long-run +0.83, ~7 mo +1.08; professional-services hours (H x10/7) +0.12, portfolio overhead (H x2) +0.23; failures doubled p_achieved 0.885 (p90 null); each scenario x2: halt/verify p_ach 0.922 (p50 +0.06), plateau/hours 0.932 (+0.03). Cross-checks: no dated proponent claim; no external anchor (pre-anchor p50 2029). Rule 7: prev (2026-10-17-milestone-the-10m-solopreneur) reproduced byte-identically (2028.17/2029.83/2038.69); made_at 2026-10-18 on identical draws: unchanged; path A started from the series' $10.98M (2026-09-15) instead of $4.64M (2026-05-22), new evidence: 2028.14/2029.80/2038.69 (-0.03/-0.03/0.00), small because prev's path A had already extrapolated Polsia past $10M by ~2026.7 (prev's path-A-only revenue date); calendar years and p_achieved unchanged. Prev's precursor sensitivity (start from $3M) is superseded by the central case.
    Window
    Driver
    shared driver task-horizon (drivers.yaml; software conversion error widened 0.553 -> 0.70 doublings, owner option D, audit 2026-10-17-calibration-d; draws via ledger.py driver-draws task-horizon --as-of 2026-10-18 (byte-identical to the 2026-10-17 draws; drivers.yaml unchanged), seed 20261015, n 10000, draw i -> draw i); anchor 2026-09-22 (2026.725): software 7.930 h, remote 0.404 h, blended 1.790 h; conversion errors drawn (software sd 0.70 dbl; remote -0.84/+0.55)
    Current
    horizon-80-software-eci 2024-10-15..2026-09-22: n 16, 0.168 -> 7.930 h, OLS doubling 3.755 mo (95% CI 3.50-4.05, R2 0.984); horizon-80-remote-rli 2025-06-05..2026-09-22: n 11, 0.005 -> 0.404 h, 2.550 mo (2.23-2.98); horizon-80-blended (KPI): n 17, 0.043 -> 1.790 h, 2.917 mo (2.74-3.12, R2 0.986)
    Previous
    halves: software 4.630 (n 6, to 2025-10-15) -> 3.723 mo (n 10); blended 3.020 (n 8) -> 2.635 mo (n 9); remote 2.171 -> 2.106 mo: no slowdown among measured points
    Long run
    METR's own 80% series 2019-2026 6.365 mo (the driver's p90); METR ~7-month long-run doubling (2025-03-19-metr-long-tasks-doubling-rv); METR's page discontinued 2026-09-08 (2026-09-08-metr-time-horizons-page-discontinued)
    Rate distribution
    driver draws p10/p50/p90: doubling_software 2.76/3.75/6.32 mo, doubling_remote 1.87/2.55/6.29, doubling_blended 2.23/3.03/6.31 (unchanged); h80_software_draw 4.34/7.99/14.79 h (prev 4.92/7.98/12.97), h80_blended_draw 1.18/1.76/2.56 h (prev 1.23/1.76/2.43)
    Measurement gap
    26 days since 2026-09-22 on ECI/RLI: unmeasured, not flat (RUBRIC 4.1 step 3); the newer SWE-Marathon point (2026-10-09) sits above the driver path
    Cross checks
    option-D cross-checks (not inputs): swe-marathon-h80-by-release 9.94 h (2026-05-28), 10.68 (2026-09-22), 16.12 (2026-10-09, CI 8.4-31; +0.88 dbl above the driver's median path); horizon-80-gap-swe-marathon +2.23/+1.56/+1.05/+1.05/+0.01/+0.01 (2026-05..10), horizon-80-gap-metr to -0.42 (2026-03); tripwire not fired; terminal-bench-4-pass-by-release 23.64% (2026-05-28) -> 64.85% (2026-09-22); new since prev: aisi-cyber-h80-by-release registered (audit 2026-10-18-aisi-cyber: its ECI slope 0.216 +- 0.032, 0.178 without GPT-5.5, vs the conversion's 0.2226: compatible, too uncertain to validate the extrapolation; owner decision on the driver pending, not applied here)
    Data as of
    2026-09-22 (driver); revenue 2026-09-15 (Polsia subscriptions; founder video 2026-10-16) and 2026-09-23 (Levels); precursor series solo-company-arr-max 2026-09-15
    Change
    Re-assessment on the 2026-10-18 intake. New evidence: the precursor series solo-company-arr-max gained a row, $10.98M (2026-09-15, Polsia subscription MRR x 12 from its public dashboard, 2026-09-15-polsia-subscription-mrr-10-98m), and the founder reported a '$20M run rate', a June price cut and outside (Sapiom) engineers on the product (2026-10-16-polsia-founder-20m-run-rate). Prev (assess:20261017T062255Z) reproduced byte-identically on the 2026-10-17 draws (2026-10-18 draws byte-identical); made_at 2026-10-18 moves nothing. Changed input (rule 7 (a)): path A starts from $10.98M at 2026-09-15 instead of $4.64M at 2026-05-22 -> p10/p50/p90 2028.17/2029.83/2038.69 -> 2028.14/2029.80/2038.69: the revenue condition is now met in most Polsia draws, as prev's path A had projected (3.09-month fitted pace vs 3.2 assumed), so the forecast hardly moves. Kept: q 0.5 (new evidence two-sided: revenue growth vs outside engineers and the founder's workload; q 0.25 +0.67, q 0 +1.38), the oversight gate, path B, disclosure and failures. Calendar years 2028/2029/2038 and p_achieved 0.94 unchanged. Status yellow, unchanged.
    Rubric rule
    Milestone yellow: measurable progress on the driver the oversight clause is tied to (shared driver task-horizon, blended 80% horizon 0.043 -> 1.79 h since Jun 2025, 2.92-month doubling) and on the solo-revenue ladder ($3M -> $10.98M recurring, Polsia, Mar -> Sep 2026), median ETA <= 5 years, but no precursor of the oversight clause, no programme and no independent corroboration of < 10 h/week; not achieved (no one-person company shown at >= $10M recurring for a quarter with < 10 h/week human oversight)
    by assess:20261018T200817Z · 22 evidence event(s)
    Evidence and news: 22 cited by the assessment, 1 other event(s)

    Cited evidence (22)

    Other events (1)

    • 2025-02-17 · data · ●○○ · published 2025-02-17legacy
      Solo-founded startups rose from 22% of new US startups in 2015 to 38% in 2024, per Forbes ('The Future is Solo', Feb 2025).
      Automated Economy Kickoff [1] Forbes: The Future is Solo

Major Open Challenges (assuming "LLMs are enough" hypothesis)

Beyond the framework: 97 event(s)
Latest news: the 8 most recently published of 329 events

All 329 events: the event log

Robots

270 events · latest news published 2026-10-18 (4 days ago)news per week news per week, the 16 weeks to 2026-10-22: 1, 1, 3, 6, 4, 1, 6, 3, 5, 1, 3, 8, 8, 3, 5, 5

KPI

General-purpose robots at work, deployments (one maker at one customer)
11 deployments
22 Oct 2026 · source
45 monthly values, 2023-01-31 to 2026-09-30; range 0 to 10202320260 deployments · Jan 20230 deployments · Feb 20230 deployments · Mar 20230 deployments · Apr 20230 deployments · May 20230 deployments · Jun 20230 deployments · Jul 20230 deployments · Aug 20230 deployments · Sep 20230 deployments · Oct 20230 deployments · Nov 20230 deployments · Dec 20230 deployments · Jan 20240 deployments · Feb 20240 deployments · Mar 20240 deployments · Apr 20240 deployments · May 20240 deployments · Jun 20240 deployments · Jul 20240 deployments · Aug 20240 deployments · Sep 20240 deployments · Oct 20240 deployments · Nov 20240 deployments · Dec 20240 deployments · Jan 20250 deployments · Feb 20250 deployments · Mar 20251 deployments · Apr 20251 deployments · May 20252 deployments · Jun 20253 deployments · Jul 20253 deployments · Aug 20253 deployments · Sep 20253 deployments · Oct 20252 deployments · Nov 20253 deployments · Dec 20254 deployments · Jan 20264 deployments · Feb 20267 deployments · Mar 20268 deployments · Apr 20268 deployments · May 20269 deployments · Jun 20269 deployments · Jul 20269 deployments · Aug 202610 deployments · Sep 2026
updated irregularly
On track: 11 robot deployments at work; net +8 in the last 12 months vs +3 the year before · assessed 2026-10-19

Eleven robot deployments are at work. The count rose by 8 over the last 12 months (9 started, 1 ended) against 3 in the 12 months before, a faster net rise than a year earlier, which is what the pioneering-stage benchmark asks, so the status is green. Since the last assessment, two Galbot deployments from March 2026 were found, in a FamilyMart convenience store and a Nepstar pharmacy in Beijing. The counts are small, and the history comes from one search back through past news that may have missed earlier deployments, so the speed-up is suggestive rather than proven.

The 11 deployment(s) at work as of 22 Oct 2026 (and 2 since reported ended or disputed)
SinceMaker · platformCustomerJobRobotsAutonomy, as reportedStatus
2 Jun 2025Agility Robotics
Digit (humanoid (legged))
GXO Logistics
GXO-run SPANX facility (fulfillment center)
transferring totes from AMRs onto conveyors—“autonomously transferring totes from autonomous mobile robots (AMRs) to conveyors”at work
9 Jul 2025AgiBot
A2-W (humanoid (dual-arm)) · also at 2 other customer(s)
Fulin Precision
Fulin Precision factory, Mianyang
carrying totes (two-shift operation, 800+ totes per shift)—“自主规划路径、调整或暂停作业”at work
17 Dec 2025Spirit AI
Xiaomo (小墨) (humanoid)
CATL
CATL Zhongzhou base
plugging high-voltage test connectors into battery packs at EOL/DCR test stations—“不仅能自主检测线束连接状态,发现异常即时上报”at work
16 Jan 2026Galbot
Galbot S1 (mobile dual-arm robot) · also at 3 other customer(s)
CATLheavy-load material carrying in production—“零遥操、自主服务于真实生产作业流程”at work
12 Mar 2026Galbot
Galbot G1 (wheeled humanoid) · also at 3 other customer(s)
FamilyMart (China)
FamilyMart Zhongguancun Dinghao store, Haidian, Beijing
in-store retail service: fetching and handing fresh food (steamed sweet potatoes; later sausages, cold drinks, hot food) to customers, plus greeting and product guidance—“机器人能够在复杂的店内环境中自主移动、精准感知并流畅完成服务动作;Galbot可独立完成蒸红薯的拿取与递送”at work
13 Mar 2026Galbot
Galbot G1 (wheeled humanoid) · also at 3 other customer(s)
Nepstar (海王星辰) pharmacy chain
Beijing Nepstar (海王星辰) pharmacy, Danling Street store, Haidian, Beijing
fulfilling online pharmacy orders: picking medicines from shelves, checking, packing and placing them in pickup lockers; restocking and stocktaking—“银河通用具身大模型机器人Galbot G1正在自主值守;机器人可自主完成接单、分拣、打包、补货、盘点等全流程自动化操作”at work
27 Mar 2026AgiBot
Nengzai No. 1 (能仔1号) (humanoid) · also at 2 other customer(s)
SAIC Motor
Buick Zhijing (别克至境) E7 battery mass-production line
grabbing battery cells and loading them on a battery mass-production line1“可自主完成电芯来料识别、抓取路径智能规划”at work
14 Apr 2026AgiBot
AgiBot G2 (wheeled humanoid) · also at 2 other customer(s)
Longcheer Technology
Longcheer tablet factory, Nanchang
loading and unloading tablets at MMIT test stations and sorting finished or defective units—“the robots autonomously pick up tablets, navigate complex factory layouts, place devices into testing fixtures”at work
13 Jun 2026UBTech
Walker S2 (humanoid (legged))
Sany Renewable Energy
Sany Renewable Energy wind-power smart factory
industrial material loading and tray handling—“Walker S2上岗国内首个风电5G全连接柔性智能制造工厂,自主进行工业上料及料盘搬运工作”at work
30 Sep 2026Galbot
Galbot G1 (humanoid) · also at 3 other customer(s)
Laobaixing Pharmacy
Laobaixing Pharmacy store, Hongcao Road, Xuhui, Shanghai
fulfilling online pharmacy orders: picking, checking, packing and storing medicines for courier pickup—“机器人可自主完成货架识别、精准取药、多维度视觉核验、自动打包、入柜存件全流程作业,全程无需人工介入”at work
16 Oct 2026Leju Robotics
Kuavo (humanoid)
Zhaofeng Mechanical & Electronic
Zhaofeng Mechanical & Electronic factory, Hangzhou (automotive-parts production line)
fetching, transferring and loading small automotive parts (80–120 mm) onto loading stations of an automotive-parts production line (solution adaptable to 15 stations), in routine operation (60,000+ parts produced)15“机器人自主完成10余个连续动作”at work
6 Apr 2025Figure AI
Figure 02 (humanoid (legged))
BMW Group
BMW plant, South Carolina (body shop)
picking sheet-metal parts from a logistics container and placing them onto a welding fixture in the body shop, in live production hours
ended, reported 19 Nov 2025: loading sheet-metal parts onto welding fixtures (Figure 02 returned to Figure HQ from BMW on its fleet-wide retirement)
ended, reported 7 Oct 2026: sheet-metal loading pilot in the body shop (2025); a 2026 non-production test
1“This isn't a test—this is what autonomous robots in production operations look like”ended
15 Jan 2026Humanoid (UK)
HMND 01 wheeled Alpha (wheeled humanoid)
Siemens
Siemens Electronics Factory, Erlangen, Germany
tote-to-conveyor destacking in the factory's logistics process
ended, reported 15 Jan 2026: two-week proof-of-concept deployment doing tote-to-conveyor destacking in the factory's logistics process (completed)
—“the robot autonomously picked totes from a storage stack, transported them to a conveyor, and placed them at the designated pickup point for human operators”ended
What counts as a deployment, why we count them rather than robots, and the caveats

The KPI, as defined: General-purpose robots at work: the number of deployments (one robot maker at one named outside customer) in which a humanoid or other self-moving robot with arms does production work, autonomously as reported, minus those a later source says ended or credibly disputes. Provisional, for the pioneering stage: to be replaced by a measure of the work done (robots × hours × interventions) once deployments disclose it.

A deployment is one robot maker whose general-purpose robot works for one named outside customer. Four things must hold. The robot moves itself (legs, wheels, a mobile base) and handles the objects of the job: a humanoid, or what the trade calls a mobile manipulator, not an arm bolted in place. It works inside the customer's live operations (a factory line, a warehouse, a store) and the source says what job it does there; a pilot on a live line counts. The customer is an outside organization, not the maker's own or affiliated plant. And a source says the robot works autonomously (on its own, without remote control); not mentioning remote control is not enough.

A deployment counts once, however many robots, sites, jobs or newer models the same customer gets; the same maker at a second customer, or a second maker at the same customer, is a new deployment. The maker is whoever builds the robot, not whoever supplies its AI. Every deployment is in the table above, with the job and the source's words on autonomy.

Not counted: fixed arms or stations, whatever AI drives them (Dyna Robotics' napkin-folding arms, a humanoid torso on a stand at a sorting conveyor); self-driving carts and forklifts, which move but do not handle; robots in their maker's own or affiliated plants; demos, livestreams, showrooms, training centres and tests outside live operations; on-site training or trial runs, unless the source says their output goes into real production; orders, contracts, plans and deliveries with no reported work; a customer named only in a list of sites or users; and work no source calls autonomous.

Why a count of deployments, and why it is provisional

The goal is robots doing human work on their own, so the ideal measure is how much work they do: how many robots, for how many hours, and how often a human has to step in. No one publishes that yet. Analysts count humanoids shipped (about 13,000 in 2025 by Omdia's count, over 18,000 by IDC's), but IDC puts more than 85% of those robots in performances, education, data collection and guided tours, and a shipment says nothing about autonomy. What is documented, one at a time, is deployments, so for this first stage we count those. The number shows how many times a maker has got a robot past demos and into someone else's real operations, and still has it there. It does not show how much work gets done: a deployment with one robot counts the same as one with a hundred. The KPI will be replaced once deployments disclose robots, hours and interventions.

Caveats

Autonomy is as reported by the maker, the customer or the press, and none of the deployments has published how often humans step in. A deployment counts from the day its first qualifying source was published, not from when the work began. It drops out once a source reports it ended, or a credible source (the customer, reporters on site, a regulator) disputes it; a disputed one counts again when a new source documents it working. Both stay in the table, greyed, with that report: later reports never rewrite what the work was, they change the deployment's status and are shown under it. The deployments are those our news gathering finds; the history before October 2026 comes from one search back to 2023, so earlier ones may be missing, most likely Chinese ones.

Status: green when the count rose more in the last 12 months than in the 12 months before (deployments added, less those that dropped out).

How the status was judged: the data window, the pace benchmark, the rule
Assessed quantity
gp-deployments: number of deployments (one robot maker at one named outside customer) in which a humanoid or other self-moving robot with arms does production work, autonomously as reported, minus those a later source says ended or credibly disputes (framework.yaml). Goal direction up; assessed as the net change in the count per 12 months. A deployment counts from the publication of its first qualifying source.
Window
Current
Span
2025-10-19..2026-10-19
Start
3
End
11
Net
8
Added
9
Ended
1
Deployments added
  • Spirit AI/CATL 2025-12-17
  • Galbot/CATL 2026-01-16
  • Galbot/FamilyMart (China) 2026-03-12
  • Galbot/Nepstar pharmacy 2026-03-13
  • AgiBot/SAIC Motor 2026-03-27
  • AgiBot/Longcheer 2026-04-14
  • UBTech/Sany Renewable Energy 2026-06-13
  • Galbot/Laobaixing Pharmacy 2026-09-30
  • Leju/Zhaofeng 2026-10-16
Deployments ended
Figure AI/BMW Group 2025-11-19
Not counted
Humanoid/Siemens: two-week proof of concept reported working and completed the same day (2026-01-15), never enters the count. Dexterity/FedEx: deployment case removed by the owner's 2026-10-19 R1 ruling (single-job box handlers are not general-purpose). Robotera/China Post: torso on a fixed stand (excluded).
Half windows net
2025-10-19..2026-04-19
5
2026-04-19..2026-10-19
3
Previous
Span
2024-10-19..2025-10-19
Start
0
End
3
Net
3
Added
3
Ended
0
Deployments added
  • Figure AI/BMW Group 2025-04-06
  • Agility/GXO 2025-06-02
  • AgiBot/Fulin Precision 2025-07-09
Half windows net
2024-10-19..2025-04-19
1
2025-04-19..2025-10-19
2
Series
2024-1002025-0412025-0622025-0732025-1032025-1122025-1232026-0142026-0372026-0482026-0692026-09102026-10-1911
Rate ratio added
3
P equal rates one sided
0.073
Rate ratio ci80
Low
1.1
High
9.45
Rate ratio ci95
Low
0.75
High
17.23
P net difference ge5 equal rates mc
0.105
Noise
Additions are Poisson counts: P(>=9 of 12 in the current window | equal rates) = 0.073; the 80% CI of the rate ratio (1.10-9.45) now excludes 1, the 95% CI (0.75-17.23) does not. Monte Carlo of the net change under equal entry (6/yr) and exit (0.5/yr) rates: P(net difference >= 5) = 0.105. The rise (net +3, then +8; every half-window positive) is clearly in the goal direction; the acceleration is suggestive, not significant at 95%.
Definition check
Borderline readings (current vs previous, net): drop any one of Spirit AI/CATL (CATL investee), Leju/Zhaofeng (JV partner, billed as a training demonstration) or AgiBot/SAIC Motor (SAIC Financial investee) 7 vs 3; drop all three 5 vs 3; never count Figure/BMW 9 vs 2. The KPI wording lists a store among live operations, so the three Galbot retail deployments count; dropping them 5 vs 3, and dropping them with the three borderline cases 2 vs 3 (the only combination that would leave green: still rising, below the benchmark, yellow).
Source
uv run core/ledger.py series robots-hardware gp-deployments --as-of 2026-10-19, cross-checked against ledger.deployment_roster on the effective events; script and output in the notes
Benchmark
tier 3: own trend, a bigger net rise in deployments at work per year than the year before (pioneering stage; no external benchmark). Current net +8 vs previous +3: above.
Benchmark source
own series (ledger deployment cases), metrics/kpi-assessment.csv
Transients discounted
None. Figure/BMW's end (2025-11-19) is a real exit, netted in the current window.
Data as of
2026-10-19 (day point of today's count; latest deployment 2026-10-16); monthly cadence, not stale.
Change
green -> green. New evidence after prev's run (gather 20261018T222255Z, merged 2026-10-18/19): deployment cases 2026-03-11-galbot-familymart-zhongguancun-store (Galbot G1 in daily service at a FamilyMart store, from 2026-03-12) and 2026-03-13-galbot-g1-nepstar-pharmacy-beijing (Galbot G1 fulfilling pharmacy orders at a Nepstar store), both in the current window; 2026-07-30-dexterity-mech-fedex-hagerstown-trailer-loading-r2 staged and then had its case removed by the owner's R1 ruling of 2026-10-19 (data commit 1ae2a92; framework wording unchanged), so it never counted. Effect: current window added 7 -> 9, net +6 -> +8; previous +3 unchanged; level 9 -> 11; P(equal rates) 0.172 -> 0.073. Prev's method (window arithmetic, Poisson test, borderline sensitivity) kept; the retail-store reading is added as a sensitivity. Status unchanged.
Rubric rule
RUBRIC.md v6 §3: green when the window trend moves in the goal direction at or above the benchmark pace. Window 1 year (deployments added in the last 12 months vs the 12 months before, net of ended ones; metrics/kpi-assessment.csv); benchmark tier 3 (own trend).
by assess:20261019T010556Z · 18 evidence event(s)
Evidence and news: 18 cited by the assessment, 14 other KPI news

Cited evidence (18)

Other events (14)

2 more metric(s) we track
Forecast: robot passes the Coffee Test by 2028 (Manifold)
0.8117 probability
22 Oct 2026 · source
2 daily values, 2026-10-15 to 2026-10-22; range 0.8117 to 0.8117Oct 26Oct 260.8117 probability · 15 Oct 20260.8117 probability · 22 Oct 2026
Forecast: robot passes the Coffee Test by 2026 (Manifold)
0.3329 probability
22 Oct 2026 · source
2 daily values, 2026-10-15 to 2026-10-22; range 0.3329 to 0.3329Oct 26Oct 260.3329 probability · 15 Oct 20260.3329 probability · 22 Oct 2026

Milestone Countdown

Independent fronts: these can fall in any order.
Expected year: dot = median (hollow: after 2100), bar = 80% range. The time axis is compressed: the farther out, the more years per step.
  • The "Wozniak" Test: Robot enters a random, previously unseen home and successfully makes a cup of coffee.Progressing: 56% zero-shot chores in 30 unseen homes; no unseen-home coffee yet, ETA ~2027 · assessed 2026-10-19 · 24 event(s)
    • Random and unseen = not chosen by the robot's developer, and not visited, mapped or scanned beforehand.
    • One independently verified success suffices; the robot may recover from its own mistakes, but no human help.
    No robot has made coffee in a random, previously unseen home; the nearest precursors are Figure's Helix 2.5 at 56% full-task success on three chores in 30 unseen homes, Physical Intelligence's pi0.7 running an espresso machine out of the box, and Sunday's ACT-2 with coffee 'not yet reliable', while a commercial home-cleaning humanoid service (Tau Robotics) still relies on remote operators. Per-home success odds rising at the pace Dyna Robotics' napkin-folding robots have cut their reject rate (an assumed carry-over), the current rate at which labs publish multi-home tests, and a 25% weight on the independent LEAP expert forecast put the ETA in 2027 (80% range 2026-2032, P(by 2100) 97%). Prediction markets (Manifold's Coffee Test) give 33% by end-2026 and 81% by end-2028 against our 13% and 72%, a gap mostly explained by their looser test rules. Yellow, not green, because the precursors are company-reported and independent signals do not corroborate them.
    ETA
    ~2027 (80% range 2026–2032; P(by 2100) 97%)
    ETA cruxes
    First, the mapping: whether unseen-home task success improves at the Dyna odds rate (an independent unseen-home benchmark repeated over time measures it; x4 slower: 2028.55). Then p0 and the qualifying campaign rate (whether labs put coffee in third-party-chosen homes with independent verification; 0.7/yr moves p50 to 2028.90, p0 0.10 to 2028.70) and the LEAP weight (0.5: 2028.80; 0: 2027.55), which is also the crux against manifold-za8292n5qc-p and manifold-92rpicoun9-p. Earlier: a coffee demo by Figure, Physical Intelligence, Sunday or DeepMind in third-party unseen homes; an independent benchmark >= 50%. Later: coffee still 'not reliable' in 2027 releases; independent evaluations far below company numbers; home robots shipping on teleoperation (as Tau's service does); the 2026 Manifold market resolving NO with no unseen-home coffee result.
    Path
    Reading used (owner-decided, framework 66c0e8a): one independently verified autonomous success making a cup of coffee with the home's own equipment, in a home not chosen by the robot's developer and not visited, mapped or scanned beforehand; the robot may recover from its own mistakes, no human help; failed homes do not cancel a success; no time limit. Context only (outside the wording): LEAP's three-home no-mistake test (p50 2029.70); pre-mapped or developer-chosen homes; the Manifold anchors' 20-minute limit; teleoperated home services (Tau). Proxy: per-home success on long-horizon chores and appliance tasks in unseen homes (Helix 2.5, pi0.7), which tracks the coffee task because coffee is one such multi-step appliance task in the same homes; its uncertainty is in p0 (0.10-0.45). Path: generalist VLA policies on mobile manipulators and humanoids (Figure Helix 2.5, Physical Intelligence pi0.7, Sunday ACT-2, Stanford/Caltech HomeBody), 1X NEO home humanoid shipping from 2026.
    Blockers
    • Technical: appliance diversity and liquid handling in unseen homes; coffee 'not yet reliable' per Sunday
    • Corroboration: unseen-home success rates are company-reported; independent benchmarks (BEHAVIOR 12.4%, REALM) show fragile generalization; a commercial home humanoid service (Tau) still runs on teleoperation
    • Safety: home deployment (Agility will not enter homes until falls are provably safe)
    How this was assessed: the data, the benchmark and the rubric rule
    ETA method
    trend (exponential growth of per-home success odds at the shared driver dyna-failure-halving odds rate, mapping assumed) with dated multi-home evaluation campaigns (first success), mixed 75/25 with the independent LEAP forecast remapped to one success; named failure scenarios (each < 10%); Monte Carlo N=10,000 on the driver's canonical draws; compared after the fact with two similar Manifold anchors (no gap)
    ETA calculation
    Per-home coffee success in a random unseen home p0 = 0.25 at 2026.7 (odds lognormal with 10%/90% points at 0.10/0.45), ASSUMED: below Helix 2.5's 56% on three chores in 30 unseen homes (2026-09-17-figure-helix-25-30-homes), above BEHAVIOR's 12.4% (sim, 2025-12-01-behavior-challenge-2025-results); pi0.7 espresso out of the box (2026-04-16-pi07-unseen-kitchens); Sunday coffee not yet reliable (2026-07-16-sunday-act2-laundry-99pct). Failure odds halve every draw i of shared driver dyna-failure-halving odds_halving_months (p50 6.52 mo, draws p10/p90 3.39/11.96; Dyna odds 0.333 -> 0.0753 in 14 mo, 2026-08-27-dyna-din-tai-fung-shift-throughput; mapping ASSUMED). Coffee enters qualifying unseen-home evaluations once p >= 0.35 (assumed): log2(0.54/0.33) = 0.7 halvings -> ~2027.04. Campaigns: MEASURED 4.94/yr unseen-home evaluation releases (7 in 17 mo: 2025-04-22-pi05-unseen-homes-r2, 2025-11-18-pistar06-espresso-13h, 2025-11-19-sunday-act1-unseen-airbnbs, 2026-04-16-pi07-unseen-kitchens, 2026-07-16-sunday-act2-laundry-99pct, 2026-09-17-figure-helix-25-30-homes, 2026-09-27-homebody-gpt6-astra-unseen-kitchen) x ASSUMED 0.5 qualifying = 2.47/yr, 5 homes each (assumed). Trend-only 2026.90/2027.55/2028.90. LEAP (2026-04-20-leap-coffee-test-forecast; superforecasters 2032, experts 2034, midpoint 2033 assumed; three homes without mistakes): 0.794/home, minus trend time log2(3.85/0.54) x 0.543 = 1.55 yr -> ~2031.4 for one success (log-SD 0.49), weight 0.25 (assumed). Failure (assumed, each < 10%): shared stall 0.02; home robots kept out of unscripted appliance use 0.01 (2025-01-01-agility-home-safety-stance-rv) -> p_achieved 0.97. New evidence 2026-10-16-tau-home-cleaning-humanoids-teleoperated (a teleoperated commercial service, not an autonomous unseen-home evaluation): outside the release class, no input changed. MC N=10,000 (made_at 2026.797): conditional 2026.95/2027.80/2031.96; unconditional 2026.95/2027.85/2032.97; P(by end-2026) 0.132, P(by end-2028) 0.720. Pre-anchor p50 2027 (2026-2032, p_a 0.97). Anchors (similar, read after; latest points 2026-10-15): manifold-za8292n5qc-p 0.333 by 2026-12-31 (23 forecasters) vs ours 0.132, diff 0.20; manifold-92rpicoun9-p 0.812 by 2028-12-31 (27 forecasters) vs ours 0.720, diff 0.09; both < 0.35, no gap. Wording explains most of it: the market-event variant (every unseen-home release counts, 4.94/yr; a developer-chosen home lets coffee appear at p 0.2; 20-min limit x0.7 per-home success) gives 0.343 / 0.777; the residual at 2028 (0.035) is our LEAP branch (variant without LEAP: 0.450 / 0.965). Crux vs the markets: weight on independent evidence (LEAP, BEHAVIOR, REALM) vs company unseen-home results. Thin, correlated (same creator and criteria), loosely resolved markets; no move from them. Sensitivities (p50): p0 0.10/0.45 2028.70/2027.30; theta 0.2/0.5 2027.45/2028.30; campaigns 0.7/4.94 per yr 2028.90/2027.60; HomeBody excluded 2027.90; m 1 2028.20; LEAP weight 0/0.5 2027.55/2028.80; LEAP log-SD 0.7 2027.80 (p90 2033.78); LEAP not remapped 2027.85 (p90 2035.11); mapping x2/x4 2028.20/2028.55, fast (task-horizon doubling_software_months 3.75 mo / 7.623) 2027.55; S0 0.08 p_a 0.91; own failure 0.05 p_a 0.931; LEAP's own three-home event (context) 2029.70. Prev (assess:20261015T143612Z) 2026/2027/2032, p_a 0.97, reproduced exactly (2026.94/2027.84/2032.97).
    Data as of
    2026-10 (Helix 2.5 2026-09; Tau 2026-10)
    Change
    yellow -> yellow. New evidence: 2026-10-16-tau-home-cleaning-humanoids-teleoperated (Tau's paid home cleaning with modified Unitree G1s relies on remote operators). It is not an autonomous unseen-home evaluation, so it does not enter the release class or change p0 (rule 7: no input contradicted); it is added to the 'later' crux and the corroboration blocker. Prev reproduced exactly (2026.94/2027.84/2032.97); rerun at made_at 2026-10-19 on the same canonical driver draws: 2026.95/2027.85/2032.97, p_achieved 0.97. Anchors unchanged (no newer points than 2026-10-15), no gap. No quantile moves; the fast-mapping sensitivity now uses the task-horizon driver (metr-horizon retired). Status yellow.
    Rubric rule
    Milestone yellow (RUBRIC v6 §4): measurable progress on the milestone's own quantity (autonomous long-horizon tasks and appliance use in unseen homes), median ETA 2027 <= made_at + 5 yr, but the precursors are company-reported and lack non-proponent corroboration, so yellow, not green. Not achieved: no verified event shows coffee made in a random unseen home.
    by assess:20261019T010556Z · 17 evidence event(s)
    Evidence and news: 17 cited by the assessment, 7 other event(s)

    Cited evidence (17)

    Other events (7)

    • 2026-07-30 · announcement · ●●○ · published 2026-07-30corrected
      Google DeepMind introduced Gemini Robotics 2 on 30 July 2026, reporting whole-body control of Apptronik's Apollo humanoid with success of 68.4% picking up objects from a table, 45.7% from the floor and 76.3% from a shelf, and 32–92% on multi-finger dexterity tasks such as tying a trash bag (44%), in its own evaluations whose environment novelty was not specified.
    • 2026-04-02 · achievement · ●●○ · published 2026-04-02corrected
      Generalist AI reported on 2 April 2026 that its GEN-1 model, pretrained on over 500,000 hours of physical interaction data and fine-tuned with about 1 hour of robot data per task, averaged 99% success on a set of dexterous tasks where its GEN-0 model (November 2025) averaged 64%, running tasks such as folding t-shirts 86 times in a row without intervention.
    • 2025-10 · achievement · ●●○ · published 2026-01-04verified
      In October 2025 Figure AI showed Figure 03 with its Helix VLA picking up novel objects from language commands; Helix controls the full upper body (35 DoF at 200 Hz) and Figure says it can grasp 'virtually any' novel household object.
      The "Wozniak" TestGeneralization [1] Figure AI: Helix
      ↳ corrects (or adds sources to) an earlier record: 2025-10: In October 2025 Figure AI showed Figure 03 with its Helix VLA picking up novel objects…
    • 2025-10 · announcement · ●●○ · published 2026-01-04verified
      1X Technologies opened pre-orders for its NEO home humanoid robot in October 2025 at $20,000 or a $499 monthly subscription.
      The "Wozniak" Test [1] 1X: NEO home robot
      ↳ corrects (or adds sources to) an earlier record: 2025-10: 1X Technologies opened pre-orders for its NEO home humanoid robot in October 2025 at…
    • 2025-03 · announcement · ●●○ · published 2026-01-04verified
      Google DeepMind introduced Gemini Robotics in March 2025, a multi-embodiment vision-language-action model with reasoning that more than doubles generalization performance versus prior models.
      The "Wozniak" TestGeneralization [1] DeepMind: Gemini Robotics
      ↳ corrects (or adds sources to) an earlier record: 2025-03: Google DeepMind introduced Gemini Robotics in March 2025, a multi-embodiment…
    • +2 older event(s): the section's event log
  • The "Fukushima" Test: Robot autonomously navigates a disaster zone and performs a critical repair (valve/switch) within human time limits.Progressing: humanoid ran a staged disaster course autonomously; no autonomous valve fix, ETA ~2027 · assessed 2026-10-19 · 18 event(s)
    • A realistic staged disaster site counts (unscripted, rubble, degraded comms and lighting; DARPA Robotics Challenge style but autonomous); a real disaster is not required.
    In April 2026 X-Humanoid's Tien Kung 3.0 completed Beijing's staged earthquake, flood and fire course fully autonomously, but no autonomous robot has been reported closing the course's emergency valve, and at the same Beijing competition's fall edition on 18 October only 5 of 29 teams ran autonomously and no autonomous humanoid placed (how they did on the valve was not reported). With an assumed navigation and repair success per attempt, a few autonomous attempts per competition, and success odds improving at the pace Dyna Robotics' napkin-folding robots have cut their reject rate (an assumed carry-over), the first qualifying autonomous repair comes ~2027 (80% range 2027-2030, P(by 2100) 95%): the new fall edition adds a second chance each year, but its few autonomous entrants mean fewer attempts per competition. Yellow, not green, because nothing close to an autonomous repair has been reported and no organiser corroborates one.
    ETA
    ~2027 (80% range 2027–2030; P(by 2100) 95%)
    ETA cruxes
    First, the venue baseline: how many autonomous humanoids attempt the valve at each Beijing edition and how they score (round-level results; had the fall edition's autonomous humanoids attempted and failed the valve, p50 would move 2027 -> 2028), and whether venues stage the repair under unscripted degraded conditions and time limits. Second, the mapping of the Dyna rate onto disaster-site manipulation (x4 slower: 2029.30). Earlier: an autonomous valve closure at the April 2027 Beijing challenge or a WRS event; a company staged-site demo. Later: autonomous entries shrinking further, autonomous categories dropped, autonomous teams again skipping manipulation.
    Path
    Reading used (the framework does not define 'human time limits'; definition crux open): with no remote control, a robot crosses an unscripted realistic staged disaster site (rubble, degraded comms and lighting) and completes a valve/switch repair within the time limit the venue sets; a measured human time as comparator is a sensitivity. Venues: Beijing E-Town Robot Warrior Challenge, now with spring and fall editions, autonomous groups per morphology and a humanoid valve-closure task; WRS F-REI Plant Disaster Challenge (valve tasks under comm blackouts); DARPA Triage Challenge (autonomy in smoke and darkness); company staged demos also count. Navigation fleets: Spot at Fukushima/Chernobyl/Sellafield, ANYmal (33,000 autonomous inspections, 200+ deployments). The repair is tied to unseen-environment manipulation because that is the binding capability.
    Blockers
    • Technical: autonomous manipulation under rubble, smoke and degraded comms not yet shown; neither Beijing edition reported an autonomous valve closure
    • Venue: competitions are teleop-dominated (spring 30 remote vs 8 autonomous rounds; fall 24 remote vs 5 autonomous teams, no autonomous humanoid placing)
    • Real sites: Fukushima Daiichi interventions remain teleoperated (not required by the wording)
    How this was assessed: the data, the benchmark and the rubric rule
    ETA method
    driver trend (exponential growth of joint navigation+repair success odds at the shared driver dyna-failure-halving odds rate, mapping assumed) evaluated attempt by attempt at the discrete venue cadence (Beijing spring and fall editions, other autumn venues) plus staged company demos (the fall-2026 valve outcomes are unreported and not used); named failure scenarios (each < 10%); Monte Carlo N=10,000 on the driver's canonical draws; reference-class and prev checks
    ETA calculation
    Navigation: at Beijing E-Town's Robot Warrior Challenge (Apr 2026, 2026-04-18-beijing-robot-warrior-challenge-tien-kung-autonomous; 17 obstacles incl. emergency valve closure, 12-min humanoid limit, 8 autonomous-navigation rounds) Tien Kung 3.0 completed the course autonomously; the other rounds' outcomes are not reported, nor any valve closure. p_nav per attempt ~ Beta(2,8) (mean 0.2): ASSUMED prior. Repair given navigation 0.4 (0.15-0.7), ASSUMED. Joint failure odds halve every draw i of shared driver dyna-failure-halving odds_halving_months (p50 6.52 mo, 2026-08-27-dyna-din-tai-fung-shift-throughput; spread assumed; mapping ASSUMED). Fall edition (18 Oct 2026, 2026-10-18-robot-warrior-fall-no-autonomous-humanoid-placing: ~6,500 m2 outdoor course, 14 tasks incl. valve closure for humanoids, wet surfaces; 24 remote vs 5 autonomous teams across humanoid/quadruped/wheeled groups; full placings name one autonomous winner, a wheeled quadruped, and no autonomous humanoid): MEASURED that an autumn edition with a valve task runs and that autonomous entries are few. Inputs changed (new evidence): autumn venue qualifies 0.4 -> 0.6/yr (assumed: Beijing's fall edition recurs and qualifies, plus irregular WRS); attempts per venue n_eff 4 (2-8) -> 2 (1-5) (assumed from 5 autonomous teams in 3 groups and 8 autonomous rounds in spring; a different unit, so no decline is measured). Valve attempts and outcomes at the fall edition are not reported, and the source does not say a successful repair would have placed: UNKNOWN, not a failure, so the base is not conditioned on them. Opportunities: Beijing each April 0.7, autumn 0.6, staged demos 0.3/yr (assumed). Failure (assumed, each < 10%): shared stall 0.02; no venue or demo ever stages and publishes a qualifying autonomous repair 0.03 -> p_achieved 0.95. MC (N=10,000 driver draws, made_at 2026.797) conditional 2027.30/2027.80/2029.80; unconditional p10 2027.30 / p50 2027.80 / p90 2030.30 (the median falls at the autumn-2027 venue, one venue before April 2028; point: joint odds 0.087 at Apr 2026 -> 29% at Apr 2027, 36% at autumn 2027, cumulative 55%); P(<=2031.80) 0.939. Steps: prev inputs at the new made_at 2027.30/2027.80/2030.25; + autumn 0.6 2027.30/2027.80/2029.80; + n_eff 2 2027.30/2027.80/2030.30 = base. Sensitivities (p50): [not base] fall-2026 unreported attempts treated as failures, P(a=0..3) 0.25/0.35/0.25/0.15 2028.30 (a=3: 2028.30, p90 2030.80); n_eff 4 (prev) 2027.80, n_eff 1 2028.30; autumn 0.4 2028.30; Beijing spring 0.4 2028.30; p_nav Beta(1,9) 2028.30, Beta(4,6) 2027.80; repair 0.15/0.7 2028.30/2027.80; demos 1/yr 2027.80; human-time comparator (nav x0.3) 2028.80; mapping slow x2/x4 2028.30/2029.30 (p90 2032.30/2035.35), fast (task-horizon doubling_software_months 3.75 mo / 7.623) 2027.65; own failure 0.10 -> p_achieved 0.882, p90 null. Reference class: DRC 2015 supervised valve turning -> first fully autonomous staged-course completion 2026 (~11 yr); the remaining step is one manipulation task inside an autonomous run. No proponent dates; no anchors. Prev (assess:20261015T100057Z) 2027/2027/2030, p_achieved 0.95, reproduced exactly (2027.29/2027.79/2030.29).
    Data as of
    2026-10 (Beijing fall edition 2026-10-18; driver Dyna 2026-08)
    Change
    yellow -> yellow. New evidence: 2026-10-18-robot-warrior-fall-no-autonomous-humanoid-placing (Beijing's fall edition: valve task for humanoids, 5 of 29 teams autonomous, no autonomous humanoid placing). Prev reproduced exactly (2027.29/2027.79/2030.29); prev inputs at the new made_at 2027.30/2027.80/2030.25. Inputs changed for this evidence (rule 7 (a)): autumn venue 0.4 -> 0.6/yr (p90 2030.25 -> 2029.80), attempts per venue 4 (2-8) -> 2 (1-5) (p90 -> 2030.30). The fall edition's valve outcomes were not reported, so they are not used. Moves: none at calendar resolution (p10/p50/p90 2027/2027/2030 as prev; decimal 2027.30/2027.80/2030.30); p_achieved 0.95 unchanged. The fast-mapping sensitivity now uses the task-horizon driver. Status yellow.
    Rubric rule
    Milestone yellow (RUBRIC v6 §4): measurable progress (autonomous completion of a staged disaster course within the time limit; unseen-environment manipulation success rising), median ETA 2027 (2027.80) <= made_at + 5 yr, but no autonomous valve/switch repair precursor and no organiser corroboration, so yellow, not green.
    by assess:20261019T010556Z · 16 evidence event(s)
    Evidence and news: 16 cited by the assessment, 2 other event(s)

    Cited evidence (16)

    Other events (2)

    • 2025 · data · ●●○ · published 2026-01-04legacy
      TEPCO retrieved only about 0.9 g of fuel debris in total from Fukushima Daiichi in 2024–2025, against roughly 880 tonnes remaining, with the retrieval robots teleoperated.
      ↳ follows up on 2025-04: TEPCO carried out a second Fukushima Daiichi fuel debris retrieval in April 2025,… (since withdrawn)
    • 2024-11 · achievement · ●●○ · published 2026-01-04corrected
      TEPCO retrieved its first fuel-debris sample from Fukushima Daiichi in November 2024; the sample weighed approximately 0.7 grams.
      ↳ corrects (or adds sources to) an earlier record: 2024-11: TEPCO retrieved the first fuel debris sample (about 0.19 g) from the Fukushima Daiichi…
  • The "Blue Collar" Shift: A general-purpose robot works full shifts in a real workplace (construction, factory, logistics) alongside humans for a month.Progressing: humanoids on real lines 8-24h/day for days-months; interventions undisclosed, ETA ~2027 · assessed 2026-10-19 · 39 event(s)
    • 8h+ shifts on 30 consecutive working days, at ≥90% of the job's required throughput.
    • No teleoperation; a disclosed average of ≤1 human intervention per shift.
    Shift length, multi-month runs and throughput are each shown somewhere (AgiBot G2s on 10-hour days at Longcheer, Galbot's claimed 3+ months of 24/7 work at CATL, 15 Leju humanoids in routine work on a Zhaofeng parts line, Robotera at 1,200 parcels an hour), but no deployer has disclosed intervention counts or teleoperation status, and a Beijing News survey in October 2026 found sustained shift performance unproven. Built from company-claimed hardware reliability, Longcheer's measured task-failure rate and assumed assists, the best site is estimated at about 1.1 human interventions a shift; with failures falling at the pace Dyna Robotics' napkin-folding robots have cut their reject rate (an assumed carry-over), a 30-day run and an assumed disclosure lag, the ETA is late 2027 (80% range 2027-2030, P(by 2100) 95%). Yellow, not green, because the numbers that decide it, interventions per shift and whether the robots are remotely operated, are undisclosed or company claims, with no independent corroboration.
    ETA
    ~2027 (80% range 2027–2030; P(by 2100) 95%)
    ETA cruxes
    First, the mapping: whether intervention rates fall like Dyna's reject fraction (dated intervention-hour logs settle it; a 30-month halving moves p90 to 2034). Then the disclosure lag (2 yr instead of 0.75 moves p50 +1.3 yr). Earlier: AgiBot, Galbot/CATL, Leju/Zhaofeng, Robotera, Figure, Agility or Dyna publishing a month-long intervention log, or a customer/auditor confirming <=1 intervention per shift without teleop. Later: disclosed rates >>1/shift, confirmed teleoperation, deployments rolled back (as Figure at BMW).
    Path
    Reading used: a general-purpose robot works 8h+ shifts on 30 consecutive working days in a real workplace alongside humans at >=90% of required throughput, no teleoperation, with a disclosed average <=1 human intervention per shift, where an intervention is any human action needed to keep it working (fault recovery, reset, tool/hand swap, assist, by an operator or maintenance team); self-performed charging/battery swaps are not interventions. Path: Chinese real-line deployments (AgiBot G2 at Longcheer, 8 robots, whole MMIT section, 99.99% task success; Galbot S1 at CATL 7x24 for 3+ months, claim; 15 Leju Kuavo at Zhaofeng, routine operation, 98% loading success but ~40% of the cycle rate; Robotera at China Post 1,200/h), Agility Digit (65,000 h across customer sites), Figure 03 (200 h continuous run at its own HQ).
    Blockers
    • Disclosure gap: no deployer publishes achieved interventions per shift or teleoperation status; an independent survey (Beijing News, Oct 2026) says takeovers and fault downtime are what must be shown (gather request: intervention-hour logs)
    • Credibility: independent reporting shows overstatement (Forbes Oct 2026: one Figure robot at a time at BMW, 2026 test ended; Robotera needed months of on-site support incl. night supervision; Longcheer relies on a maintenance team)
    • Technical: hour-level MTBF typical for humanoids; UBTech Walker S2 at 30-50% of human productivity, Leju at Zhaofeng ~40% of the line's cycle; joint wear under three-shift duty
    How this was assessed: the data, the benchmark and the rubric rule
    ETA method
    trend (exponential decline of a component-built intervention rate at the shared driver dyna-failure-halving, mapping assumed) plus the literal 30-day run floor and an assumed disclosure lag; named failure scenarios (each < 10%); Monte Carlo N=10,000 on the driver's canonical draws, other components shared with Dark Line; proponent, reference-class and prev cross-checks
    ETA calculation
    Gap: I0 = human interventions per 8-h robot-shift at the best real-line site (mid-2026) vs <=1. Components: hardware 8/MTBF, MTBF 16 h (5-60; centre sourced company claims, 2026-04-14-agibot-humanoid-mtbf-vs-industrial 'two-shift' level, 2026-03-24-agibot-mtbf-hundred-hours upper tail; spread assumed) -> 0.5/shift; task failures 0.133/shift measured (Longcheer 55,107 ops at 99.987% = 7.16 failures over 8 robots x 54 h, 2026-06-28-agibot-longcheer-whole-section-8-robots; forecast 0.15 (0.08-0.5) assumed; robot-hour reading 1.06); share needing a human 0.5 (0.2-1, assumed); other assists 0.3/shift (0.05-1.5, assumed) -> I0 median 1.13 (0.45-3.19), P(<=1) 0.437. Capability = 2026.5 + max(0, log2 I0) x T, T = draw i of shared driver dyna-failure-halving halving_months (p50 7.623 mo measured from 2026-08-27-dyna-din-tai-fung-shift-throughput, reject fraction 25% -> 7% in 14 mo; spread assumed; draws 3.96/7.64/13.98 mo; mapping onto interventions ASSUMED) + 30 working days 0.12 yr (literal floor) + disclosure lag 0.75 yr (0.25-2.5, assumed) -> point 2026.5 + 0.18 x 0.635 + 0.12 + 0.75 = 2027.5. Failure (assumed, each < 10%): shared robotics stall 0.02; no verifiable month-long log ever published or every run disputed 0.03 -> p_achieved 0.951. MC (N=10,000 driver draws, made_at 2026.797) conditional 2027.00/2027.78/2029.65; unconditional p10 2027.01 / p50 2027.84 / p90 2030.56; P(<=2031.80) 0.929. New evidence, no input changed: Zhaofeng (2026-10-16-leju-kuavo-zhaofeng-parts-loading-r2: 15 Leju robots, ~1,000 cumulative running hours over 2+ months 'without failure', >98% loading success, no teleop, company data; 2026-10-18-zhaofeng-kuavo-cycle-gap-lights-out-goal: 35-40 s per load vs 15 s for a skilled worker, ~40% of the line's cycle) is an ambiguous company MTBF claim (hours basis and 'failure' undefined) from a site far below the 90% throughput clause, so it enters as a sensitivity (MTBF 300 h (100-1,000): I0 0.46, p50 2027.58); 2026-10-14-bjnews-shift-performance-unproven (independent: takeovers and fault downtime undisclosed) supports the disclosure lag; 2026-10-09-dyna-din-tai-fung-1000-napkins-per-day (1,000-1,100/day per restaurant vs ~1,590 per 18-h shift in August) is a driver-source update, not refitted here (owner finding). Sensitivities (p50): I0 1.5 (0.4-6) 2028.09; I0 3 (1-10) 2028.62; lag 0 / 2 yr 2027.18 / 2029.15; mapping slow x2 2028.13, x4 (~30 mo, Agility) 2028.58 (p90 2034.75); fast (task-horizon driver doubling_software_months p50 3.75 mo / 7.623) 2027.64; own failure 0.10 -> p_achieved 0.881, p90 null. Proponents, remaining time from made_at x1.5-3: BofA mass adoption from 2028 -> 2028.6-2030.4. Reference class: one live-production chore (Apr 2025) -> multi-robot real-line logs (Jun 2026) in ~15 mo. Prev (assess:20261015T100057Z) 2027/2027/2030, p_achieved 0.951, reproduced exactly (2027.01/2027.84/2030.54).
    Data as of
    2026-10 (baseline Longcheer 2026-06; driver Dyna 2026-08; Zhaofeng 2026-10)
    Change
    yellow -> yellow. New evidence: 2026-10-16-leju-kuavo-zhaofeng-parts-loading-r2 and 2026-10-18-zhaofeng-kuavo-cycle-gap-lights-out-goal (15 humanoids in routine work, company MTBF claim, ~40% of the line's cycle), 2026-10-14-bjnews-shift-performance-unproven (independent: sustained performance unproven), 2026-10-09-dyna-din-tai-fung-1000-napkins-per-day (driver source update). None contradicts an input (rule 7): the Zhaofeng MTBF claim is ambiguous company data from a site below the throughput clause (sensitivity, p50 2027.58), the survey supports the disclosure lag, the Dyna figure bears on the shared driver, which is not refitted here. Prev reproduced exactly (2027.01/2027.84/2030.54); rerun at made_at 2026-10-19 on the same canonical driver draws: 2027.01/2027.84/2030.56, p_achieved 0.951. No quantile moves; the fast-mapping sensitivity now uses the task-horizon driver (metr-horizon was retired). Status yellow.
    Rubric rule
    Milestone yellow (RUBRIC v6 §4): measurable progress on the milestone's own quantity (8h+ real-line shifts, multi-day to multi-month runs, throughput at or above requirement at some sites), median ETA 2027 <= made_at + 5 yr, but the binding metrics (interventions/shift, no teleop) have no non-proponent corroboration (an independent survey, Beijing News Oct 2026, calls sustained performance unproven), so yellow, not green. Not achieved: no verified event discloses an average of <=1 intervention per shift over 30 consecutive working days.
    by assess:20261019T010556Z · 29 evidence event(s)
    Evidence and news: 29 cited by the assessment, 10 other event(s)

    Cited evidence (29)

    Other events (10)

  • Robotaxi Saturation: Autonomous robotaxis outnumber human-driven taxis in a major metropolitan area (driverless transport solved).Progressing: Waymo ~15% of SF ride-hail bookings, flat in 2026; fleet ~4,000 cars, ETA ~2031 · assessed 2026-10-19 · 45 event(s)
    • Taxis include ride-hail; count the vehicles in service at peak.
    • Driverless (SAE L4) service across the metro's service area qualifies; SAE L5 is not required.
    In San Francisco, Waymo took about 15% of the money spent on Waymo, Uber and Lyft trips inside its service zones in June 2026, by YipitData's count of email receipts, slightly down from 16% in January. Meanwhile Waymo's fleet grew from about 2,500 to 4,000 cars between December 2025 and September 2026 as it expanded from 6 to 15 cities. If San Francisco's share stays flat until Waymo's next-generation Ojai vehicles arrive, around early 2027, and then grows as fast as the fleet has, robotaxis would outnumber human-driven taxis and ride-hail cars there around 2031 (80% range 2029-2040, P(by 2100) 92%), later than the previous ETA of 2028, which assumed 2025's ride growth continued. Yellow, not green: the one independent measure of the share shows a stall, so the renewed growth the forecast relies on is not yet corroborated.
    ETA
    ~2031 (80% range 2029–2040; P(by 2100) 92%)
    ETA cruxes
    First, the growth mapping: whether SF's robotaxi share resumes growing like Waymo's fleet (0.58/yr) once Ojai supply arrives, or stays near the 2026 ride/share rate (half the fleet rate: p50 2034; the 2026 ride rate 0.14/yr: 2043). Settles it: YipitData's next SF share readings, a CPUC/SFMTA vehicle count, Waymo's SF fleet size. Then the stall length (1.5 yr: 2032). Earlier: the SF share rising above ~20% in 2027, Waymo reaching ~1M rides/week, Tesla or Zoox adding SF driverless fleets. Later: the share still flat through 2027, Ojai imports delayed (tariffs), a suspension after a serious incident.
    Path
    Reading used (owner-decided, framework 66c0e8a): robotaxis in service outnumber human-driven taxis plus ride-hail cars in service (vehicles on road at peak) in one major metro; driverless SAE L4 across the metro's service area qualifies, L5 not required. Metro = San Francisco. Proxy for the level: YipitData's Waymo share of Waymo+Uber+Lyft bookings inside Waymo's zones (dollars, not vehicles); it tracks the vehicle ratio because trips served and vehicles in service at peak scale together, and the bookings-to-vehicles factor is an assumed input (m, 0.7-1.4). Proxy for the rate: Waymo's fleet (vehicles, the milestone's unit), system-wide; its mapping onto SF is assumed. Path: Waymo (~4,000 cars, 15 US cities, Ojai/6th-gen driver ramping, $16B raised); second routes: China (Apollo Go, Pony.ai 1,975 cars and Guangzhou city-centre service, WeRide), Tesla (unsupervised in Texas/Florida, SF still with safety drivers), Zoox (NHTSA exemption up to 2,500/yr).
    Blockers
    • Data: no SF vehicle counts; one share series (YipitData, two points) (gather request: Yipit updates, CPUC/SFMTA counts, Waymo SF fleet)
    • Supply: Waymo's SF share flat in H1 2026 while its fleet went to new cities; growth depends on the Ojai vehicle ramp
    • Safety/regulatory: Santa Monica child struck (NHTSA PE26001), NTSB on remote assistance passing a school bus; China paused new AV licences after the Wuhan mass stall (no reported end as of 2026-10-19)
    How this was assessed: the data, the benchmark and the rubric rule
    ETA method
    trend (exponential growth of the logistic SF robotaxi/human vehicle odds) from the measured SF booking-share level (YipitData, a proxy), held flat for an assumed supply stall, then growing at the measured Waymo fleet growth (mapping assumed), plus an assumed publication lag; named failure scenarios (each < 10%); Monte Carlo N=200k (no shared driver); prev, proponent and reference-class cross-checks
    ETA calculation
    Level: YipitData SF Waymo share of Waymo+Uber+Lyft gross bookings inside Waymo's zones 16% (Jan 2026) -> 15% (Jun 2026) (2026-06-01-yipit-waymo-15pct-sf-bookings, MEASURED proxy; LA 17->15, Phoenix 19->16): odds 0.190 -> 0.176, g = ln(0.176/0.190)/(5/12) = -0.18/yr (whole-percent rounding range -0.37..0). Bookings-to-vehicles-in-service mapping m = 1 (0.7-1.4), ASSUMED (prev's vehicle composite r0 0.16 at Dec 2025 = 0.84 x Yipit's Jan odds). Growth: Waymo fleet ~2,500 (Dec 2025, 2025-12-01-waymo-450k-weekly-rides) -> ~3,000 (Mar 2026, 2026-03-24-waymo-3000-cars-500k-weekly-rides) -> ~4,000 in 15 cities (24 Sep 2026, 2026-09-24-waymo-fleet-4000-texas-1102; Texas 1,102 registered, +49% in 3 weeks as Ojai arrives): g_fleet = ln(1.6)/0.81 = 0.58/yr MEASURED; rides 450k -> 500k/wk = 0.13/yr (2025: 250k -> 450k = 0.88/yr). Model: SF odds flat for a stall D = 0.55 yr (0.2-1.6) after Jun 2026 (ASSUMED: the named constraint is vehicle supply, easing as Ojai vehicles arrive; SF Ojai riders since 2026-05-28-waymo-ojai-mesa-tens-of-thousands), then growth g ~ N(0.58, 0.30), floor 0.15 (mapping system fleet -> SF odds ASSUMED; spread and floor prev's, ASSUMED, kept), up to odds 1 (logistic odds grow exponentially, no early S-curve slowdown), + publication lag 0.4 yr (0.15-1.2, assumed). Point: 2026.45 + 0.55 + ln(1/0.176)/0.58 (= 2.99) + 0.4 = 2030.4. Failure (assumed, each < 10%): permanent regulatory reversal in every lead metro 0.02 (Cruise ended one operator; Wuhan's city suspension of Apollo Go was temporary, existing service partly resuming in three districts after ~4 months, 2026-08-03-apollo-go-wuhan-service-resumes; China's national pause on new AV licences, fleet additions, test programmes and new cities, 2026-04-29-china-pauses-new-av-licences, 'for an unknown period', has no reported end: unresolved, duration unmeasured. Kept at 0.02 because the scenario needs a permanent reversal in every lead metro including SF, where no halt is reported; the open China pause freezes the second route's expansion. F1 0.04 (failure 0.10): p_a 0.90, p50 2031.11, p90 2067.50); economics/competition plateau below parity in every major metro through 2100 0.05 (raised from 0.02: the share fell in all three Yipit metros in H1 2026); parity never counted 0.01 -> p_achieved 0.92. MC (N=200k) conditional 2029.14/2030.82/2036.55; unconditional p10 2029.18 / p50 2031.05 / p90 2040.57 (p90 sits at the 98th conditional percentile, set by the low-g tail); P(by 2031.80) 0.608; P(by end-2030) 0.493. Attribution vs prev 2027.60/2028.62/2031.58, p_a 0.95: new level and fleet rate, no stall 2028.60/2030.15/2038.08; + stall 2029.16/2030.95/2038.85; + plateau 0.05 2029.18/2031.05/2040.57, p_a 0.92. Prev's own mapping (SF odds grow like system rides) on the 2026 ride rate (0.13/yr, run at 0.14) gives p50 2041.47. Sensitivities (p50): no stall 2030.23; stall 1.5 yr 2032.30, 0.25 yr 2030.56; g 0.88 (2025 rides) 2029.84; g 0.29 (half) 2034.61 (CRUX); g 0.14 without a stall 2043.14 (CRUX); g SD 0.15/0.40 2030.86/2031.15 (p90 2035.04/2041.43); floor 0.05/0.25 p90 2061.82/2036.26; m 0.84/0.6/1.4 2031.36/2031.97/2030.43; lag 0/1.2 2030.45/2032.20; plateau 0.02 (prev failure 0.05) 2030.95 (p90 2038.85), failure 0.15 p_a 0.85, p90 null. Cross-checks: Waymo's 1M rides/wk by end-2026 target (2026-02-24-waymo-four-metros-1m-weekly-target, proponent: 2x in ~10 months) and Goldman's 7k -> 1M global fleet 2025-2030 (2026-04-30-goldman-robotaxi-fleet-1m-2030, 2.7x/yr) discounted 1.5-3x both imply growth at or above g 0.58 once supply flows; the Yipit stall says it has not yet. Reference class: operator stalls so far were incident- or supply-driven and lasted months (Wuhan suspension Apr-Aug 2026, 2026-08-03-apollo-go-wuhan-service-resumes; Cruise ended; China's national licence pause still open). No anchors. Prev (assess:20261015T100057Z) 2027/2028/2031, p_a 0.95, reproduced exactly (2027.60/2028.62/2031.58). p50 lies at 2031.05: a slightly earlier input reads as 2030.
    Data as of
    2026-09 (Waymo fleet 2026-09-24; SF share 2026-06)
    Change
    yellow -> yellow. New evidence (gather 20261018, 25 robotaxi events published Jan-Sep 2026): Waymo ~3,000 cars and 500k rides/wk (Mar 2026), ~4,000 cars in 15 cities at 500k rides/wk (Sep 2026); YipitData SF booking share 16% -> 15% (Jan -> Jun 2026); Apollo Go Wuhan stall, suspension and partial resumption; China's national licence pause (no reported end); Pony.ai 1,975 cars; Tesla unsupervised in 6 metros (42 registered in Texas); Zoox exemption. Prev's model (odds growing at Waymo's 2025 system ride rate 0.88/yr from a Dec 2025 composite level) is contradicted (rule 7 (a)): system rides grew 0.13/yr and the SF share fell. Replaced inputs: level = Yipit SF share (Jun 2026) x assumed bookings-to-vehicles factor, instead of the assumed SF fleet / on-road / denominator composite; rate = measured Waymo fleet growth 0.58/yr after an assumed supply stall (0.55 yr), instead of the 2025 ride rate; plateau scenario 0.02 -> 0.05 (Yipit: share fell in all three metros). Kept: growth spread SD 0.30 and floor 0.15, lag, F1 0.02 (the China licence pause is open but SF has no halt), F3. Moves: p10 2027 -> 2029 (2027.60 -> 2028.60 new level and rate, -> 2029.16 stall, -> 2029.18 plateau), p50 2028 -> 2031 (2028.62 -> 2030.15 new level and rate, -> 2030.95 stall, -> 2031.05 plateau), p90 2031 -> 2040 (2031.58 -> 2038.08 new level and the lower rate centre, whose spread reaches a slower tail -> 2038.85 stall -> 2040.57 plateau: p_achieved 0.92 puts p90 in the low-growth tail), p_achieved 0.95 -> 0.92 (plateau scenario). Status yellow unchanged.
    Rubric rule
    Milestone yellow (RUBRIC v6 §4): measurable progress on the milestone's quantity (SF robotaxi share, ~15% of bookings; Waymo fleet 2,500 -> 4,000), median ETA 2031 (2031.05) <= made_at + 5 yr (2031.80), but green's corroboration condition fails: the only non-proponent measure of the SF share (YipitData) shows it flat to falling in H1 2026, and the resumed growth the median relies on rests on Waymo's fleet and supply plans. Not achieved: no event shows robotaxis outnumbering taxis + ride-hail in a metro.
    by assess:20261019T010556Z · 42 evidence event(s)
    Evidence and news: 42 cited by the assessment, 3 other event(s)

    Cited evidence (42)

    Other events (3)

    • 2025-11 · setback · ●○○ · published 2025-12-10verified
      A Waymo robotaxi killed a dog in November 2025, the company's second animal fatality in two months.
      ↳ corrects (or adds sources to) an earlier record: 2025-11: A Waymo robotaxi killed a dog in November 2025, the company's second animal fatality in…
    • 2025-11 · projection · ●●○ · published 2025-11-13corrected
      Baidu said Apollo Go's Wuhan operations were nearing break-even and projected to achieve profitability by 2025.
      ↳ corrects (or adds sources to) an earlier record: 2025-11: Baidu said Apollo Go's Wuhan operations were nearing break-even and projected to…
    • 2025-10 · setback · ●○○ · published 2025-12-10verified
      A Waymo robotaxi killed a cat in October 2025, raising questions about its sensor detection.
      ↳ corrects (or adds sources to) an earlier record: 2025-10: A Waymo robotaxi killed a cat in October 2025, raising questions about its sensor…
  • The Dark Line: A production line staffed only by general-purpose robots runs a full week, 24/7, with no humans on the floor.Progressing: 15 humanoids load 15 stations beside workers; no 24/7 robot-only line, ETA ~2031 · assessed 2026-10-19 · 23 event(s)
    • A real line of 5+ stations; robots also do material moves and routine maintenance, including their own (charging, battery swaps).
    • ≥90% of the line's required throughput, with one product changeover by software alone during the run.
    • Purpose-built lights-out automation ("dark factories") does not count; it is reported under Beyond. General-purpose = robots that software alone could move to other jobs (humanoids, mobile manipulators), not machines built for this line.
    • No teleoperation and no remote fault-fixing; a remote human may only give job-level orders (e.g. start the changeover).
    No report shows a 5+ station line run only by robots round the clock with no humans on the floor; the nearest are 15 Leju humanoids loading parts at 15 stations of Zhaofeng's line alongside workers, at about 40% of the line's cycle rate, and 8 AgiBot G2s running Longcheer's test section 10 hours a day with a maintenance team. With the same breakdown, task-failure and assist rates as the Blue Collar Shift estimate, a 7-robot line with 3 spares would need a human about 105 times a week; with those rates falling at the pace Dyna Robotics' napkin-folding robots have cut their reject rate (an assumed carry-over), and allowing for the throughput and changeover requirements and for how often anyone stages an attempt, the first qualifying week comes ~2031 (P(by 2100) 88%). Yellow: the ETA is just inside 5 years, but there is no robot-only multi-station precursor or corroborated human-free 24/7 run.
    ETA
    ~2031 (80% range 2028–never/after 2100; P(by 2100) 88%)
    ETA cruxes
    First, the mapping: whether breakdown and intervention rates halve like Dyna's reject fraction (halving twice as slow moves p50 to 2035.15); dated MTBF and intervention-hour logs settle it. Then the attempt rate (1/yr: 2032.71), the economics scenario (own failure 0.25: p_achieved 0.735) and the size of other human assists (1.5/shift: 2032.09). Earlier: a disclosed MTBF >= 100 h at a real site (Zhaofeng's claim, if documented); a staged multi-robot 24/7 week; robots doing line maintenance (Zhaofeng's changeover recalibration) or a software-only changeover. Later: MTBF stuck at hour level, multi-robot collisions, humanoid lines far below required throughput, programmes scaled back.
    Path
    Reading used (owner-decided wording, framework 17ea1bf): a real line of 5+ stations staffed only by robots not purpose-built for it (humanoids/mobile manipulators running general models), no human entering the floor for 168 h, no teleoperation and no remote fault-fixing (a remote human only gives job-level orders). The line's own machines may be automated; the jobs people do (loading, moves, inspection, upkeep) must be done by general-purpose robots. Nearest precursors: Leju Kuavo at Zhaofeng (15 robots at 15 stations of an auto-parts line, workers present, ~40% of the cycle, exploring robot recalibration at changeovers and a lights-out closed loop); AgiBot G2 at Longcheer (8 robots, whole MMIT section, day shifts, maintenance team); Galbot S1 at CATL (7x24 bin moves, claim); Figure 03 HQ fleet with self-charging rotation (claim); autonomous battery swap (UBTech, Atlas). Path: the Blue Collar reliability components driven ~7 halvings lower, plus software changeover, then a staged multi-station week; throughput modelled as a gate on the bottleneck station; scheduled joint service falls outside a one-week run.
    Blockers
    • Technical: ~105 human-needed events per robot-line-week today (hour- to two-shift-level MTBF, task failures, assists) vs ~0.7 needed; multi-robot collisions when scaling (Longcheer)
    • Technical: robot-performed routine line maintenance and a software-only changeover not demonstrated (UBTech needs human tool swaps; Zhaofeng only exploring robot recalibration)
    • Economic: purpose-built automation may be cheaper (Zhaofeng: robots fill gaps between automated processes), so the line may only be staged as a showcase
    • Disclosure: no deployer publishes human-presence or intervention data
    • Throughput: single stations shown at 90-106% of need (company claims), but Zhaofeng's 15-station line runs at ~40% of its cycle and UBTech at 30-50% of human productivity
    How this was assessed: the data, the benchmark and the rubric rule
    ETA method
    driver trend (exponential decline of breakdown, task-failure and assist rates at the shared driver dyna-failure-halving, mapping assumed) in an explicit one-week model (finite spares net of robots away charging, fault absorption, software changeover, >= 90% throughput gate) with dated staged attempts, setup and report lag; named failure scenarios (each < 10%); Monte Carlo N=10,000 on the driver's canonical draws, components shared with Blue Collar; discounted-proponent and reference-class checks
    ETA calculation
    Week: 7 active robots (5 stations + 2 movers, assumed) x 168 h, K = 3 spares (assumed) minus robots away charging round(7 x cfrac), cfrac 0.10 (0.02-0.25, assumed; self-swap/charging per 2025-07-17-ubtech-walker-s2-autonomous-battery-swap, 2026-01-05-atlas-product-self-battery-swap, 2026-02-22-figure-03-hq-24-7-no-babysitter). Per-robot rates (Blue Collar components, same draws): hardware 8/MTBF (MTBF 16 h sourced company claim, spread 5-60 assumed), task failures 0.133/8h measured (2026-06-28-agibot-longcheer-whole-section-8-robots; spread 0.08-0.5 assumed) x 0.5 needing a human (assumed), other assists 0.3/shift (assumed). Absorption 0.6 (assumed). Mid-2026: unabsorbable 105/week (38-328), absorbable 43/week. P(week) = exp(-lam_na) x P(Poisson(lam_m) <= K_eff) x p_changeover (0.3, assumed) x [throughput gate]. All event rates halve every draw i of shared driver dyna-failure-halving halving_months (p50 7.623 mo measured, 2026-08-27-dyna-din-tai-fung-shift-throughput; spread assumed; mapping ASSUMED); changeover odds at its odds_halving_months; bottleneck throughput b0 0.7 (0.4-1.0, assumed; Zhaofeng's 15 s needed / 35-40 s per load = 0.40, 2026-10-18-zhaofeng-kuavo-cycle-gap-lights-out-goal, sits at the low end) x availability 0.95 (assumed) doubling at its throughput_doubling_months (p50 8.10) must reach 0.90: gate 10/50/90/99% 2026.50/2026.76/2027.41/2028.30, nonbinding at base. Point: lam_na 105 -> 0.7 needs 7.2 halvings x 0.635 yr = 4.6 yr -> ~2031.1 for a 50% week. Attempts Poisson 6/yr (assumed) from made_at + setup 0.4 yr (assumed); report lag 0.15 yr (assumed). Failure (assumed, each < 10%): shared stall 0.02; purpose-built automation cheaper so no qualifying staged line 0.08 (Zhaofeng's GM: robots fill the manual gaps between automated processes; its chairman's lights-out goal points the other way; neither moves it); never verifiably disclosed 0.02 -> p_achieved 0.882. MC (N=10,000 driver draws, made_at 2026.797) conditional 2028.88/2030.89/2034.47; unconditional p10 2028.97 / p50 2031.28 / p90 null; P(<=2031.80) 0.578, P(<=2036.80) 0.857. Sensitivities (p50): mapping slow x2 2035.15 (CRUX), x4 2042.55, fast (task-horizon doubling_software_months 3.75 mo / 7.623) 2029.23; b0 0.4 (Zhaofeng) 2031.28 (nonbinding), b0 0.4 with doubling x4 2031.47; MTBF 60 h 2030.80, MTBF per the Zhaofeng claim 300 h (100-1,000) 2030.67; other assists 1.5/shift 2032.09; attempts 1/yr 2032.71; 15 active robots (Zhaofeng's scale) 2032.12; own failure 0.05/0.25 -> p_achieved 0.931/0.735 (p50 2031.11/2031.99); shared stall 0.08 -> 0.827, 2031.49; prev's full table (cfrac, absorption, K, changeover, setup, lag, dark-floor x2) unchanged in structure, each within +-0.7 yr. Discounted proponents: Aitu 2028-2030 multi-process scale-up (2026-07-23-xinhua-single-process-not-full-line) x1.5-3 -> 2030.1-2033.4; Zhaofeng's chairman expects the 15 s cycle in 6-12 months -> 2027.5-2029.8 for line-rate throughput, consistent with the nonbinding gate. Prev (assess:20261015T100057Z) 2028/2031/null, p_achieved 0.882, reproduced exactly (2028.97/2031.28).
    Data as of
    baseline 2026-06 (Longcheer); driver 2026-08 (Dyna); context to 2026-10 (Zhaofeng)
    Change
    yellow -> yellow. New evidence: 2026-10-16-leju-kuavo-zhaofeng-parts-loading-r2 and 2026-10-18-zhaofeng-kuavo-cycle-gap-lights-out-goal (15 humanoids at 15 stations with workers present, 35-40 s vs 15 s cycle, robot recalibration and lights-out explored, robots fill gaps between automated processes). No input contradicted (rule 7): the cycle ratio 0.40 is at the low end of the assumed b0 range and the gate stays nonbinding; the MTBF claim is ambiguous company data (sensitivity 2030.67); the lights-out goal and the gap-filling quote bear on scenario D1 in opposite directions and leave it at 0.08. Prev reproduced exactly; rerun at made_at 2026-10-19 on the same driver draws: 2028.97/2031.28/null, p_achieved 0.882 (conditional p10 2028.89 -> 2028.88). No move. The fast-mapping sensitivity now uses the task-horizon driver (metr-horizon retired): 2029.41 -> 2029.23. Status yellow.
    Rubric rule
    Milestone yellow (RUBRIC v6 §4): measurable progress on the drivers the milestone is tied to (multi-robot real-line operation, now 15 robots at 15 stations; MTBF, task success, autonomous charging/battery swap), median ETA 2031 <= made_at + 5 yr (2031.80) but the path is not fully evidenced (no robot-only multi-station precursor, no corroborated human-free 24/7 run), so yellow, not green.
    by assess:20261019T010556Z · 23 evidence event(s)
    Evidence and news: 23 cited by the assessment

    Cited evidence (23)

Major Open Challenges

Beyond the framework: 58 event(s)
  • 2026-09-30 · data · ●●○ · published 2026-09-30verified
    The IFR's World Robotics 2026 Service Robots report (30 September 2026) said global sales of professional service robots rose 24% to almost 250,000 units in 2025 (transport and logistics 117,500, a 47% share) and consumer service robots 37% to almost 34.2 million, and that about 7,000 full-size humanoids (above 140 cm) intended for commercial and professional uses beyond R&D and entertainment were sold worldwide in 2025, while most current humanoid applications remain specialized and often require human teleoperation.
  • 2026-09-24 · data · ●●○ · published 2026-09-24verified
    The IFR's World Robotics 2026 report (24 September 2026) said the global operational stock of industrial robots rose 9% to a record 5 million units in 2025 as annual installations rose 11% to more than 600,000, with China installing 354,000 (up 20%, 59% of the world total; Chinese suppliers 55% of their home market), the United States overtaking Japan as the second-largest market with almost 38,500 (up 12%) versus Japan's 36,219 (down 19%), and forecast installations of 655,000 in 2026 (up 9%) and 806,000 in 2029.
  • 2026-09-18 · announcement · ●○○ · published 2026-09-18corrected
    CNMO reported on 18 September 2026 that Lei Jun, sharing a CCTV News visit to Xiaomi's Changping phone factory, said its in-house iBrain industrial-AI system cut engineers' manual parameter tuning (e.g. battery-cover assembly to a 0.05 mm gap) from 4 hours to 2 minutes and on-site anomaly handling from 2 hours to 3 minutes; CNMO added, citing official information, that the factory's modular lines (key processes 100% automated, 96.8% self-developed hardware) can switch products within 10 hours and turn out one phone every 6 seconds per line (600 per hour per line) — iBrain recommends parameters and anomalies are still handled on site, and no staffing or actual output figure was given (purpose-built lines, no general-purpose robots).
  • 2026-09-16 · data · ●○○ · published 2026-09-16corrected
    China's National Bureau of Statistics reported on 16 September 2026 that industrial enterprises above designated size produced 729,352 sets of industrial robots in January–August 2026 (up 29.0% year on year; 96,174 in August alone, up 34.6%) and 13,931,863 sets of service robots (up 12.1%).
  • 2026-08-27 · setback · ●○○ · published 2026-08-28verified
    Security researcher Olivier Laflamme disclosed on 27 August 2026 two independent root remote-code-execution chains in Unitree's G1 EDU humanoid (CVE-2026-76639, network-adjacent, and CVE-2026-76640, starting over Bluetooth Low Energy without pairing), after Unitree had patched a related cloud robot-ownership check in July 2026, with no fixed firmware release for either flaw verified as of the disclosure, The Hacker News reported.
  • +53 older event(s): the section's event log
Latest news: the 8 most recently published of 270 events

All 270 events: the event log

Rockets and Space

189 events · latest news published 2026-10-15 (7 days ago)news per week news per week, the 16 weeks to 2026-10-22: 1, 3, 4, 1, 4, 2, 1, 4, 3, 3, 3, 3, 8, 1, 5, 0

What child hasn't looked at the starry sky in wonder? The universe promises many worlds humanity could spread to — removing some eggs from the "one basket", a new age of discovery, making all raw materials cheap, and vast opportunities for community independence. And if nothing else, transport by orbital flights is the next best thing to teleportation, allowing you to reach the opposite side of the globe in 90 minutes.

KPI

Cheapest launch to low Earth orbit, per kg (constant 2025 $)
1673 $/kg
2025 · source
64 annual values, 1962-12-31 to 2025-12-31; range 1673 to 177031962202517703 $/kg · 196217703 $/kg · 196317703 $/kg · 19649743 $/kg · 19659743 $/kg · 19666416 $/kg · 19676416 $/kg · 19686416 $/kg · 19696416 $/kg · 19716416 $/kg · 19726416 $/kg · 19739743 $/kg · 19749743 $/kg · 19759743 $/kg · 19769743 $/kg · 19779743 $/kg · 19789743 $/kg · 19799743 $/kg · 19809743 $/kg · 19819743 $/kg · 19829743 $/kg · 19839743 $/kg · 19846059 $/kg · 19856059 $/kg · 19876059 $/kg · 19886059 $/kg · 19896059 $/kg · 19906059 $/kg · 19916059 $/kg · 19926059 $/kg · 19936059 $/kg · 19946059 $/kg · 19956059 $/kg · 19966059 $/kg · 19976059 $/kg · 19986059 $/kg · 19996059 $/kg · 20006059 $/kg · 20026059 $/kg · 20036059 $/kg · 20046059 $/kg · 20056059 $/kg · 20066059 $/kg · 20076059 $/kg · 20086059 $/kg · 20096059 $/kg · 20106059 $/kg · 20115758 $/kg · 20125675 $/kg · 20135347 $/kg · 20145347 $/kg · 20153648 $/kg · 20161809 $/kg · 20181776 $/kg · 20191755 $/kg · 20201676 $/kg · 20211673 $/kg · 20221673 $/kg · 20231673 $/kg · 20241673 $/kg · 2025
next update due by 15 Jan 2027
Stalled: $1,673/kg (2025, Falcon Heavy); 2021-25 -0.04%/yr vs its own long-run -2.4%/yr · assessed 2026-10-18

The cheapest ride to orbit has cost about $1,673/kg (Falcon Heavy) every year since 2021: -0.04%/yr over 2021-2025, after falling 19%/yr over 2016-2020. The benchmark is the price's own long-run decline of 2.4%/yr since 1962; against it the 2021-2025 trend is flat, so the status is red (Stalled). Prices published in 2026 do not break the stall: Falcon 9's list price rose to $74M (about $3,360/kg) and SpaceX's rideshare price rose too. The one thing that could change this: Starship's first disclosed launch price ($90M for the Starlab station, about $900/kg at its 100-tonne design capacity) would roughly halve the 2026 figure if it counts as a published price for a rocket in service.

The KPI's precise definition

The KPI, as defined: Cost to LEO ($/kg): the cheapest published price per kg to low Earth orbit of a dedicated launch among the rockets in service, inflation-adjusted (constant 2025 $)

How the status was judged: the data window, the pace benchmark, the rule
Assessed quantity
cost-to-leo-best-real: cheapest published price per kg to LEO of a dedicated launch among the rockets in service each year (JSR GCAT), constant 2025 $ (BLS CPI-U); list prices (Falcon 9, Falcon Heavy) where published, CSIS $/kg otherwise; goal_direction down. A year without a list row holds the last listed year's real value (collector rule, commit 1d31c3c).
Window
Current
Span
2021-2025
Values 2025 $ per kg
2021167620221673202316732024167320251673
OLS log slope per yr
-0.0004
OLS log slope SE
0.0002
% per yr
-0.04
Endpoint change %
-0.18
Half means
2021-2022
1674
2023-2025
1673
Cheapest
Falcon Heavy every year; 2021 list $90M/63,800 kg, 2022 $97M/63,800 kg; 2023-2025 hold the 2022 list price in real terms
Previous
Span
2016-2020
Values 2025 $ per kg
2016364820173572201818092019177620201755
OLS log slope per yr
-0.2162
OLS log slope SE
0.0666
% per yr
-19.44
Endpoint cagr %
-16.72
Cross check falcon9 nominal usd per kg
2021
2719
2022
2939
2023
3045
2024
3170
2025
3175
2026
3364
Note
list-price-falcon-9 / list-leo-kg-falcon-9 (2026: $74M / 22,000 kg); real 2021-25 ~3,231 -> 3,175 (prev), flat; 2026 CPI not yet published
Cross check rideshare nominal usd per kg
2020
5000
2021
5000
2022
5500
2023
5500
2024
6000
2025
6500
2026
7000
Note
rideshare-price-per-kg-spacex (side series): rising
Noise
the series moves only by list-price steps and CPI timing; Falcon 9 real $/kg wanders ±1% year to year, so -0.04%/yr is flat within noise
Source
uv run core/ledger.py series rockets cost-to-leo-best-real --as-of 2026-10-18 (64 rows, 1962-2025, unchanged since prev); OLS by kpi_calc.py in ledger/assessments/notes/rockets/20261018T191702Z.md
Benchmark
tier 3: own long-run decline of the best $/kg: OLS -2.37%/yr over 1962-2025 (17,703 -> 1,673 $/kg); 1996-2025 OLS -5.16%/yr. The current window, -0.04%/yr, is far below either and not clearly negative.
Benchmark source
own series (cost-to-leo-best-real: published list prices deflated with CPI, CSIS $/kg where no list price; rockets in service per JSR GCAT)
Transients discounted
None. The stall spans the full window and has no named cause with an expected reversal. Starship pricing is not yet an observation: the $90.0M Starlab launch commitment (2026-03-10-starlab-starship-launch-90m; ~900 $/kg nominal at the 100 t V3 capacity, 2026-05-20-spacex-s1-starship-payload-h2-2026) is a contract disclosure for a future launch, Starship reached orbit with payload only on 2026-09-28, and whether the collector's 2026 row counts it is open (crux). The ~$100/kg figure and the S-1 -99% target are projections (rule 5).
Data as of
2025 (row published 2026-01-15); annual cadence, the 2026 row is due after year-end: not stale.
Change
No change in status or numbers: no new observation of cost-to-leo-best-real (still 1962-2025, the 2026 row is due after year-end); kpi_calc.py reproduces prev's window statistics exactly. New since prev (all published before prev's made_at, merged by the 2026-10-18 gather): Falcon 9 2026 list price $74M (3,364 $/kg nominal, up), rideshare 7,000 $/kg (up), Starship's first disclosed dedicated-launch price ($90M for Starlab), Kinetica-2 cost claim, the PNAS Nexus experience-curve study (an average-cost series, not the cheapest list price), and SpaceX turning away dedicated Falcon customers after 2028; none is an observation of the assessed metric. Label: removed '(tier 3)', which RUBRIC §6 keeps out of labels (the tier stays in basis.benchmark).
Rubric rule
RUBRIC.md v6 §3: red when the window trend is flat within noise (stalled). Current 5-yr window 2021-2025 vs previous non-overlapping 2016-2020; benchmark tier 3 (own long-run trend).
by assess:20261018T191702Z · 10 evidence event(s)
Evidence and news: 10 cited by the assessment, 6 other KPI news

Cited evidence (10)

Other events (6)

8 more metric(s) we track
Falcon 9 payload to low Earth orbit (as published with its price)
22000 kg
2025 · source
16 annual values, 2010-12-31 to 2025-12-31; range 10450 to 228002010202510450 kg · 201010450 kg · 201113150 kg · 201213150 kg · 201313150 kg · 201413150 kg · 201522800 kg · 201622800 kg · 201722800 kg · 201822800 kg · 201922800 kg · 202022800 kg · 202122800 kg · 202222000 kg · 202322000 kg · 202422000 kg · 2025
Falcon Heavy payload to low Earth orbit (as published with its price)
63800 kg
2022 · source
5 annual values, 2018-12-31 to 2022-12-31; range 63800 to 638002018202263800 kg · 201863800 kg · 201963800 kg · 202063800 kg · 202163800 kg · 2022
Falcon 9 list price per launch ($M, current $)
69.85 $M
2025 · source
16 annual values, 2010-12-31 to 2025-12-31; range 54 to 69.852010202556 $M · 201059.5 $M · 201154 $M · 201254 $M · 201361.2 $M · 201461.2 $M · 201562 $M · 201662 $M · 201762 $M · 201862 $M · 201962 $M · 202062 $M · 202167 $M · 202267 $M · 202369.75 $M · 202469.85 $M · 2025
Falcon Heavy list price per launch ($M, current $)
97 $M
2022 · source
5 annual values, 2018-12-31 to 2022-12-31; range 90 to 972018202290 $M · 201890 $M · 201990 $M · 202090 $M · 202197 $M · 2022
Forecast: self-sustaining extraterrestrial colony by 2050 (Manifold)
0.2400 probability
22 Oct 2026 · source
2 daily values, 2026-10-15 to 2026-10-22; range 0.24 to 0.24Oct 26Oct 260.24 probability · 15 Oct 20260.24 probability · 22 Oct 2026
Payload mass launched to orbit in the year
3194.0 t
2025 · source
70 annual values, 1956-12-31 to 2025-12-31; range 0 to 3194195620250 t · 19568.4 t · 19575.1 t · 195822.7 t · 196048.4 t · 1961107.2 t · 196296 t · 1963183.5 t · 1964281.5 t · 1965289.8 t · 1967410.1 t · 1968448.9 t · 1969340.1 t · 1970421.4 t · 1971369.7 t · 1972350.8 t · 1974382.3 t · 1975384.7 t · 1976378.2 t · 1977400.8 t · 1978379.6 t · 1979611.4 t · 1981752.3 t · 1982855.8 t · 19831003.8 t · 19841419.5 t · 1985475.4 t · 1986745 t · 1988954 t · 19891065.4 t · 1990969 t · 19911159.9 t · 1992998.4 t · 19931032.9 t · 19951025.6 t · 19961184.6 t · 1997824.5 t · 1998557.2 t · 1999866.5 t · 2000796.1 t · 2002283.2 t · 2003176.6 t · 2004331.8 t · 2005572 t · 2006569.8 t · 2007866.4 t · 2009641.9 t · 2010687.1 t · 2011351.5 t · 2012328.8 t · 2013331.1 t · 2014337.4 t · 2016394.5 t · 2017388.9 t · 2018399.2 t · 2019572 t · 2020797.4 t · 20211462.8 t · 20232625.9 t · 20243194 t · 2025
next update due by 15 Jan 2027
SpaceX rideshare price per kg (current $)
6500 $/kg
2025 · source
6 annual values, 2020-12-31 to 2025-12-31; range 5000 to 6500202020255000 $/kg · 20205000 $/kg · 20215500 $/kg · 20225500 $/kg · 20236000 $/kg · 20246500 $/kg · 2025
SpaceX rideshare price per kg, smallest ticket to orbit (constant 2025 $)
6500 $/kg
2025 · source
6 annual values, 2020-12-31 to 2025-12-31; range 5811 to 6500202020256220 $/kg · 20205941 $/kg · 20216050 $/kg · 20225811 $/kg · 20236158 $/kg · 20246500 $/kg · 2025
next update due by 15 Jan 2027

Milestone Countdown

A sequence: each milestone is expected after the one before it.
now20282030203520402050206020752100later
Expected year: dot = median (hollow: after 2100), bar = 80% range; arrows: each milestone is expected after the one before. The time axis is compressed: the farther out, the more years per step.
  1. The Deluge: 100,000 tonnes delivered to orbit in a single year — the threshold to enable Mars colonization.Progressing: 3,194 t to orbit in 2025 (3.2% of goal); +45%/yr 2021-25, 2026 ~flat; ETA ~2036 · assessed 2026-10-18 · 30 event(s)
    • Cargo plus propellant delivered by tanker flights counts; the launch vehicles themselves do not.
    Annual payload mass to orbit rose from 797 t in 2021 to 3,194 t in 2025, +45%/yr, but quarterly industry tallies show 2026 running only about 6% above 2025 in its first half: Falcon 9's launch rate has plateaued and Starship delivered its first orbital payload only in September 2026. Projecting the 2021-25 growth rate forward from that lower 2026 level gives an 87% chance of a 100,000-tonne year by 2100 and a median of 2036 (10% chance by 2034). Yellow, not green: the median is about 10 years out, and reaching it depends on Starship flying hundreds of times a year, which it has not yet demonstrated.
    ETA
    ~2036 (80% range 2034–never/after 2100; P(by 2100) 87%)
    ETA cruxes
    Earlier: BryceTech Q3/Q4 2026 and JSR's 2026 total above ~3,700 t (H2 >= +25% y/y); monthly operational Starship payload flights in 2027; the LC-39A operator licence and an approved Starbase PEIS (authorization beyond today's 25/yr toward ~500 flights/yr), a third site; evidence that JSR's tally omits tanker propellant. Later: a 2026 total near or below 2025's (~3,180 t) or a flat 2027 (-> 2037); Starship grounding or losses (stall branch P 0.25 -> 2039); demand stalling beyond constellations.
    Path
    Own quantity: annual mass delivered to orbit, read as metric tonnes of cargo plus tanker-delivered propellant delivered to Earth orbit or beyond in one calendar year, launch vehicles excluded; measured by JSR annual payload tonnage, nowcast for 2026 from BryceTech's quarterly upmass (the same outcome, reported quarterly; JSR's year-on-year ratio assumed equal to Bryce's). Near term: Falcon 9/Starlink (~70-80% of mass, cadence flat in H1 2026), Amazon Leo, Chinese constellations and new reusable boosters; 100 kt/yr needs ~1,000 flights/yr of a ~100 t fully reusable Starship-class vehicle (or ~500 at 200 t), so growth must pass from Falcon 9 to Starship over 2027-2030. Starship V3 delivered its first orbital payload (26 Starlink V3) on 2026-09-28.
    Blockers
    • Technical: Starship not yet operational (first orbital payload flight 2026-09-28; flights 12-13 suborbital; ship-to-ship propellant transfer slipped to Q1 2027)
    • Regulatory capacity: Starship currently authorized for 25 launches/yr at Starbase; LC-39A's 44/yr has environmental clearance (EIS/ROD) but no FAA operator licence yet; expansion to 100/456 Starbase launches/yr is only proposed (PEIS begun October 2026)
    • Momentum: 2026 runs ~+6% y/y worldwide in H1 (SpaceX's own mass -5.5%), ~0.8 yr behind the 2021-25 trend
    • Measurement: ton unit (metric vs short) and whether JSR's payload tonnage counts tanker-delivered propellant; JSR's 2026 total not before January 2027
    How this was assessed: the data, the benchmark and the rubric rule
    ETA method
    driver trend: log-linear on payload-mass-to-orbit via the shared driver launch-mass (draw i of its mass_2025_t and log_slope -> draw i of this simulation, n=10000), with the 2026 step nowcast from the faster-reporting BryceTech quarterly upmass and three named failure scenarios; one Monte Carlo distribution; cross-checked by a bottom-up Starship-cadence and launch-licence count, a discounted proponent date and the Falcon 9 ramp
    ETA calculation
    Gap 100000/3194.0 = 31.31x (4.97 doublings). series rockets payload-mass-to-orbit --as-of 2026-10-18 (unchanged), 2021-25: 797.4, 1046.4, 1462.8, 2625.9, 3194.0 t -> OLS ln slope 0.3695 (se 0.0321) = +44.7%/yr, doubling 1.88 yr; on trend 2026 4,622 t. 2026 measured by the faster series (BryceTech): 2025 2,712.0 t (2026-04-08-brycetech-2025-upmass-2712-t); Q1 2026 647.4 t +18% y/y (2026-06-15-brycetech-q1-2026-upmass), Q2 732.5 t -2% (2026-08-24-brycetech-q2-2026-upmass) -> H1 1,379.9 vs 1,296.1 t = +6.47%; SpaceX own H1 1,041 vs 1,102 t = -5.5% (2026-08-04-spacex-10q-h1-2026-mass-down). Model: ln M(2026) = ln mass_2025_t + ln r_i, r_i = (H1 2026 + q_i x H2 2025 1,415.9 t)/2,712.0, q_i ~ split-LN(1.07; p10 0.93, p90 1.25) assumed (H1 rate, Starship's first orbital payloads offsetting Q2's -2%); r p10/p50/p90 0.995/1.068/1.162 -> 3,178/3,412/3,710 t JSR-equivalent (JSR ratio = Bryce ratio, assumed), ~0.8 yr of trend growth behind; then growth at driver launch-mass log_slope_i from 2026 (ledger.py driver-draws launch-mass --as-of 2026-10-18, seed 20261015, n 10000; split-normal p10 0.20/p50 0.3695/p90 0.47, draws 0.1998/0.3684/0.4707; p50 measured, spread assumed); first year with ln M >= ln 100000 + e_i, e ~ N(0, 0.07) assumed. Failure (MC masses): S1 demand plateau 0.084 (class: 2 earlier ramps in this series, the demand-driven one 1957-68 followed by a 51-yr plateau; failing now needs <4.7%/yr for 75 yr), S2 debris/regulatory cap 0.027 (ESA 2026 runaway projection vs a proposed expansion to 456 Starbase launches/yr (PEIS begun) and NSPM-17: both directions, kept), S3 collapse of access 0.010, trend too slow 0.006; none >= 10%. Result p_achieved 0.872; p10 2034, p50 2036 (P by end-2035 0.411, 2036 0.516, 2037 0.589), p90 null; if achieved 2034/2036/2043; P by 2040 0.728. Sensitivities (same draws): H2 y/y 0.93 -> 2037, 1.25 -> 2036; SpaceX's H1 ratio for the year -> 2037; second stalled year (2027 = 2026's step) -> 2037; reversion to the 2021-25 line (prev's model) -> 2035; fixed +21.6%/yr -> 2044, +30% -> 2039, +60% -> 2034; stall branch P 0.25 of 5-15 yr -> 2039 (unmeasured, not in median); failure 0.05 -> 0.942, p90 2049; 0.25 -> 0.741, 2037; short tons -> 2037; JSR omitting tanker propellant (share -> 0.5 by 2035) -> 2035, x2 bound -> 2034 (earlier only). Bottom-up: 100 kt needs ~1,000 flights/yr at 100 t or ~500 at 200 t; currently authorized 25/yr at Starbase (~2.5 kt at 100 t; 2026-10-14-faa-starbase-456-launches-peis); LC-39A 44/yr environmentally cleared (final EIS/ROD) but its FAA operator licence still outstanding (2026-01-29-faa-lc39a-starship-44-launches); Starbase 100 (Phase 1) / 456 (Phase 2) only proposed, PEIS just begun. Even 456 + 44 = 500 is half of 1,000: 2036 needs the LC-39A licence, the PEIS approved, plus another site or 200-t flights; regulatory capacity is no model input (cap risk in S2), so no number moves. Proponent: Musk 1 Mt/yr in ~3 yr (2026-06-09-musk-million-tons-three-years) x1.5-3 on 2.6 yr remaining -> 2031-2035 for 1 Mt/yr, earlier than our p10; weighted down (roadmap, measured 2026 step ~+7%, Starship schedules slipped >3x). Driver note: the launch-mass fit (2021-25) predates the 2026 quarters, whose ~+7% step is below its p10 slope; used as is, flagged for the owner. Prev (2026-10-18, assess:20261018T191702Z): 0.872, 2034/2036/null, reproduced byte-identically on unchanged data and driver draws; all inputs kept.
    Window
    Current
    Span
    2021-2025
    Values t
    2021797.420221046202314632024262620253194
    Loglin growth % per yr
    44.7
    Loglin slope
    0.3695
    Loglin slope SE
    0.0321
    Doubling yr
    1.88
    Previous
    Span
    2016-2020
    Values t
    2016337.42017394.52018388.92019399.22020572
    Loglin growth % per yr
    11.3
    Loglin slope
    0.1068
    Loglin slope SE
    0.0364
    Nowcast 2026
    Bryce t
    2025
    2712
    H1 2025
    1296
    H1 2026
    1380
    Q1 2026
    647.4
    Q2 2026
    732.5
    H1 year on year
    1.065
    Spacex h1 year on year
    0.9446
    Jsr equivalent 2026 t p10 p50 p90
    3178, 3412, 3710
    On trend 2026 t
    4622
    Long run
    2016-2025_pct_per_yr
    30
    2011-2025_pct_per_yr
    14.7
    Source
    uv run core/ledger.py series rockets payload-mass-to-orbit --as-of 2026-10-18; BryceTech quarterly events; eta.py in ledger/assessments/notes/rockets/20261018T191702Z.md
    Change
    Prev (2026-10-18-milestone-the-deluge, assess:20261018T191702Z, same made_at) reproduced byte-identically: its eta.py, run unchanged on the same ledger, gives the same output (0.872, 2034/2036/null). No new evidence: the ledger's rockets events and observations are unchanged since prev's run (last data merge f980611, which prev used), the launch-mass driver draws are identical (md5 5a3042a8...). Prev's inputs were re-checked against the event claims and the rubric and no error was found, so every input is kept (rule 7) and nothing moved; status yellow unchanged (rule 1: no newer evidence). Review-1 D1: the inherited statement '69 launches/yr licensed' was corrected to 25 authorized (Starbase) + 44 environmentally cleared awaiting a licence (LC-39A) + 100/456 proposed; no licence count is a model input, so no number moved.
    Rubric rule
    Milestone yellow: measurable progress on the milestone's own quantity and median ETA 2036 <= made_at + 10 yr (RUBRIC.md §4); not green because p50 > made_at + 5 yr and there is no demonstrated precursor at relevant scale (one orbital Starship payload flight, no operational cadence).
    by assess:20261018T211044Z · 26 evidence event(s)
    Evidence and news: 26 cited by the assessment, 4 other event(s)

    Cited evidence (26)

    Other events (4)

  2. The Export: Product manufactured in space is sold commercially on Earth (beyond novelty items).Progressing: no recurring space-made product sold yet; drug-making flight due early 2027; ETA ~2036 · assessed 2026-10-18 · 21 event(s)
    • Recurring commercial sales of a space-manufactured product line, from repeated production, to customers who use it for its function: sales from ongoing production, not stock from a few experimental flights (e.g. NIST's "space beads", sold from 1985), and not material supplied for clinical trials.
    No space-made product is yet sold on Earth from repeated production, and none of today's ventures has reported even a first sale to customers who use its product. But the routes are funded and flying: Varda has returned six capsules and raised $251M to pursue a space-made drug, with its first flight to make a drug formulation for patients (with United Therapeutics) due in early 2027, while semiconductor, fibre and bioprinting firms keep flying demonstrations. A drug must still pass trials and approval, and materials sales are slower to become recurring; together that gives an 88% chance by 2100 and a median of 2036 (10% chance by 2031). Yellow, not green: the median is about 10 years out, every candidate is still at demonstration scale, and the evidence comes mostly from the companies themselves.
    ETA
    ~2036 (80% range 2031–never/after 2100; P(by 2100) 88%)
    ETA cruxes
    Earlier: the early-2027 Varda/United Therapeutics flight returning a formulation that reaches an IND or first dosing by 2028; a paid repeat supply contract for ZBLAN fibre, semiconductor crystals or bioprinted implants. Later: the 2027 flight slips or yields no candidate (trial start 2028+ -> 2036-37); Varda's flights remain reentry/defence services (P(A) 1/3 -> 2041); first materials sales stay one-off batches (hazard 1.25%/yr -> 2040, P 0.66). Either way: a report that a candidate line (ZBLAN, crystals, implants) has already sold to a functional customer (P 0.25 -> 2034).
    Path
    Reading (d964534 details): recurring commercial sales of a space-made product line from repeated production, to Earth customers who use it for its function (materials to industry or research buyers, or a marketed drug); one-off batches and clinical-trial supply excluded. Paths: Varda capsules (space formulation with United Therapeutics from 2027 -> trials -> marketed product); Flawless Photonics ZBLAN; Space Forge and Besxar semiconductor crystals/wafers; Auxilium and Redwire biofabrication; return capacity from Varda and SpaceX Starfall; platforms Vast Haven-1 (Q1 2027), Axiom, NASA commercial stations (awards 2027).
    Blockers
    • Regulatory/technical: no product has passed qualification for sale (pharma needs trials and approval; ZBLAN quality verification has no reported result)
    • Commercial: a first sale to functional customers must become a recurring line from repeated production; no such sale and no repeat customer is reported in the ledger for any current candidate (historic one-off stock such as NIST's 1985 beads is excluded by the wording)
    • Evidence: all supporting events are proponent-sourced (gather request: ZBLAN verification result and sales, Space Forge/Besxar crystal sales, Varda IND or trial start)
    How this was assessed: the data, the benchmark and the rubric rule
    ETA method
    structural floor (drug trials and review, partly sourced) plus a thinned flat hazard for recurring materials lines, earliest of competing paths, named common-mode failure scenarios; one Monte Carlo distribution (prev's model, reproduced; trial start conditioned on the sourced first formulation flight, materials hazard restarted at made_at); cross-checked against a reformulation reference class, a discounted proponent date and the previous ETA
    ETA calculation
    Gap 0 -> 1 recurring product line (none reported in the ledger; historical one-off stock like NIST's 1985 beads is excluded by the wording; Varda in May 2026 'could not name anything manufactured in space, returned and sold', 2026-05-13-varda-united-therapeutics: one company's statement). Path A (Varda pharma, P 0.5): trial start 2025.91 + LN(1.7 yr; 80% 0.8-3.6), conditioned on >= 2027.5 (first patient-directed formulation flight with United Therapeutics 'early 2027', sourced; + ~2-3 months flight and return, assumed; Varda's 2026 flights carried defence/thermal payloads: 2026-01-29-varda-w5-reentry, 2026-10-01-varda-w8-w9-dual-launch) -> start p10/p50/p90 2027.63/2028.33/2030.25 (prev 2026.71/2027.61/2029.51); + programme LN(4.0; 2.5-7.0; FDA review ~1 yr sourced, rest assumed) + recurrence lag LN(0.5; 0.25-1.0). Path B (materials): first sales 5%/yr from made_at 2026.80 (assumed state, not a measured absence: every ledger candidate - ZBLAN quality verification ongoing, ForgeStar-1 no return, Besxar suborbital test 1 of 12, Auxilium/Redwire output for research, LambdaVision pre-clinical - is pre-sale as of 2026-10-18; memoryless) x P(recurring) 0.6 = 3%/yr, + repeat-order lag LN(1.5; 0.5-4.0). MC N=400k: p_achieved 0.877; p10 2031, p50 2036 (P by end-2035 0.498, 2036 0.532: on the 2035/2036 boundary), p90 null; if achieved 2030/2034/2068. Failure 0.123 (MC masses): C1 no product beats terrestrial alternatives 0.050, C2 loss of space access 0.020 (inherited; 0.01 as in Deluge/Homestead -> 2035, 0.886), C3 path A fails and no recurring materials line by 2100 0.053; none >= 10%. Path-A failure (0.5, within the model) cross-checked against a counted class: commercial microgravity production aimed at a marketed drug, ended: McDonnell Douglas/Ortho EOS = 0 of 1 -> 1/3 (sensitivity). Sensitivities (same draws): hazard origin 2026.0 -> 2035, 0.878; 2024.8 -> 2035, 0.880; P 0.10 / 0.25 that a candidate already had a qualifying first sale -> 2035, 0.880 / 2034, 0.885 (median on the 2035/2036 boundary, kept at 2036: judged P ~5%); earliest trial start 2027.25 / 2028.0 -> 2035 / 2036; P(A) 1/3 -> 2041, 0.859; 0.65 -> 2034; hazard 1.25% -> 2040, 0.660; 7.5% -> 2035, 0.912; programme 2.5/6 yr -> 2034/2037; recurrence 0.4/0.8 -> 2037/2035; common 0.03/0.15 -> 2035/2037. Reference class reformulation 5-8 yr from the 2027 flight + 0.5 -> 2032.5-2035.5 (path A if it succeeds). Proponent: no dated first product (Series D 'scale toward', 2026-09-30-varda-series-d-251m); background 'late 2020s' x1.5-3 -> 2031-2036. Return capacity grows (SpaceX Starfall demo launch and targeted splashdown, 1,000 kg payload capacity, 2026-06-23-spacex-starfall-demo; Redwire on Starfall 2028) but has no measured mapping to sale odds: context. Prev (2026-10-18, assess:20261018T191702Z): 0.877, 2031/2036/null, reproduced byte-identically; all inputs kept.
    Change
    Prev (2026-10-18-milestone-the-export, assess:20261018T191702Z, same made_at) reproduced byte-identically: its eta.py, run unchanged on the same ledger, gives the same output (0.877, 2031/2036/null). No new evidence: the ledger's rockets events and observations are unchanged since prev's run (last data merge f980611, which prev used), the launch-mass driver draws are identical (md5 5a3042a8...). Prev's inputs were re-checked against the event claims and the rubric and no error was found, so every input is kept (rule 7) and nothing moved; status yellow unchanged (rule 1: no newer evidence). Review-1: E1 the corrected Varda record's removed five-mission count is no longer cited (it fed no input); E2 the materials-hazard origin 2026.80 is relabelled an assumed state, with origin and alternative-state sensitivities (earlier origins -> 2035; kept 2036, disclosed as a boundary median). No number moved.
    Rubric rule
    Milestone yellow: measurable progress (repeated in-space production with return to Earth, funded drug-formulation programme) and median ETA 2036 <= made_at + 10 yr (RUBRIC.md §4); not green (p50 > made_at + 5 yr; no precursor at commercial scale; no non-proponent corroboration).
    by assess:20261018T211044Z · 19 evidence event(s)
    Evidence and news: 19 cited by the assessment, 2 other event(s)

    Cited evidence (19)

    Other events (2)

    • 2025 · announcement · ●●○ · published 2026-01-04corrected
      Vast’s Haven-1 flight article is built; the company currently targets launch in 2027.
      ↳ corrects (or adds sources to) an earlier record: 2025: Vast's Haven-1 commercial space station flight article is complete, with launch…
    • 2025-11-28 · achievement · ●○○ · published 2025-11-30legacy
      Varda Space Industries launched its W-5 in-space pharmaceutical manufacturing capsule on 28 November 2025.
  3. The Homestead: Permanent crewed base operates 1+ year using local resources (Moon or Mars).Distant: no crewed landing since 1972; space-grown food still experimental; ETA ~2069 · assessed 2026-10-18 · 61 event(s)
    • Continuously crewed for 12+ months, and life-sustaining self-sufficient: the crew's air, water and food come from local resources and recycling for the whole year, with no resupply of consumables from Earth (equipment and spare parts may still come from Earth).
    Space stations already recycle nearly all their water, and China's all its oxygen, but none grows a meaningful share of its crew's food, and a largely self-sufficient year has been shown only in a ground test; the first crewed Moon landing since 1972 is planned for 2028 and NASA's permanent outpost from 2032. Allowing for a landing, then a permanent base, then a decision to grow the base's own food and a decade to achieve it gives a 68% chance by 2100 and a median of 2069 (10% chance by 2044), so red. Whether anyone commits to growing a base's own food is the main uncertainty: funded requirements for it at both the US and Chinese bases would pull the median into the late 2050s.
    ETA
    ~2069 (80% range 2044–never/after 2100; P(by 2100) 68%)
    ETA cruxes
    First whether anyone pursues food self-sufficiency: a funded Lunar Agriculture Module build, a crop-production requirement in NASA's Moon Base outpost phase, or a Chinese lunar greenhouse with a calorie target -> earlier (0.5/0.6 -> 2058); outpost plans that keep full resupply -> later (US at the station rate -> 2081). Then programme survival to a base (Artemis IV landing in 2028-29; abandonment 0.67 -> 2091), the closure interval (a greenhouse supplying > 25% of a crew's calories -> 5 yr -> 2063) and a funded settlement programme. Anchor: manifold-infkbfl3unm9gnq9qgky-p moving above ~0.6 for 2049 would put the market > 0.35 from us, to be examined against the pursuit crux.
    Path
    Reading (d964534 details): a base continuously crewed for 12+ months during which all oxygen, water and food consumed are produced on site from local resources or recycling (food grown from recycled water/CO2/nutrients counts; Earth food stocked and eaten in the year does not); equipment, spares and hardware may come from Earth. Moon or Mars. Paths: NASA's Moon Base (Artemis IV landing early 2028, outpost assembly from 2032, fission reactor by 2030) and China's ILRS (crewed landing before 2030, basic model 2035), each needing a continuous base and then bioregenerative food production (~58x the EDEN analog); SpaceX's stated self-growing lunar city; later a Mars settlement or successor programme. Water and air recycling are near closure (ISS 98% water; Tiangong >96% water, 100% O2); ISRU O2 at 12 g/h on Mars and 70 g/h in a ground vacuum chamber.
    Blockers
    • Technical: no crewed lander demonstrated; Starship HLS propellant transfer demo slipped to Q1 2027; Axiom suits possibly not ready before 2031 (OIG)
    • Technical: food closure: no station grows a meaningful share of crew food (Tiangong wheat and ISS crops are experiments); best analog greenhouse ~2% of a 4-crew diet; full closure demonstrated only on the ground (Lunar Palace)
    • Technical: ISRU at demo scale (MOXIE 12 g/h; MRE 70 g/h on the ground); in-situ ice extraction not demonstrated (PRIME-1 could not excavate); polar surface ice sparse
    • Programmatic: no programme plans food self-sufficiency for a base (Lunar Agriculture Module only a ground demonstrator, build decision by 2032); FY2027 request cuts NASA to $18.8B; Gateway paused; 3 of 4 2026 Moon Base landers slipped
    How this was assessed: the data, the benchmark and the rubric rule
    ETA method
    structural floor chain (crewed landing -> continuously crewed base -> air/water/food closure -> literal self-sufficient year) with discounted proponent landing dates, reference-class intervals, disclosed pursuit judgments, a later-programme branch and named failure scenarios; one Monte Carlo over the US and Chinese programmes (earliest wins); prev's model reproduced and updated for new evidence; compared with one similar anchor after the pre-anchor forecast
    ETA calculation
    Prev's chain (assess:20261018T191702Z: 0.677, 2044/2069/null; N=400k, same seeds) reproduced byte-identically; all inputs kept. Landing (sourced projections, discounted on the time remaining from 2026.80): US early 2028 = 2028.25 (Artemis IV, 2026-10-09-artemis-iv-early-2028-artemis-v-late-2028; was Sep 2028) x LN(1.8; 1.3-2.8) -> p50 2029.4; China ~2030 (2026-02-11-long-march-10-mengzhou-abort-test) x LN(1.15; 1.0-1.5). Landing -> continuous base LN(7.5 yr; 4.5-13.5) (NASA outpost assembly from 2032, 2026-05-26-nasa-moon-base-phases-outpost-2032, consistent); abandonment US 0.30 / China 0.25. Closure gap measured: water 98% (ISS) and >96% (Tiangong), O2 100% regenerated (Tiangong), ~50% (ISS); food 0% grown on stations; EDEN ISS ~187 kcal/d vs 10,800 for 4 crew ~58x; Tiangong wheat through a full cycle (2026-09-21-tiangong-14-plant-species, an experiment); Lunar Palace closed a year on the ground. Pursuit of food closure US 0.40 / China 0.50 (disclosed judgments, moved from 0.35/0.45 by new evidence: Tiangong crops and a planned lunar vegetable garden, CMSA's in-orbit bioregenerative goal 2026-03-12-cmsa-tiangong-rlss-water-self-sufficiency-goal, the NASA/CSA/DLR Lunar Agriculture Module demonstrator 2026-08-01-nasa-csa-dlr-lunar-agriculture-module, net of the HALO ECLSS termination and an ISRU-cost study; a funded requirement would be 0.5/0.6). Closure LN(10 yr; 5-20) + 1-yr literal floor. Later programme if neither closes, P 0.5 (class: 0 of 2 resolved national crewed Mars programmes -> 1/4 per attempt; ~2.4 attempts 2045-70): U(2045,2070) + LN(12; 7-20) + closure + 1. MC: p_achieved 0.677; p10 2044, p50 2069, p90 null; if achieved 2043/2052/2085 (bimodal; the median lies between the modes); P by end 2049 0.273, 2060 0.448, 2070 0.508, 2080 0.577. Failure 0.323: S-a lunar bases on Earth resupply, nobody pursues food closure, no later programme 0.168 = 0.89 x [(1-0.70x0.40)(1-0.75x0.50) - 0.30x0.25] x 0.5; counted outcome class 0 of 5 long-duration stations (Salyut 6, Salyut 7, Mir, ISS, Tiangong) produced a meaningful share of crew food; no pursuit class is countable (no surface base has existed), so pursuit is a disclosed judgment; station rate transferred (1/7) -> US 2081, 0.624; both 2098, 0.510. Common mode 0.110 = H1 0.04 + H2 0.03 + H3 0.01 + H4 0.03 (each < 10%); no base ever and no later programme 0.034; closure after 2100 0.012. Sensitivities (same draws): pursuit kept 0.35/0.45 -> 2075, 0.653; 0.5/0.6 -> 2058, 0.721; 0.2/0.3 -> 2087; later P 0.25 -> 2072, 0.582; abandonment 0.67/0.67 -> 2091, 0.548; closure 5/15 yr -> 2063/2076; common 0.06/0.20 -> 2064/2078; US discount 2.5 (OIG suits ~2031, 2026-04-20-oig-spacesuit-delays-artemis) -> 2069. Proponent: Musk's self-growing lunar city in <10 yr (2026-02-08-musk-spacex-moon-city-priority) x1.5-3 -> 2040-2054, matching the conditional lunar mode. Lift: shared driver launch-mass (used_by rockets/the-deluge only) is not binding for a base; its draws are not sampled. Anchor (read after the pre-anchor p50 2069 was written): manifold-infkbfl3unm9gnq9qgky-p (Manifold InfkbfL3uNM9GNq9qgKy, similar, 53 forecasters, 'relatively self-sustaining extraterrestrial colony before 2050') 0.24 on 2026-10-15 vs ours P(by end 2049) 0.273: no gap (threshold 0.35). Its wording on the same draws: no completed year -> 0.300; 'relatively' self-sustaining -> 0.434; any location -> earlier; a sustained 'colony' -> later. Loose criteria and a 2049 horizon weigh it lightly; forecast not moved.
    Change
    Prev (2026-10-18-milestone-the-homestead, assess:20261018T191702Z, same made_at) reproduced byte-identically: its eta.py, run unchanged on the same ledger, gives the same output (0.677, 2044/2069/null). No new evidence: the ledger's rockets events and observations are unchanged since prev's run (last data merge f980611, which prev used), the launch-mass driver draws are identical (md5 5a3042a8...); the anchor manifold-infkbfl3unm9gnq9qgky-p has no point after 2026-10-15 (0.24). Prev's inputs were re-checked against the event claims and the rubric and no error was found, so every input is kept (rule 7) and nothing moved; status red unchanged (rule 1: no newer evidence).
    Rubric rule
    Milestone red: median ETA 2069 > made_at + 10 yr (RUBRIC.md §4: Distant).
    by assess:20261018T211044Z · 40 evidence event(s)
    Evidence and news: 40 cited by the assessment, 21 other event(s)

    Cited evidence (40)

    Other events (21)

Major Open Challenges

Beyond the framework: 54 event(s)
Latest news: the 8 most recently published of 189 events

All 189 events: the event log

Fusion and Energy

237 events · latest news published 2026-10-16 (6 days ago)news per week news per week, the 16 weeks to 2026-10-22: 4, 8, 3, 3, 4, 3, 2, 5, 3, 8, 5, 5, 10, 8, 3, 4

Energy is the key limiting factor of the material world. It does not have to be. If all electricity bills go to zero, how does that change our lives, from heating (homes, iron or saltwater) to food, to travel, to compute? There are many short-term fixes, but the long-term approach is unlikely to be anything but nuclear fusion (and superconductors make everything easier).

KPI

World household electricity price (constant 2025 $)
112.9 $/MWh
Q1 2026 · source
▲ +3.2 vs Q1 2025
29 quarterly values, 2018-06-30 to 2026-03-31; range 105.1 to 136.820182026132 $/MWh · 30 Jun 2018134.6 $/MWh · 31 Mar 2019136.8 $/MWh · 30 Jun 2019129.5 $/MWh · 30 Sep 2019129.7 $/MWh · 31 Dec 2019128.4 $/MWh · 31 Mar 2020130.4 $/MWh · 30 Jun 2020127.3 $/MWh · 30 Sep 2020128.1 $/MWh · 31 Dec 2020121.9 $/MWh · 31 Mar 2021124 $/MWh · 30 Jun 2021124.1 $/MWh · 30 Sep 2021122.1 $/MWh · 31 Dec 2021112.9 $/MWh · 31 Mar 2022119.1 $/MWh · 30 Jun 2022122.6 $/MWh · 30 Sep 2022125.2 $/MWh · 31 Dec 2022111.5 $/MWh · 31 Mar 2023111.6 $/MWh · 30 Jun 2023112.6 $/MWh · 30 Sep 2023111 $/MWh · 31 Dec 2023108.5 $/MWh · 31 Mar 2024105.1 $/MWh · 30 Jun 2024113.2 $/MWh · 31 Dec 2024109.7 $/MWh · 31 Mar 2025113.1 $/MWh · 30 Jun 2025112.8 $/MWh · 30 Sep 2025114.4 $/MWh · 31 Dec 2025112.9 $/MWh · 31 Mar 2026
Behind pace: $113/MWh (2026-Q1), falling $2.90/MWh a year vs its own long-run pace of $3.51 · assessed 2026-10-18

The worldwide household price, in 2025 dollars, averaged $111/MWh from late 2023 to early 2026, down 6% from $119 over the previous two and a half years: a fall of about $2.90/MWh a year. That is clearly downward but slower than the $3.51/MWh a year it has fallen on average over its longer record, so it is behind pace. Caveat: the measure runs only to early 2026 and has been edging up over its most recent stretch, and more recent reports (record Japanese bills, rising retail prices in most EU markets, US electricity prices outpacing inflation) point to a further rise it has not yet captured.

The KPI's precise definition

The KPI, as defined: Worldwide average household (retail) electricity price ($/MWh): what people actually pay, population- or consumption-weighted where available, inflation-adjusted (real $)

How the status was judged: the data window, the pace benchmark, the rule
Assessed quantity
elec-price-household-world-popw-real: worldwide population-weighted household retail electricity price, constant 2025 US$/MWh; goal_direction down. Framework KPI includes distribution, taxes and fees, not generation LCOE.
Window
Span
2021-Q2..2026-Q1, five calendar years; 19 observations, 2024-Q3 missing; equal time halves, not equal observation counts
Current
Span
2023-Q4..2026-Q1
N
9
Observations
2023-Q41112024-Q1108.52024-Q2105.12024-Q4113.22025-Q1109.72025-Q2113.12025-Q3112.82025-Q4114.42026-Q1112.9
Mean
111.2
SD
2.96
Mean time
2025
OLS
Slope
2.478
SE
1.061
Previous
Span
2021-Q2..2023-Q3
N
10
Observations
2021-Q21242021-Q3124.12021-Q4122.12022-Q1112.92022-Q2119.12022-Q3122.62022-Q4125.22023-Q1111.52023-Q2111.62023-Q3112.6
Mean
118.6
SD
5.767
Mean time
2022
OLS
Slope
-4.914
SE
2.059
Whole window OLS
Slope
-2.498
SE
0.7339
Mean difference
-7.381
Percent change
-6.225
Half mean time separation years
2.542
Half mean pace per year
-2.904
Naive SE difference
2.074
Noise note
Half-mean fall 7.381 exceeds earlier-half SD 5.767; quarterly autocorrelation makes the naive SE descriptive, not a significance test. Benchmark shortfall is modest; recent-half OLS +2.478/yr is a watch item, not a whole-window reversal.
Long run benchmark
Span
2018-Q2..2026-Q1
N
29
Observations
2018-Q21322019-Q1134.62019-Q2136.82019-Q3129.52019-Q4129.72020-Q1128.42020-Q2130.42020-Q3127.32020-Q4128.12021-Q1121.92021-Q21242021-Q3124.12021-Q4122.12022-Q1112.92022-Q2119.12022-Q3122.62022-Q4125.22023-Q1111.52023-Q2111.62023-Q3112.62023-Q41112024-Q1108.52024-Q2105.12024-Q4113.22025-Q1109.72025-Q2113.12025-Q3112.82025-Q4114.42026-Q1112.9
Mean
120.2
SD
8.89
Mean time
2022
OLS
Slope
-3.507
SE
0.3626
Source
uv run core/ledger.py series fusion elec-price-household-world-popw-real --as-of 2026-10-18; latest 2026-Q1 = 112.9, collector, published 2026-10-09; quarter midpoint time = year+(quarter-0.5)/4; same 29 observations as prev
Benchmark
Tier 3: own long-run OLS 2018-Q2..2026-Q1, 29 observations over 7.75 years, -3.5074077505 ±0.3625733515 $/MWh/year; current halves -2.9040437158, current-window OLS -2.4980145278 ±0.7339107168. No external required or milestone-implied household-price path exists.
Benchmark source
Fixed KPI specification: own series, tier 3; elec-price-household-world-popw-real (GlobalPetrolPrices country prices, World Bank population weights, CPI deflation).
Data as of
2026-Q1
Change
Prev 2026-10-16-kpi (v6, yellow). No new observation of elec-price-household-world-popw-real (latest 2026-Q1 = 112.9, published 2026-10-09); window statistics reproduce prev exactly (halves 118.57 / 111.19, pace -2.904, OLS -2.498, benchmark -3.507). Data age 201 days from quarter end, below two quarterly cadences plus the ~192-day lag: not stale. Newly ingested context events (Eurostat EU H1-2026 €28.32/100 kWh, down from €28.96; ACER-CEER upward retail trend in 18 EU markets Jan-Aug 2026; Japan record household bills for Oct 2026; US CPI electricity +4.4% y/y vs +3.7% all items; GPP unweighted nominal average 174/176/179 for 2026-Q1..Q3) hint at a 2026 rise; they are other quantities, not imputed, and 2026-Q2 onward is unmeasured, not flat. Label: dropped "(tier 3)" per RUBRIC §6 (tier is in basis.benchmark). Yellow retained.
Rubric rule
Rubric §3: five-year half means clearly decline (-7.38 $/MWh, beyond the earlier-half SD 5.77), but the half-mean pace -2.90 and whole-window OLS -2.50 $/MWh/yr are below the tier-3 own long-run pace -3.51; yellow. §5: status unchanged.
by assess:20261018T192708Z · 7 evidence event(s)
Evidence and news: 7 cited by the assessment, 19 other KPI news

Cited evidence (7)

Other events (19)

9 more metric(s) we track
Household electricity price, simple country average (GlobalPetrolPrices)
179.0 $/MWh
Q3 2026 · source
▲ +9.0 vs Q3 2025
29 quarterly values, 2019-03-31 to 2026-09-30; range 137 to 18120192026140 $/MWh · 31 Mar 2019150 $/MWh · 30 Jun 2019140 $/MWh · 30 Sep 2019140 $/MWh · 31 Dec 2019140 $/MWh · 31 Mar 2020140 $/MWh · 30 Jun 2020137 $/MWh · 30 Sep 2020138 $/MWh · 31 Dec 2020137 $/MWh · 31 Mar 2021138 $/MWh · 30 Jun 2021138 $/MWh · 30 Sep 2021138 $/MWh · 31 Dec 2021141 $/MWh · 31 Mar 2022160 $/MWh · 30 Jun 2022172 $/MWh · 30 Sep 2022181 $/MWh · 31 Dec 2022155 $/MWh · 31 Mar 2023156 $/MWh · 30 Jun 2023155 $/MWh · 30 Sep 2023156 $/MWh · 31 Dec 2023156 $/MWh · 31 Mar 2024150 $/MWh · 30 Jun 2024160 $/MWh · 31 Mar 2025167 $/MWh · 30 Jun 2025170 $/MWh · 30 Sep 2025170 $/MWh · 31 Dec 2025174 $/MWh · 31 Mar 2026176 $/MWh · 30 Jun 2026179 $/MWh · 30 Sep 2026
World household electricity price (current $)
112.9 $/MWh
Q1 2026 · source
▲ +3.2 vs Q1 2025
29 quarterly values, 2018-06-30 to 2026-03-31; range 102.3 to 114.420182026103 $/MWh · 30 Jun 2018106.9 $/MWh · 31 Mar 2019108.7 $/MWh · 30 Jun 2019102.9 $/MWh · 30 Sep 2019103 $/MWh · 31 Dec 2019103.2 $/MWh · 31 Mar 2020104.8 $/MWh · 30 Jun 2020102.3 $/MWh · 30 Sep 2020103 $/MWh · 31 Dec 2020102.6 $/MWh · 31 Mar 2021104.4 $/MWh · 30 Jun 2021104.4 $/MWh · 30 Sep 2021102.7 $/MWh · 31 Dec 2021102.6 $/MWh · 31 Mar 2022108.3 $/MWh · 30 Jun 2022111.4 $/MWh · 30 Sep 2022113.8 $/MWh · 31 Dec 2022105.6 $/MWh · 31 Mar 2023105.7 $/MWh · 30 Jun 2023106.6 $/MWh · 30 Sep 2023105.1 $/MWh · 31 Dec 2023105.8 $/MWh · 31 Mar 2024102.4 $/MWh · 30 Jun 2024110.3 $/MWh · 31 Dec 2024109.7 $/MWh · 31 Mar 2025113.1 $/MWh · 30 Jun 2025112.8 $/MWh · 30 Sep 2025114.4 $/MWh · 31 Dec 2025112.9 $/MWh · 31 Mar 2026
EU wholesale electricity price (IEA)
105 $/MWh
H1 2026 · source
▲ +15 vs H1 2025
2 half-yearly values, 2025-06-30 to 2026-06-30; range 90 to 105Jun 25Jun 2690 $/MWh · 30 Jun 2025105 $/MWh · 30 Jun 2026
updated irregularly
US wholesale electricity price (IEA)
52 $/MWh
H1 2026 · source
▲ +4 vs H1 2025
2 half-yearly values, 2025-06-30 to 2026-06-30; range 48 to 52Jun 25Jun 2648 $/MWh · 30 Jun 202552 $/MWh · 30 Jun 2026
updated irregularly
Cost of new offshore wind power (IRENA)
78 $/MWh
2025 · source
7 annual values, 2010-12-31 to 2025-12-31; range 78 to 20820102025208 $/MWh · 2010155 $/MWh · 2015114 $/MWh · 201891 $/MWh · 202081 $/MWh · 202279 $/MWh · 202478 $/MWh · 2025
Cost of new onshore wind power (IRENA)
33 $/MWh
2025 · source
7 annual values, 2010-12-31 to 2025-12-31; range 33 to 11320102025113 $/MWh · 201076 $/MWh · 201556 $/MWh · 201841 $/MWh · 202034 $/MWh · 202234 $/MWh · 202433 $/MWh · 2025
Cost of new utility-scale solar power (IRENA)
44 $/MWh
2025 · source
7 annual values, 2010-12-31 to 2025-12-31; range 43 to 41720102025417 $/MWh · 2010135 $/MWh · 201579 $/MWh · 201861 $/MWh · 202051 $/MWh · 202243 $/MWh · 202444 $/MWh · 2025
Forecast: fusion engineering breakeven by 2040 (Manifold)
0.8710 probability
22 Oct 2026 · source
2 daily values, 2026-10-15 to 2026-10-22; range 0.871 to 0.871Oct 26Oct 260.871 probability · 15 Oct 20260.871 probability · 22 Oct 2026
Forecast: commercial fusion electricity by 2035 (Manifold)
0.3678 probability
22 Oct 2026 · source
2 daily values, 2026-10-15 to 2026-10-22; range 0.3678 to 0.3678Oct 26Oct 260.3678 probability · 15 Oct 20260.3678 probability · 22 Oct 2026

Milestone Countdown

A sequence: each milestone is expected after the one before it.
now20282030203520402050206020752100later
Expected year: dot = median (hollow: after 2100), bar = 80% range; arrows: each milestone is expected after the one before. The time axis is compressed: the farther out, the more years per step.
  1. The First Watt: First commercial fusion plant delivers sustained electricity to a public grid.Progressing: no fusion plant on any grid; Helion's Orion licensed, 2028 goal softened, ETA ~2033 · assessed 2026-10-18 · 57 event(s)
    • Sustained = net electricity exported under commercial operation for 3+ consecutive months.
    No commercial fusion plant exports net electricity to a public grid, and no device has yet produced more electricity than it uses; Helion's Orion plant is licensed and being built, and Commonwealth Fusion Systems has applied to connect its first plant to the grid in the early 2030s. Discounting the companies' schedules for slippage and requiring three months of sustained export gives a 93% chance by 2100 and a median of 2033 (with a 10% chance each of 2029 or earlier and of after 2060), so yellow. The median moved a year later because Helion now says Orion only begins initial operations in 2028, with full power not before 2029-2030. Caveat: a prediction market puts commercial fusion electricity by 2035 at 37%, a looser test on which we are at 60%, and an industry survey's median is about 2037; both point later, and how much to trust Helion's fast schedule is what decides it.
    ETA
    ~2033 (80% range 2029–2060; P(by 2100) 93%)
    ETA cruxes
    Helion route weight in driver fusion-first-watt first (.40/.25/.10 -> p50 2035/2037/2038; the 2035 Manifold anchor gap sits here); slip median 1.5-3x (2031-2035); Helion re-dated to 2029.5/2030.5 (2035/2036); Helion ramp 0-x2 (2032-2033); ARC date (2032-2033). Earlier: Polaris net electrical recovery, Orion generator installed and Chelan PUD interconnection signed, SPARC first plasma and Q>1 in 2027. Later: Orion grid connection past 2028, Polaris without the needed gain, SPARC slipping further, FOAK availability too low for 3 consecutive months.
    Path
    Reading (owner definition d964534): a plant in commercial operation exporting net electricity to a public grid for 3+ consecutive months, dated at the end of the third month; a pulse, test sync or PPA does not count. Driver start = start of commercial grid operation; Helion branch adds a ramp to net export (sourced from its full-power statement), all routes the 3-month window. Lead path: Helion Orion (licensed June 2026, $1.5B raised, Microsoft contract requiring grid connection by end-2028); then CFS ARC (PJM interconnection request, $4B raised, DOE-reviewed design, SPARC ~80% but behind its magnet plan), TAE Da Vinci 2031 (going-concern doubt), Type One Infinity Two 2034, General Fusion ~2035.
    Blockers
    • Technical: no verified net electrical gain in any device; target gain is not electrical gain; a published critique questions Helion's D-He3 gain basis.
    • Schedule: Helion softened its 2028 electricity goal (full power 2029-2030) and is still resolving FRC merging before locking Orion's design; SPARC turn-on slipped to 2027 and its magnet installation is behind plan.
    • Reliability: a first-of-a-kind plant must hold 3 consecutive months of commercial net export; no plant availability data exist.
    • Regulatory: US NRC fusion-machine rule still proposed (state licences issued in WA and TN); no structural block, no assumed gate.
    • Gather: Polaris electrical results, Orion interconnection agreement, SPARC first plasma; driver fusion-first-watt refit (owner).
    How this was assessed: the data, the benchmark and the rubric rule
    ETA method
    discounted proponent dates with construction floors in a route scenario mixture (shared driver fusion-first-watt), plus a sourced Helion ramp to net export and the definitional 3-month window; reference-class, survey and anchor cross-checks
    ETA calculation
    Gap: 0 vs 1 qualifying plant (net export under commercial operation for 3+ consecutive months); no net electrical gain anywhere (NIF record Q=4.13, 2025-04-07-nif-q-4-13-rv; 11th ignition 7.9 MJ gain ~3.8, 2026-06-20-nif-11th-ignition-7-9mj; Polaris D-T fusion at 150 M degC, no gain result, 2026-02-13-helion-polaris-d-t-fusion-150mc). No gain/plant series in any section. Model = prev 20261015T105338Z (reproduced exactly: P .9324, 2028.78/2032.43/2060.88): draw i of shared driver fusion-first-watt (driver-draws --as-of 2026-10-18, seed 20261015, n 10000; helion .50/arc .35/successor .08/never .07, slip lognormal(ln2,.40), helion start max(2028, asof+(2028-asof)F) from 2025-01-01-helion-2028-microsoft-target-rv, arc max(2030, asof+(2032.5-asof)F) from 2025-01-01-cfs-sparc-arc-timeline-rv) + milestone mapping. Mapping update on new evidence 2026-09-08-helion-orion-2028-goal-softened (2028 = 'begin initial operations'/grid connection; 50 MW full power not before 2029-2030): helion branch T = start + ramp tri(0.25,1.0,2.0) yr + 0.25 (3 months); arc/successor T = start + 0.25. Result: P(by2100) .9324, p10 2029.81, p50 2033.12, p90 2060.88 (calendar 2029/2033/2060); conditional median 2032.43; branch medians helion 2030.58, arc 2038.40. Sensitivities: ramp 0/x2 -> 2032.43/2033.93; helion weight .40/.25/.10 -> 2035.39/2037.63/2038.91, .55 -> 2032.28; slip 1.5x/3x -> 2031.78/2035.78; ARC 2031/2034 -> 2032.39/2033.70; Helion re-dated 2029.5/2030.5 (no ramp) -> 2035.26/2036.87; never .15/.03 -> P .849/.970. Cross-checks: discounted (1.5/2/3x) Helion full power 2030 -> 2031.6/2033.2/2036.4, ARC 2035.4/2038.2/2043.9, TAE Da Vinci 2031 (2026-08-05-tae-da-vinci-operations-2031; going-concern doubt) 2033.1/2035.2/2039.4, Type One 2034 2037.6/2041.2/2048.4; FIA 2026 survey (2026-07-13-fia-2026-global-fusion-industry-report, 45 firms): 42% by 2035, median ~2037.4, later than ours; fission 12-15 yr from precursor -> 2035-40. Pre-anchor p50 2033 (2029-2060, P .93). Anchors: manifold-iubcricrjrizushzxq97-p (engineering breakeven by 2040, weaker, 0.871, 56 forecasters) vs ours P(by 2040-12-31) .739: bound holds. manifold-pr0qngelph-p (commercial fusion electricity by 2035, weaker, 0.368, 11 forecasters) vs ours P(by 2035-12-31) .597: weaker-bound gap .23, explained not closed. Crux: Helion route weight (.50) and slip in driver fusion-first-watt; the market's .37 matches helion weight ~.25 (.411) or a 2030.5 Helion date (.430). Settles it: Polaris net electrical recovery and an Orion interconnection agreement (toward ours) or Orion grid connection re-dated past 2028 (toward the market). Thin market, loose, weaker event: soft bound. No move: shared-driver inputs; driver finding reported (refit warranted on 2026-09-08-helion-orion-2028-goal-softened, 2026-05-08-helion-tiny-merge-testbed, 2026-09-22-cfs-sparc-8-of-18-tf-magnets; weight .25-.40 -> p50 2035-2037). Prev 2028/2032/2060 P .93 -> 2029/2033/2060 P .93. Working: notes/fusion/20261018T192708Z.md.
    Change
    Prev 2026-10-15-milestone-the-first-watt-3 (assess:20261015T105338Z; yellow, 2028/2032/2060, P .93), reproduced exactly (2028.78/2032.43/2060.88, P .9324); unchanged on driver draws as of 2026-10-18. Trigger: newly ingested 2026 events (gather 2026-10-18). (a) New evidence 2026-09-08-helion-orion-2028-goal-softened: helion-branch ramp tri(0.25,1.0,2.0) yr between start of operations and sustained net export (prev 0): p10 2028 -> 2029 (2028.78 -> 2029.81), p50 2032 -> 2033 (2032.43 -> 2033.12); p90 2060 and P .9324 unchanged. The other new events (SPARC delays, CFS PJM request and $1B, TAE 2031 and going-concern doubt, Type One 2034, General Fusion 2035, FIA survey, Polaris D-T) bear on driver inputs and cross-checks: reported as a driver finding, no move. Status yellow unchanged.
    Rubric rule
    RUBRIC v6 §4/§4.1 on the d964534 wording: no verified achievement; measurable construction and licensing progress; unconditional p50 2033 <= made_at+10 yr gives yellow; not green (p50 after 2031-10, no net-electricity precursor at relevant scale). Status unchanged.
    by assess:20261018T192708Z · 48 evidence event(s)
    Evidence and news: 48 cited by the assessment, 9 other event(s)

    Cited evidence (48)

    Other events (9)

  2. Grid Parity: Fusion Levelized Cost Of Electricity falls below $100/MWh, competitive with gas.Distant: fusion cost unmeasured; first plants estimated >$150/MWh vs <$100 (2025$) goal, ETA ~2071 · assessed 2026-10-18 · 22 event(s)
    • $100/MWh in constant 2025 US dollars is the test ("competitive with gas" explains it, it is not a second threshold).
    No fusion plant runs, so fusion's cost of electricity is unmeasured; the only independent estimate puts early plants above $150/MWh, against the under-$100/MWh (2025 dollars) goal. A 2026 Nature Energy study finds fusion plants likely to get cheaper by only 2-8% for each doubling of capacity built, far slower than the roughly 20% of offshore wind that the previous forecast borrowed. Starting the cost decline from the first plant's arrival (see The First Watt) and allowing a 20% chance that costs never fall (as with fission), the chance by 2100 is 66% and the median 2071 (previously 2046): decades away, so red. How fast fusion costs fall with experience is what decides it.
    ETA
    ~2071 (80% range 2038–never/after 2100; P(by 2100) 66%)
    ETA cruxes
    Mapping first: fusion experience rate (Tang 2-8%) vs the offshore analogue (~20%): mapping weight 0/.5/1 -> 2079/2062/2046, LR 2% -> null, 8% -> 2058, offshore LR 15% -> 2063; non-learning (P .53-.81, p50 2061-2090); FOAK cost and its dollar basis ($150-250, 2021 $: 2063-2095); deployment pace (recent offshore rate -> null); First Watt timing (2070-2075). Earlier: audited FOAK LCOE <$120 (2025 $), repeat orders with measured capex declines >8% per doubling, a cheap mass-manufactured design. Later/never: FOAK overruns, low availability, redesigns, no repeat orders.
    Path
    Reading (owner definition d964534): fusion-plant LCOE strictly below $100/MWh in constant 2025 USD; "competitive with gas" is explanatory, not a second threshold; not a subsidised PPA or market price. Proxy chain (no fusion cost series): First Watt start of commercial operation (shared driver fusion-first-watt) -> FOAK cost (Lindley >$150) -> cost decline = offshore wind's deployment-driven decline (shared driver irena-lcoe) rescaled to fusion's experience rate (Tang et al. 2026; transfer assumed, rate sourced), weight .25 on the unscaled offshore rate. Gas LCOE ($77-102 benchmarks, 2025-26) is context only.
    Blockers
    • Technical/economic: no operating fusion plant, so no measured capital, O&M, availability or LCOE.
    • Economic: independent early FOAK estimate >$150/MWh vs <$100 (2025 $); a Nature Energy study puts fusion experience rates at 2-8%, so learning closes the gap slowly.
    • Data: no fusion deployment series to measure Wright learning; offshore-wind capacity (for the transfer) not in the ledger; driver irena-lcoe not yet refit with IRENA 2025.
    • Gather: offshore wind cumulative capacity series, Lindley's dollar year, a second independent fusion experience-rate estimate, real plant cost/availability data.
    How this was assessed: the data, the benchmark and the rubric rule
    ETA method
    learning curve (Wright-law transfer: offshore-wind deployment pace from shared driver irena-lcoe, fusion experience rate from Tang et al. 2026, mixed with the prior 1:1 offshore mapping) after the shared First Watt timing (driver fusion-first-watt), with a counted non-learning branch; reference-class and discounted-survey cross-checks
    ETA calculation
    Gap: fusion LCOE unmeasured; 2023-01-01-lindley-fusion-foak-lcoe-rv >$150/MWh early magnetic FOAK (sourced); assumed median C0 $170 (2024 $) = $174.5 (2025 $, CPI-U 321.943/313.689) -> 1.74x vs $100. C0 consistency: 2026-07-10-whyte-lo-fusion-economic-q-framework ($100/MWh <-> ~$12/W at 2% real) and 2026-07-10-tokamak-energy-st-e1-capex-target ($12-14k/kW commercial phase -> ~$100-111 at 2% real, pilot above). Analogue: driver irena-lcoe r_offshore (lognormal(ln .075651,.55); offshore 208/155/114/91/81/79 2010-24, 2024-01-01-irena-lcoe-offshore-wind-2024-rv; 2025 = 78 in 2025 $ (-3.8% real), 2026-07-02-irena-lcoe-2025-solar-wind, not yet in the fit: driver finding). Model = prev 20261016T063036Z (reproduced exactly: P .7475, 2033.36/2046.04/null): G_i = start_i + ln(C0/thr)/r_i, start_i = draw i of shared driver fusion-first-watt, r_offshore_i = draw i of shared driver irena-lcoe (driver-draws --as-of 2026-10-18, seed 20261015, n 10000); thr $97.436 (2024 $); 20% non-learning; FW never -> never. Mapping update on new evidence 2026-03-23-nature-energy-fusion-experience-rates-overestimated (fusion experience rates 2-8%, adopted 5%, vs 8-20% assumed): offshore's decline embeds LR ~20% (b_off = .075651 / ln(83/3.1)/14 = .075651/.2348 = .322; capacity 3.1 -> 83 GW 2010-24, GWEC, sourced); fusion r_i = r_offshore_i x b_fus/b_off with LR_fus tri(2,5,8)% (ratio at 5% .229, r ~.0174/yr; 0.5566/.0174 = 32 yr after the first plant), weight .75; prev 1:1 mapping weight .25. Failure scenario non-learning 20%: class = capital-intensive generators commercialised since 1950 (fission, CCGT, onshore, offshore, PV, CSP): 1 of 6 (fission) no real cost decline -> .17, Laplace .25; .20 kept. FW never .068 (driver); slow learning missing 2100 .093 (model outcome). MC: P(by2100) .6555, p10 2038.00, p50 2071.30, p90 null (calendar 2038/2071/null); conditional median 2054.42; P(by end-2050) .284. Sensitivities: Tang only 2079.41 (P .625), weight .5 2062.05, prev mapping 2046.03 (.748); LR_fus 2%/8%/12% -> null (.423)/2058.12/2051.50; LR_off 15%/25% -> 2062.70/2080.61; recent offshore rate -> null (.463); C0 150/190/250 -> 2063.15/2078.11/2095.05; C0 in 2021 $ 2080.25; non-learning .10/.35/0 -> 2065.07/2090.09/2061.18; follow-on +3 yr 2074.28; FW slip 3x 2074.84, helion weight .25 2073.61. Cross-checks: first commercial plant -> LCOE <$100 took fission ~10-15, onshore ~15-20, offshore ~28, PV ~30 yr: ~20 yr from ~2032 -> ~2052 = our conditional median 2054; FIA viability survey (2026-07-13-fia-2026-survey-cost-viability-timing) median ~2038.9, discounted 1.5/2/3x -> 2044.9/2050.9/2063.0 (looser event; our P(by end-2063) .44). No anchors. Prev 2033/2046/null P .75 -> 2038/2071/null P .66. Working: notes/fusion/20261018T192708Z.md.
    Change
    Prev 2026-10-16-milestone-grid-parity (assess:20261016T063036Z; red, 2033/2046/null, P .75), reproduced exactly (2033.36/2046.04/null, P .7475); on 2026-10-18 driver draws 2033.35/2046.03/null. Trigger: newly ingested 2026 events. (a) New evidence 2026-03-23-nature-energy-fusion-experience-rates-overestimated (fusion experience rates 2-8%, adopted 5%) contradicts prev's 1:1 offshore mapping, whose implied experience rate is ~20% (b_off .322 from GWEC capacity 3.1 -> 83 GW 2010-24): replaced by r = r_offshore x b_fus/b_off, LR_fus tri(2,5,8)%, weight .75 (prev mapping .25, assumed): p10 2033 -> 2038 (2033.35 -> 2038.00), p50 2046 -> 2071 (2046.03 -> 2071.30), p_achieved .75 -> .66 (.7475 -> .6555); p90 null. Tang-only would give 2044/2079/.625. Other new evidence (IRENA 2025 points, Whyte-Lo, Tokamak Energy capex target, gas LCOE rises, FIA viability survey) informs cross-checks and C0 consistency; no input moved. Status red unchanged.
    Rubric rule
    RUBRIC v6 §4/§4.1: no verified fusion LCOE below $100/MWh (2025 USD); unconditional p50 2071 > made_at+10 yr gives red/Distant. Status unchanged.
    by assess:20261018T192708Z · 22 evidence event(s)
    Evidence and news: 22 cited by the assessment

    Cited evidence (22)

Tech Tree

Beyond the framework: 67 event(s)
Latest news: the 8 most recently published of 237 events

All 237 events: the event log

Health and Lifespan

304 events · latest news published 2026-10-16 (6 days ago)news per week news per week, the 16 weeks to 2026-10-22: 4, 11, 2, 11, 4, 1, 3, 4, 6, 5, 3, 6, 7, 7, 6, 1

Some people long for immortality, others would just prefer not to die (or live a low-quality life) yet. The biggest symbol for fixing this is our journey to cure cancer, but the fight against other diseases such as Alzheimer's (or potential pandemics), as well as perfected early diagnostics, are just as important. And to achieve not just plain longevity, but long healthy lifespan, eventually we need to move further — to evolve our biology, not just fight off diseases.

KPI

Healthy life expectancy, median country (WHO)
63.8 years
2023 · source
24 annual values, 2000-12-31 to 2023-12-31; range 61.3 to 63.82000202361.3 years · 200061.5 years · 200161.7 years · 200261.8 years · 200361.9 years · 200462 years · 200562.2 years · 200662.3 years · 200762.5 years · 200862.6 years · 200962.9 years · 201062.7 years · 201162.9 years · 201263.1 years · 201363.3 years · 201463.4 years · 201563.1 years · 201663.5 years · 201763.8 years · 201863.6 years · 201962.5 years · 202062.1 years · 202163.4 years · 202263.8 years · 2023
updated irregularly
Behind pace: 63.8 yrs (2023); +0.03 yrs/yr excluding the COVID dip vs +0.13 pre-2019 trend · assessed 2026-10-18

Healthy life expectancy in the median country was 63.8 years in 2023 (WHO Global Health Estimates), back above its 2019 level after the COVID-19 dip. Leaving the 2020–21 pandemic years aside, the other three years from 2019 to 2023 average 63.6 years against 63.4 in 2014–18, a gain of about 0.03 years per year — a quarter of the pace before 2019 (0.13 years per year): moving the right way but too slowly, so yellow. The main caveat is that a pace measured from only three recent years is imprecise.

The KPI's precise definition

The KPI, as defined: Median country Healthy Life Expectancy (HALE) at birth (years) — currently ~63y (WHO GHE 2021; ~72y is median life expectancy, not HALE)

How the status was judged: the data window, the pace benchmark, the rule
Assessed quantity
hale-median-country: unweighted median across 185 countries of WHO GHE HALE at birth, both sexes, years; goal_direction up; fixed five-year window.
Window
Current
Span
2019–2023
Values
201963.6202062.5202162.1202263.4202363.8
N
5
Mean
63.08
OLS slope yr per yr
0.13
Residual SD
0.8204
Scored ex transient
Span
2019, 2022, 2023
Values
201963.6202263.4202363.8
N
3
Mean
63.6
Slope
0.02308
Residual SD
0.2746
Previous
Span
2014–2018
Values
201463.3201563.4201663.1201763.5201863.8
N
5
Mean
63.42
Slope
0.11
Residual SD
0.2214
Comparison
Mean difference ex covid
0.18
Centre year difference
5.333
Between centres rate
0.03375
Descriptive noise SE
0.08685
Descriptive z
2.073
Pace share of benchmark
0.265
Mean difference raw
-0.34
Benchmark fit
Span
2000–2018
N
19
Slope
0.1274
Residual SD
0.1189
Values
200061.3200161.5200261.7200361.8200461.9200562200662.2200762.3200862.5200962.6201062.9201162.7201262.9201363.1201463.3201563.4201663.1201763.5201863.8
Through 2019 sensitivity
0.1241
Source
uv run core/ledger.py series health hale-median-country --as-of 2026-10-18 (collector, GHO WHOSIS_000002, published 2026-10-01); statistics in notes 20261018T211426Z Appendix B.
Noise caveat
The historical OLS residual SD is a descriptive noise scale, not a measurement-error model; the raw window slope (+0.13) includes the pandemic rebound and the raw mean difference (−0.34) the trough; neither substitutes for the ex-transient comparison.
Benchmark
Tier 3, own pre-2019 long-run OLS 2000–2018: +0.127 yr/yr (2000–2019: +0.124). Ex-transient centre-to-centre pace +0.034 yr/yr = 26.5% of benchmark. WHO global population-weighted +~0.28 yr/yr 2000–2019 is context only.
Benchmark source
WHO Global Health Estimates, GHO WHOSIS_000002 (hale-median-country), fixed KPI spec tier 3.
Transients discounted
COVID-19 2020–2021: 63.6 (2019) → 62.5 → 62.1, then 63.4 (2022) and 63.8 (2023); two years < one window, named cause, reversal measured; the trough is omitted from secular scoring and the rebound is not scored as acceleration.
Data as of
2023
Change
Yellow unchanged. No new observation of hale-median-country (effective series identical to prev, published 2026-10-01; 2026-10-02-who-ghe-2023-hale-release restates the same 2019/2023 values), so every statistic reproduces prev exactly. Record moves from rubric v4 to v6 (KPI rules unchanged v2–v6, no re-judgment). Label drops '(tier 3)' per §6. New context events (WHS 2026 global HALE 63 in 2023, GBD 2023 morbidity gap, ONS UK healthy life expectancy fall 2022–24, PAHO) do not measure the assessed metric.
Rubric rule
§3: yellow — the ex-transient window moves upward beyond descriptive noise (z 2.07) but below the tier-3 own-trend pace (26.5% of it); COVID-19 2020–21 is a transient with its reversal measured, so it moves the status in neither direction. Not stale: data to 2023, 2.8 years before made_at, irregular cadence threshold 3 years.
by assess:20261018T211426Z · 7 evidence event(s)
Evidence and news: 7 cited by the assessment, 10 other KPI news

Cited evidence (7)

Other events (10)

2 more metric(s) we track
Healthy life expectancy, world population-weighted (WHO)
62.8 years
2023 · source
24 annual values, 2000-12-31 to 2023-12-31; range 57.9 to 63.22000202357.9 years · 200058.2 years · 200158.4 years · 200258.7 years · 200359 years · 200459.4 years · 200559.9 years · 200660.2 years · 200760.5 years · 200860.9 years · 200961.1 years · 201061.4 years · 201161.7 years · 201262 years · 201362.2 years · 201462.3 years · 201562.5 years · 201662.7 years · 201763 years · 201863.2 years · 201962.4 years · 202061.4 years · 202162.3 years · 202262.8 years · 2023
updated irregularly
Forecast: therapy slowing or reversing human ageing by 2040 (Manifold)
0.6012 probability
22 Oct 2026 · source
2 daily values, 2026-10-15 to 2026-10-22; range 0.6012 to 0.6012Oct 26Oct 260.6012 probability · 15 Oct 20260.6012 probability · 22 Oct 2026

Milestone Countdown

Independent fronts: these can fall in any order.
Expected year: dot = median (hollow: after 2100), bar = 80% range. The time axis is compressed: the farther out, the more years per step.

Major Open Challenges

Beyond the framework: 53 event(s)
Latest news: the 8 most recently published of 304 events

All 304 events: the event log

Climate and Environment

215 events · latest news published 2026-10-18 (4 days ago)news per week news per week, the 16 weeks to 2026-10-22: 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 13, 22, 23, 17, 24, 5

This endeavor is unlike the other four, as it is about fixing the past rather than improving the future. A hundred years ago, we would have been talking about terraforming Sahara and Antarctica, but humanity messed up the Earth. Many historic civilizations fell to climate change, and we now have to clean up our mess if we are to survive into a better future.

KPI

CO₂ at Mauna Loa, monthly mean (NOAA)
426.07 ppm
Sep 2026 · source
▲ +1.70 vs Sep 2025
823 monthly values, 1958-03-31 to 2026-09-30; range 312.42 to 432.3419582026315.71 ppm · Mar 1958318.29 ppm · May 1959318.18 ppm · Jul 1960314.99 ppm · Sep 1961316.69 ppm · Nov 1962319.57 ppm · Jan 1964320.89 ppm · Mar 1965324.08 ppm · May 1966324.09 ppm · Jun 1967322.11 ppm · Aug 1968321.78 ppm · Oct 1969325.13 ppm · Dec 1970327.63 ppm · Feb 1972331.5 ppm · Apr 1973332.2 ppm · Jun 1974329.95 ppm · Aug 1975328.72 ppm · Oct 1976333.6 ppm · Dec 1977336.69 ppm · Feb 1979340.93 ppm · Apr 1980342.54 ppm · Jun 1981340.24 ppm · Aug 1982340.53 ppm · Oct 1983343.31 ppm · Nov 1984346.78 ppm · Jan 1986349.81 ppm · Mar 1987354.35 ppm · May 1988354.05 ppm · Jul 1989351.38 ppm · Sep 1990353.89 ppm · Nov 1991357.1 ppm · Jan 1993360.11 ppm · Mar 1994363.83 ppm · May 1995363.69 ppm · Jul 1996360.44 ppm · Sep 1997365.67 ppm · Nov 1998369.45 ppm · Jan 2000371.69 ppm · Feb 2001375.19 ppm · Apr 2002378.46 ppm · Jun 2003376.17 ppm · Aug 2004377.19 ppm · Oct 2005382.02 ppm · Dec 2006386.06 ppm · Feb 2008389.76 ppm · Apr 2009392.38 ppm · Jun 2010390.33 ppm · Aug 2011391.27 ppm · Oct 2012397.03 ppm · Dec 2013400.55 ppm · Feb 2015407.6 ppm · Apr 2016409.08 ppm · Jun 2017408.9 ppm · Jul 2018408.76 ppm · Sep 2019413.1 ppm · Nov 2020418.13 ppm · Jan 2022420.99 ppm · Mar 2023426.9 ppm · May 2024427.87 ppm · Jul 2025426.07 ppm · Sep 2026
next update due by 7 Nov 2026
CO₂ growth, 10-year average (Mauna Loa)
2.56 ppm/yr
2025 · source
58 annual values, 1968-12-31 to 2025-12-31; range 0.82 to 2.64196820250.82 ppm/yr · 19680.86 ppm/yr · 19690.91 ppm/yr · 19700.89 ppm/yr · 19711 ppm/yr · 19721.05 ppm/yr · 19731.11 ppm/yr · 19741.12 ppm/yr · 19751.07 ppm/yr · 19761.21 ppm/yr · 19771.24 ppm/yr · 19781.28 ppm/yr · 19791.35 ppm/yr · 19801.42 ppm/yr · 19811.33 ppm/yr · 19821.45 ppm/yr · 19831.5 ppm/yr · 19841.51 ppm/yr · 19851.58 ppm/yr · 19861.57 ppm/yr · 19871.67 ppm/yr · 19881.61 ppm/yr · 19891.56 ppm/yr · 19901.52 ppm/yr · 19911.48 ppm/yr · 19921.38 ppm/yr · 19931.43 ppm/yr · 19941.51 ppm/yr · 19951.48 ppm/yr · 19961.47 ppm/yr · 19971.54 ppm/yr · 19981.51 ppm/yr · 19991.55 ppm/yr · 20001.61 ppm/yr · 20011.81 ppm/yr · 20021.9 ppm/yr · 20031.87 ppm/yr · 20041.92 ppm/yr · 20051.97 ppm/yr · 20062.01 ppm/yr · 20071.86 ppm/yr · 20081.97 ppm/yr · 20092.04 ppm/yr · 20102.07 ppm/yr · 20112.08 ppm/yr · 20122.06 ppm/yr · 20132.11 ppm/yr · 20142.15 ppm/yr · 20152.29 ppm/yr · 20162.25 ppm/yr · 20172.38 ppm/yr · 20182.43 ppm/yr · 20192.43 ppm/yr · 20202.47 ppm/yr · 20212.39 ppm/yr · 20222.52 ppm/yr · 20232.64 ppm/yr · 20242.56 ppm/yr · 2025
next update due by 10 Jan 2027
Regressing: 427.35 ppm (2025); +2.56 ppm/yr, up from 2.15 the decade before; need ≤1.79 · assessed 2026-10-18

Atmospheric CO₂ at Mauna Loa reached 427.35 ppm in 2025, and it is rising faster, not slower: 2.56 ppm per year on average over 2016–2025, up from 2.15 over 2006–2015, with each successive five-year average higher than the last. The goal is for the rise to stop, and the IPCC 1.5°C pathways cited by the UK Met Office need 2020s growth of at most 1.79 ppm per year, so the trend is moving the wrong way: red. The slower rise so far in 2026 (about 1.8 ppm per year) follows a La Niña and is expected to reverse as a record El Niño develops, so it does not change the decade-scale picture.

The KPI's precise definition

The KPI, as defined: Atmospheric CO₂ concentration (ppm) and 10-year trend (ppm/year)

How the status was judged: the data window, the pace benchmark, the rule
Assessed quantity
co2-trend-10yr-mlo-jan-dec: NOAA Mauna Loa Jan–Dec CO₂ growth, ten-year mean in ppm/yr; goal_direction down toward ≤ 0; trend window 10 years (ENSO cycle), compared with the previous non-overlapping window and half-decade means.
Window
Current
Span
2016-2025
Annual ppm
20163.0320171.920182.8520192.4920202.320212.3520221.8420233.3220243.3320252.23
Mean ppm per yr
2.564
SD annual
0.5431
Half decades
2016-2020
2.514
2021-2025
2.614
Registered 10yr mean
2.56
Previous
Span
2006-2015
Annual ppm
20061.6920072.3120081.542009220102.320111.9220122.6520131.9920142.1720152.95
Mean ppm per yr
2.152
SD annual
0.4247
Half decades
2006-2010
1.968
2011-2015
2.336
Registered 10yr mean
2.15
Change ppm per yr
0.412
SE difference
0.218
Difference over SE
1.89
Mean 2020 2025
2.562
Level ppm 2025
427.4
Method
Means of the annual co2-growth-mlo-jan-dec rows; the registered rolling co2-trend-10yr-mlo-jan-dec values (2.56 / 2.15) are the same means rounded. The SE is descriptive (independent-years approximation), not a formal test.
Source
uv run core/ledger.py series climate co2-growth-mlo-jan-dec / co2-trend-10yr-mlo-jan-dec / co2-trend-5yr-mlo-jan-dec / co2-mlo-annual --as-of 2026-10-18
Benchmark
Tier 1: 2020s mean growth ≤ 1.79 ppm/yr (upper end of 1.33–1.79 for IPCC AR6 C1 1.5°C pathways). 2020–2025 mean 2.5617 (incomplete decade) exceeds it.
Benchmark source
UK Met Office CO₂ forecast page citing IPCC AR6 C1 pathways (2026-02-04-metoffice-co2-too-fast-for-1-5c); metrics/kpi-assessment.csv row climate, tier 1.
Transients discounted
  • Jan–Sep 2026 monthly year-on-year gains 1.97, 2.26, 2.00, 1.48, 1.83, 1.82, 1.26, 2.07, 1.70 ppm (mean 1.82; co2-growth-mlo-yoy-monthly; Jan–Sep average +1.82 vs +2.86 a year earlier, 2026-10-09-noaa-co2-ytd-jan-sep-2026-slower-rise): shorter than one window, named cause (La Niña-like 2025–26 conditions), expected reversal (record El Niño forecast, Niño 3.4 ~+3.7°C Oct–Dec: 2026-10-06-wmo-el-nino-record-nino34-forecast, 2026-10-08-noaa-cpc-enso-strong-el-nino-advisory). Moves the status in neither direction.
  • An El Niño-driven 2027 growth spike is a projection (2026-09-28-hausfather-el-nino-2027-co2-growth-spike), not evidence.
Data as of
2025
Change
No new annual observation of the assessed metric since prev (2026-10-13-kpi-2, rubric v4; KPI rules are unchanged v2–v6, so no rubric correction is needed): the window means are identical. New since prev: September 2026 monthly data (426.07 ppm, +1.70 YoY; 2026-10-09-noaa-co2-monthly-sep-2026) and the Jan–Sep summary extend the transient, and the El Niño forecasts strengthen the expected reversal. data_as_of 2025 (published 2026-01-10) is within 2 annual cadences + lag: no Stale prefix. Status red unchanged.
Rubric rule
RUBRIC.md v6 §3 (KPI rules unchanged since v1): red — the assessed growth rate moves away from the downward goal across non-overlapping ten-year windows (and across all four half-decades); the ppm level is reported, not scored.
by assess:20261018T192714Z · 14 evidence event(s)
Evidence and news: 14 cited by the assessment, 14 other KPI news

Cited evidence (14)

Other events (14)

20 more metric(s) we track
Energy-related CO₂ emissions (IEA)
38082 MtCO2
2025 · source
Fossil CO₂ emissions (Global Carbon Budget)
38.1 GtCO2
2025 · source
67 annual values, 1959-12-31 to 2025-12-31; range 8.81 to 38.1195920258.81 GtCO2 · 19599.33 GtCO2 · 19609.36 GtCO2 · 19619.69 GtCO2 · 196210.2 GtCO2 · 196311.24 GtCO2 · 196511.78 GtCO2 · 196612.15 GtCO2 · 196712.81 GtCO2 · 196813.67 GtCO2 · 196914.8 GtCO2 · 197015.4 GtCO2 · 197116.11 GtCO2 · 197216.87 GtCO2 · 197416.86 GtCO2 · 197517.73 GtCO2 · 197618.22 GtCO2 · 197718.87 GtCO2 · 197819.35 GtCO2 · 197919.25 GtCO2 · 198018.72 GtCO2 · 198118.57 GtCO2 · 198219.28 GtCO2 · 198419.97 GtCO2 · 198520.25 GtCO2 · 198620.91 GtCO2 · 198721.72 GtCO2 · 198821.99 GtCO2 · 198922.52 GtCO2 · 199022.99 GtCO2 · 199122.51 GtCO2 · 199322.72 GtCO2 · 199423.26 GtCO2 · 199523.96 GtCO2 · 199624.1 GtCO2 · 199724.01 GtCO2 · 199824.54 GtCO2 · 199925.21 GtCO2 · 200025.93 GtCO2 · 200227.29 GtCO2 · 200328.23 GtCO2 · 200429.19 GtCO2 · 200530.15 GtCO2 · 200631.02 GtCO2 · 200731.55 GtCO2 · 200830.99 GtCO2 · 200932.76 GtCO2 · 201034.33 GtCO2 · 201234.61 GtCO2 · 201334.78 GtCO2 · 201434.71 GtCO2 · 201534.69 GtCO2 · 201635.26 GtCO2 · 201736 GtCO2 · 201836.32 GtCO2 · 201936.04 GtCO2 · 202136.72 GtCO2 · 202237.26 GtCO2 · 202337.78 GtCO2 · 202438.1 GtCO2 · 2025
Fossil and industry CO₂ emissions (Carbon Monitor)
37.2 GtCO2
2025 · source
Total CO₂ emissions incl. land use (Global Carbon Budget)
42.2 GtCO2
2025 · source
67 annual values, 1959-12-31 to 2025-12-31; range 16.82 to 42.361959202517.5 GtCO2 · 195916.94 GtCO2 · 196016.99 GtCO2 · 196116.82 GtCO2 · 196217.15 GtCO2 · 196317.62 GtCO2 · 196517.7 GtCO2 · 196618.4 GtCO2 · 196719.14 GtCO2 · 196820.61 GtCO2 · 196921.49 GtCO2 · 197021.54 GtCO2 · 197122.55 GtCO2 · 197223.19 GtCO2 · 197422.99 GtCO2 · 197523.79 GtCO2 · 197624.84 GtCO2 · 197725.44 GtCO2 · 197825.21 GtCO2 · 197925.25 GtCO2 · 198024.55 GtCO2 · 198124.1 GtCO2 · 198225.71 GtCO2 · 198426.75 GtCO2 · 198527.2 GtCO2 · 198627.41 GtCO2 · 198727.87 GtCO2 · 198827.97 GtCO2 · 198928.35 GtCO2 · 199028.71 GtCO2 · 199128.25 GtCO2 · 199329.39 GtCO2 · 199429.53 GtCO2 · 199530.5 GtCO2 · 199632.12 GtCO2 · 199730.8 GtCO2 · 199831.1 GtCO2 · 199931.35 GtCO2 · 200032.03 GtCO2 · 200234.62 GtCO2 · 200334.67 GtCO2 · 200435.12 GtCO2 · 200536.19 GtCO2 · 200636.62 GtCO2 · 200737.5 GtCO2 · 200837.53 GtCO2 · 200939.28 GtCO2 · 201041.01 GtCO2 · 201240.93 GtCO2 · 201341.19 GtCO2 · 201441.22 GtCO2 · 201540.07 GtCO2 · 201640.57 GtCO2 · 201740.88 GtCO2 · 201841.21 GtCO2 · 201940.7 GtCO2 · 202141.5 GtCO2 · 202242.01 GtCO2 · 202342.36 GtCO2 · 202442.2 GtCO2 · 2025
CO₂ global, annual mean (NOAA)
425.62 ppm
2025 · source
47 annual values, 1979-12-31 to 2025-12-31; range 336.85 to 425.6219792025336.85 ppm · 1979338.91 ppm · 1980340.11 ppm · 1981340.85 ppm · 1982342.53 ppm · 1983344.07 ppm · 1984345.54 ppm · 1985346.97 ppm · 1986348.68 ppm · 1987351.16 ppm · 1988352.79 ppm · 1989354.06 ppm · 1990355.4 ppm · 1991356.09 ppm · 1992356.84 ppm · 1993358.33 ppm · 1994360.18 ppm · 1995361.93 ppm · 1996363.04 ppm · 1997365.7 ppm · 1998367.79 ppm · 1999368.96 ppm · 2000370.57 ppm · 2001372.58 ppm · 2002375.14 ppm · 2003376.95 ppm · 2004378.98 ppm · 2005381.15 ppm · 2006382.9 ppm · 2007385.02 ppm · 2008386.5 ppm · 2009388.75 ppm · 2010390.62 ppm · 2011392.65 ppm · 2012395.4 ppm · 2013397.34 ppm · 2014399.65 ppm · 2015403.07 ppm · 2016405.22 ppm · 2017407.61 ppm · 2018410.07 ppm · 2019412.45 ppm · 2020414.7 ppm · 2021417.08 ppm · 2022419.35 ppm · 2023422.79 ppm · 2024425.62 ppm · 2025
next update due by 10 Jan 2027
CO₂ global, monthly mean (NOAA)
426.10 ppm
Jul 2026 · source
▲ +2.01 vs Jul 2025
571 monthly values, 1979-01-31 to 2026-07-31; range 334.36 to 428.6819792026336.56 ppm · Jan 1979337.36 ppm · Nov 1979337.22 ppm · Aug 1980340.63 ppm · Jun 1981342.52 ppm · Apr 1982342.37 ppm · Jan 1983342.83 ppm · Nov 1983342.13 ppm · Sep 1984346.26 ppm · Jun 1985348.22 ppm · Apr 1986348.56 ppm · Feb 1987349.25 ppm · Nov 1987349.27 ppm · Sep 1988351.56 ppm · Jul 1989355.51 ppm · Apr 1990356.19 ppm · Feb 1991355.95 ppm · Dec 1991353.58 ppm · Sep 1992355.73 ppm · Jul 1993359.74 ppm · May 1994360.62 ppm · Feb 1995361.65 ppm · Dec 1995360.67 ppm · Oct 1996361.93 ppm · Jul 1997366.86 ppm · May 1998368.9 ppm · Mar 1999368.88 ppm · Dec 1999367.91 ppm · Oct 2000368.32 ppm · Aug 2001373.71 ppm · May 2002375.91 ppm · Mar 2003376.52 ppm · Dec 2003375.73 ppm · Oct 2004376.73 ppm · Aug 2005382.63 ppm · May 2006384.01 ppm · Mar 2007385.23 ppm · Jan 2008383.67 ppm · Oct 2008383.63 ppm · Aug 2009389.01 ppm · Jun 2010391.66 ppm · Mar 2011392.61 ppm · Jan 2012393.56 ppm · Nov 2012393.24 ppm · Aug 2013397.72 ppm · Jun 2014400.96 ppm · Apr 2015402.62 ppm · Jan 2016403.76 ppm · Nov 2016402.66 ppm · Sep 2017408.06 ppm · Jun 2018411.33 ppm · Apr 2019412.97 ppm · Feb 2020413.25 ppm · Nov 2020412.38 ppm · Sep 2021415.67 ppm · Jul 2022420.48 ppm · Apr 2023422.79 ppm · Feb 2024425.2 ppm · Dec 2024423.06 ppm · Sep 2025426.1 ppm · Jul 2026
next update due by 9 Nov 2026
CO₂ growth in the year (global)
2.06 ppm/yr
2025 · source
67 annual values, 1959-12-31 to 2025-12-31; range 0.49 to 3.76195920250.96 ppm/yr · 19590.71 ppm/yr · 19600.78 ppm/yr · 19610.56 ppm/yr · 19620.57 ppm/yr · 19631.1 ppm/yr · 19651.1 ppm/yr · 19660.61 ppm/yr · 19670.99 ppm/yr · 19681.32 ppm/yr · 19691.13 ppm/yr · 19700.73 ppm/yr · 19711.47 ppm/yr · 19720.68 ppm/yr · 19741.23 ppm/yr · 19750.97 ppm/yr · 19761.92 ppm/yr · 19771.29 ppm/yr · 19782.14 ppm/yr · 19791.67 ppm/yr · 19801.15 ppm/yr · 19811 ppm/yr · 19821.23 ppm/yr · 19841.65 ppm/yr · 19851.01 ppm/yr · 19862.66 ppm/yr · 19872.17 ppm/yr · 19881.47 ppm/yr · 19891.22 ppm/yr · 19900.75 ppm/yr · 19911.23 ppm/yr · 19931.66 ppm/yr · 19942 ppm/yr · 19951.05 ppm/yr · 19961.98 ppm/yr · 19972.84 ppm/yr · 19981.33 ppm/yr · 19991.25 ppm/yr · 20002.36 ppm/yr · 20022.29 ppm/yr · 20031.56 ppm/yr · 20042.47 ppm/yr · 20051.78 ppm/yr · 20062.13 ppm/yr · 20071.77 ppm/yr · 20081.58 ppm/yr · 20092.36 ppm/yr · 20102.41 ppm/yr · 20122.45 ppm/yr · 20132.03 ppm/yr · 20142.95 ppm/yr · 20152.83 ppm/yr · 20162.14 ppm/yr · 20172.39 ppm/yr · 20182.5 ppm/yr · 20192.38 ppm/yr · 20212.24 ppm/yr · 20222.69 ppm/yr · 20233.76 ppm/yr · 20242.06 ppm/yr · 2025
next update due by 10 Jan 2027
CO₂ global annual-mean increase (WMO)
3.5 ppm/yr
2024 · source
CO₂ annual-mean increase (Mauna Loa, NOAA)
2.74 ppm/yr
2025 · source
2 annual values, 2024-12-31 to 2025-12-31; range 2.74 to 3.53Dec 24Dec 253.53 ppm/yr · 20242.74 ppm/yr · 2025
next update due by 10 Jan 2027
CO₂ annual-mean increase (Mauna Loa, Scripps)
2.68 ppm/yr
2025 · source
updated irregularly
CO₂ growth in the year (Mauna Loa)
2.23 ppm/yr
2025 · source
67 annual values, 1959-12-31 to 2025-12-31; range 0.31 to 3.33195920250.94 ppm/yr · 19590.5 ppm/yr · 19600.96 ppm/yr · 19610.65 ppm/yr · 19620.71 ppm/yr · 19631.06 ppm/yr · 19651.28 ppm/yr · 19660.69 ppm/yr · 19671.06 ppm/yr · 19681.35 ppm/yr · 19691 ppm/yr · 19700.8 ppm/yr · 19711.74 ppm/yr · 19720.96 ppm/yr · 19741.09 ppm/yr · 19750.79 ppm/yr · 19762.15 ppm/yr · 19771.3 ppm/yr · 19781.83 ppm/yr · 19791.68 ppm/yr · 19801.43 ppm/yr · 19810.86 ppm/yr · 19821.51 ppm/yr · 19841.21 ppm/yr · 19851.47 ppm/yr · 19862.06 ppm/yr · 19872.24 ppm/yr · 19881.24 ppm/yr · 19891.2 ppm/yr · 19901.05 ppm/yr · 19911.36 ppm/yr · 19931.95 ppm/yr · 19942.01 ppm/yr · 19951.24 ppm/yr · 19961.91 ppm/yr · 19972.97 ppm/yr · 19980.92 ppm/yr · 19991.62 ppm/yr · 20002.51 ppm/yr · 20022.26 ppm/yr · 20031.59 ppm/yr · 20042.57 ppm/yr · 20051.69 ppm/yr · 20062.31 ppm/yr · 20071.54 ppm/yr · 20082 ppm/yr · 20092.3 ppm/yr · 20102.65 ppm/yr · 20121.99 ppm/yr · 20132.17 ppm/yr · 20142.95 ppm/yr · 20153.03 ppm/yr · 20161.9 ppm/yr · 20172.85 ppm/yr · 20182.49 ppm/yr · 20192.35 ppm/yr · 20211.84 ppm/yr · 20223.32 ppm/yr · 20233.33 ppm/yr · 20242.23 ppm/yr · 2025
next update due by 10 Jan 2027
CO₂ change on the same month a year earlier (Mauna Loa)
1.70 ppm
Sep 2026 · source
▼ -0.64 vs Sep 2025
811 monthly values, 1959-03-31 to 2026-09-30; range -0.35 to 4.39195920260.94 ppm · Mar 19591.74 ppm · May 19600.19 ppm · Jun 19610.61 ppm · Aug 19620.57 ppm · Oct 19630.36 ppm · Dec 19641.18 ppm · Jan 19660.64 ppm · Mar 19670.57 ppm · May 19681.74 ppm · Jul 19691.02 ppm · Aug 19700.5 ppm · Oct 19711.54 ppm · Dec 19720.81 ppm · Jan 19740.45 ppm · Mar 19750.77 ppm · May 19761.81 ppm · Jul 19771.86 ppm · Aug 19781.79 ppm · Oct 19791.48 ppm · Dec 19801.21 ppm · Feb 19820.59 ppm · Mar 19831.63 ppm · May 19841.11 ppm · Jul 19850.91 ppm · Aug 19861.9 ppm · Oct 19872.34 ppm · Dec 19881.67 ppm · Feb 19901.58 ppm · Mar 19910.48 ppm · May 19920.3 ppm · Jul 19931.72 ppm · Sep 19941.93 ppm · Oct 19951.57 ppm · Dec 19961.89 ppm · Feb 19982.36 ppm · Apr 19990.63 ppm · May 20001.66 ppm · Jul 20012.58 ppm · Sep 20022.58 ppm · Oct 20031.51 ppm · Dec 20042.49 ppm · Feb 20061.93 ppm · Apr 20072 ppm · May 20081.62 ppm · Jul 20092.08 ppm · Sep 20101.61 ppm · Nov 20112.51 ppm · Dec 20121.24 ppm · Feb 20141.84 ppm · Apr 20153.75 ppm · May 20162.74 ppm · Jul 20172.14 ppm · Sep 20182.26 ppm · Nov 20192.26 ppm · Dec 20202.52 ppm · Feb 20223.16 ppm · Apr 20233.23 ppm · Jun 20242.32 ppm · Jul 20251.7 ppm · Sep 2026
next update due by 7 Nov 2026
CO₂ at Mauna Loa, annual mean (NOAA)
427.35 ppm
2025 · source
67 annual values, 1959-12-31 to 2025-12-31; range 315.98 to 427.3519592025315.98 ppm · 1959316.91 ppm · 1960317.64 ppm · 1961318.45 ppm · 1962318.99 ppm · 1963320.04 ppm · 1965321.37 ppm · 1966322.18 ppm · 1967323.05 ppm · 1968324.62 ppm · 1969325.68 ppm · 1970326.32 ppm · 1971327.46 ppm · 1972330.19 ppm · 1974331.13 ppm · 1975332.03 ppm · 1976333.84 ppm · 1977335.41 ppm · 1978336.84 ppm · 1979338.76 ppm · 1980340.12 ppm · 1981341.48 ppm · 1982344.87 ppm · 1984346.35 ppm · 1985347.61 ppm · 1986349.31 ppm · 1987351.69 ppm · 1988353.2 ppm · 1989354.45 ppm · 1990355.7 ppm · 1991357.21 ppm · 1993358.96 ppm · 1994360.97 ppm · 1995362.74 ppm · 1996363.88 ppm · 1997366.84 ppm · 1998368.54 ppm · 1999369.71 ppm · 2000373.45 ppm · 2002375.98 ppm · 2003377.7 ppm · 2004379.98 ppm · 2005382.09 ppm · 2006384.02 ppm · 2007385.83 ppm · 2008387.64 ppm · 2009390.1 ppm · 2010394.06 ppm · 2012396.74 ppm · 2013398.81 ppm · 2014401.01 ppm · 2015404.41 ppm · 2016406.76 ppm · 2017408.72 ppm · 2018411.65 ppm · 2019416.41 ppm · 2021418.53 ppm · 2022421.08 ppm · 2023424.61 ppm · 2024427.35 ppm · 2025
next update due by 10 Jan 2027
CO₂ at Mauna Loa, daily mean (NOAA)
426.65 ppm
20 Oct 2026 · source
58 daily values, 2026-05-01 to 2026-10-20; range 425.04 to 433.95May 26Oct 26433.95 ppm · 1 May 2026433.47 ppm · 10 May 2026429.21 ppm · 27 Jul 2026429.01 ppm · 28 Jul 2026429.29 ppm · 29 Jul 2026428.52 ppm · 31 Jul 2026428.47 ppm · 2 Aug 2026428.28 ppm · 7 Aug 2026427.8 ppm · 8 Aug 2026428.02 ppm · 12 Aug 2026426.95 ppm · 13 Aug 2026427.8 ppm · 14 Aug 2026426.95 ppm · 19 Aug 2026426.86 ppm · 20 Aug 2026426.98 ppm · 21 Aug 2026427.11 ppm · 22 Aug 2026426.88 ppm · 23 Aug 2026426.87 ppm · 24 Aug 2026427.03 ppm · 25 Aug 2026427.01 ppm · 26 Aug 2026426.93 ppm · 27 Aug 2026427.32 ppm · 30 Aug 2026427.33 ppm · 31 Aug 2026426.81 ppm · 2 Sep 2026427.13 ppm · 3 Sep 2026426.57 ppm · 8 Sep 2026426.62 ppm · 9 Sep 2026426.25 ppm · 10 Sep 2026425.73 ppm · 11 Sep 2026425.23 ppm · 12 Sep 2026425.04 ppm · 13 Sep 2026425.57 ppm · 14 Sep 2026425.53 ppm · 15 Sep 2026426.53 ppm · 17 Sep 2026426.4 ppm · 18 Sep 2026426.42 ppm · 19 Sep 2026426.32 ppm · 20 Sep 2026425.22 ppm · 21 Sep 2026425.8 ppm · 22 Sep 2026425.95 ppm · 24 Sep 2026425.75 ppm · 29 Sep 2026425.81 ppm · 30 Sep 2026425.84 ppm · 1 Oct 2026425.3 ppm · 2 Oct 2026425.89 ppm · 4 Oct 2026426.21 ppm · 5 Oct 2026426.39 ppm · 6 Oct 2026426.43 ppm · 8 Oct 2026426.4 ppm · 10 Oct 2026426.56 ppm · 11 Oct 2026426.78 ppm · 12 Oct 2026427.01 ppm · 13 Oct 2026426.84 ppm · 14 Oct 2026426.71 ppm · 16 Oct 2026427.25 ppm · 17 Oct 2026426.67 ppm · 18 Oct 2026426.73 ppm · 19 Oct 2026426.65 ppm · 20 Oct 2026
next update due by 23 Oct 2026
CO₂ at Mauna Loa, monthly mean (Scripps)
425.61 ppm
Sep 2026 · source
▲ +1.54 vs Sep 2025
818 monthly values, 1958-03-31 to 2026-09-30; range 313.21 to 43219582026315.71 ppm · Mar 1958316.53 ppm · Jul 1959314.17 ppm · Sep 1960316.1 ppm · Nov 1961317.7 ppm · Dec 1962322.25 ppm · May 1964321.21 ppm · Jul 1965318.64 ppm · Sep 1966320.73 ppm · Nov 1967324 ppm · Jan 1969325.99 ppm · Feb 1970327.78 ppm · Apr 1971329.09 ppm · Jun 1972329.31 ppm · Aug 1973327.38 ppm · Oct 1974330.77 ppm · Dec 1975333.43 ppm · Feb 1977336.65 ppm · Mar 1978339.48 ppm · May 1979339.57 ppm · Jul 1980336.71 ppm · Sep 1981339.28 ppm · Nov 1982343.82 ppm · Jan 1984346.01 ppm · Feb 1985349.53 ppm · Apr 1986351.25 ppm · Jun 1987350.19 ppm · Aug 1988349.79 ppm · Oct 1989354.02 ppm · Dec 1990356.53 ppm · Feb 1992358.18 ppm · Mar 1993361.51 ppm · May 1994361.74 ppm · Jul 1995359.32 ppm · Sep 1996362.32 ppm · Nov 1997368.05 ppm · Jan 1999370.42 ppm · Mar 2000372.78 ppm · Apr 2001375.34 ppm · Jun 2002374.42 ppm · Aug 2003374.17 ppm · Oct 2004379.93 ppm · Dec 2005383.68 ppm · Feb 2007385.8 ppm · Mar 2008390.15 ppm · May 2009390.34 ppm · Jul 2010389.05 ppm · Sep 2011393.03 ppm · Nov 2012398.01 ppm · Jan 2014401.6 ppm · Mar 2015407.48 ppm · Apr 2016409.04 ppm · Jun 2017407.02 ppm · Aug 2018408.4 ppm · Oct 2019413.88 ppm · Dec 2020418.99 ppm · Feb 2022420.51 ppm · Mar 2023426.7 ppm · May 2024427.56 ppm · Jul 2025425.61 ppm · Sep 2026
next update due by 5 Dec 2026
CO₂ growth, 10-year average (global)
2.53 ppm/yr
2025 · source
58 annual values, 1968-12-31 to 2025-12-31; range 0.79 to 2.62196820250.79 ppm/yr · 19680.82 ppm/yr · 19690.87 ppm/yr · 19700.86 ppm/yr · 19710.95 ppm/yr · 19721.04 ppm/yr · 19731.06 ppm/yr · 19741.07 ppm/yr · 19751.06 ppm/yr · 19761.19 ppm/yr · 19771.22 ppm/yr · 19781.3 ppm/yr · 19791.36 ppm/yr · 19801.4 ppm/yr · 19811.35 ppm/yr · 19821.39 ppm/yr · 19831.44 ppm/yr · 19841.49 ppm/yr · 19851.49 ppm/yr · 19861.56 ppm/yr · 19871.65 ppm/yr · 19881.59 ppm/yr · 19891.54 ppm/yr · 19901.5 ppm/yr · 19911.47 ppm/yr · 19921.41 ppm/yr · 19931.45 ppm/yr · 19941.49 ppm/yr · 19951.49 ppm/yr · 19961.43 ppm/yr · 19971.49 ppm/yr · 19981.48 ppm/yr · 19991.48 ppm/yr · 20001.59 ppm/yr · 20011.76 ppm/yr · 20021.86 ppm/yr · 20031.85 ppm/yr · 20041.9 ppm/yr · 20051.97 ppm/yr · 20061.99 ppm/yr · 20071.88 ppm/yr · 20081.9 ppm/yr · 20092.02 ppm/yr · 20102 ppm/yr · 20112.01 ppm/yr · 20122.03 ppm/yr · 20132.07 ppm/yr · 20142.12 ppm/yr · 20152.23 ppm/yr · 20162.23 ppm/yr · 20172.29 ppm/yr · 20182.38 ppm/yr · 20192.38 ppm/yr · 20202.44 ppm/yr · 20212.42 ppm/yr · 20222.45 ppm/yr · 20232.62 ppm/yr · 20242.53 ppm/yr · 2025
next update due by 10 Jan 2027
CO₂ growth, decade average (Scripps, Mauna Loa)
2.41 ppm/yr
2019 · source
2 annual values, 2009-12-31 to 2019-12-31; range 1.91 to 2.41200920191.91 ppm/yr · 20092.41 ppm/yr · 2019
updated irregularly
CO₂ growth, 2020s average so far (Scripps, Mauna Loa)
2.61 ppm/yr
2025 · source
updated irregularly
CO₂ growth, 5-year average (global)
2.63 ppm/yr
2025 · source
63 annual values, 1963-12-31 to 2025-12-31; range 0.62 to 2.68196320250.72 ppm/yr · 19630.62 ppm/yr · 19640.7 ppm/yr · 19650.76 ppm/yr · 19660.77 ppm/yr · 19670.86 ppm/yr · 19681.02 ppm/yr · 19691.03 ppm/yr · 19700.96 ppm/yr · 19711.13 ppm/yr · 19721.09 ppm/yr · 19741.11 ppm/yr · 19751.16 ppm/yr · 19761.25 ppm/yr · 19771.22 ppm/yr · 19781.51 ppm/yr · 19791.6 ppm/yr · 19801.63 ppm/yr · 19811.45 ppm/yr · 19821.56 ppm/yr · 19831.38 ppm/yr · 19841.37 ppm/yr · 19851.35 ppm/yr · 19861.68 ppm/yr · 19871.74 ppm/yr · 19881.79 ppm/yr · 19891.71 ppm/yr · 19901.65 ppm/yr · 19911.27 ppm/yr · 19921.08 ppm/yr · 19931.27 ppm/yr · 19951.33 ppm/yr · 19961.58 ppm/yr · 19971.91 ppm/yr · 19981.84 ppm/yr · 19991.69 ppm/yr · 20001.85 ppm/yr · 20011.93 ppm/yr · 20021.82 ppm/yr · 20031.86 ppm/yr · 20042.11 ppm/yr · 20052.09 ppm/yr · 20062.05 ppm/yr · 20071.94 ppm/yr · 20081.95 ppm/yr · 20091.92 ppm/yr · 20101.92 ppm/yr · 20111.97 ppm/yr · 20122.11 ppm/yr · 20132.2 ppm/yr · 20142.53 ppm/yr · 20162.48 ppm/yr · 20172.47 ppm/yr · 20182.56 ppm/yr · 20192.44 ppm/yr · 20202.35 ppm/yr · 20212.37 ppm/yr · 20222.43 ppm/yr · 20232.68 ppm/yr · 20242.63 ppm/yr · 2025
next update due by 10 Jan 2027
CO₂ growth, 5-year average (Mauna Loa)
2.61 ppm/yr
2025 · source
63 annual values, 1963-12-31 to 2025-12-31; range 0.63 to 2.64196320250.75 ppm/yr · 19630.63 ppm/yr · 19640.74 ppm/yr · 19650.8 ppm/yr · 19660.81 ppm/yr · 19670.88 ppm/yr · 19681.09 ppm/yr · 19691.08 ppm/yr · 19700.98 ppm/yr · 19711.19 ppm/yr · 19721.14 ppm/yr · 19741.15 ppm/yr · 19751.15 ppm/yr · 19761.23 ppm/yr · 19771.26 ppm/yr · 19781.43 ppm/yr · 19791.55 ppm/yr · 19801.68 ppm/yr · 19811.42 ppm/yr · 19821.63 ppm/yr · 19831.57 ppm/yr · 19841.47 ppm/yr · 19851.48 ppm/yr · 19861.72 ppm/yr · 19871.7 ppm/yr · 19881.64 ppm/yr · 19891.64 ppm/yr · 19901.56 ppm/yr · 19911.24 ppm/yr · 19921.07 ppm/yr · 19931.37 ppm/yr · 19951.41 ppm/yr · 19961.69 ppm/yr · 19972.02 ppm/yr · 19981.81 ppm/yr · 19991.73 ppm/yr · 20001.81 ppm/yr · 20011.93 ppm/yr · 20021.79 ppm/yr · 20031.92 ppm/yr · 20042.11 ppm/yr · 20052.12 ppm/yr · 20062.08 ppm/yr · 20071.94 ppm/yr · 20082.02 ppm/yr · 20091.97 ppm/yr · 20102.01 ppm/yr · 20112.08 ppm/yr · 20122.17 ppm/yr · 20132.21 ppm/yr · 20142.56 ppm/yr · 20162.41 ppm/yr · 20172.58 ppm/yr · 20182.64 ppm/yr · 20192.51 ppm/yr · 20202.38 ppm/yr · 20212.37 ppm/yr · 20222.46 ppm/yr · 20232.63 ppm/yr · 20242.61 ppm/yr · 2025
next update due by 10 Jan 2027

Milestone Countdown

A sequence: each milestone is expected after the one before it.
now20282030203520402050206020752100later
Expected year: dot = median (hollow: after 2100), bar = 80% range; arrows: each milestone is expected after the one before. The time axis is compressed: the farther out, the more years per step.
  1. The Bend: Year of peak global greenhouse gas emissions is definitively behind us.Progressing: GHG roughly flat (+0.3% Jan–Jul 2026), peak not yet confirmed; ETA ~2036 · assessed 2026-10-18 · 55 event(s)
    • Definitively: a major global all-GHG inventory shows the peak year 3+ years back and the latest year at least 1% below it.
    Global greenhouse-gas emissions are roughly flat near their highest level: up 0.7% in 2025 by the EU's EDGAR inventory (land use excluded) and 0.3% in January–July 2026 by Climate TRACE; counting land-use CO₂, 2025 was about 0.2% below 2024, far short of the 1% drop the milestone requires. Fossil-CO₂ growth, though, keeps slowing decade by decade, and clean power outgrew electricity demand in 2025. Extrapolating that slowdown puts the actual peak around 2030 and its confirmation — an inventory showing the peak three or more years back and the latest year at least 1% lower, plus a year for reporting — at a median of 2036, with a 95% chance by 2100: yellow, but only just inside the ten-year horizon that counts as progressing. Whether this year's oil-shock dip in emissions becomes a lasting decline, and whether methane and other gases follow CO₂ down, could move this several years either way.
    ETA
    ~2036 (80% range 2031–2050; P(by 2100) 95%)
    ETA cruxes
    1) Mapping of CO₂ deceleration onto non-CO₂ (assumed m=1; m=0 → p50 2040, red); CH₄/N₂O inventories, EU methane-rule delay. 2) Full-year 2026/2027 all-GHG growth: a measured +0.5% → p50 ~2040 (red); a measured fall that survives the 2027 oil rebound → as early as 2029–30. 3) Persistence of the fossil curvature (halved → 2044; doubled → 2033; October outlooks sit at driver p80–p98). 4) China/India 2026–27 emissions (solar slowdown, drought, coal orders). 5) Monte Carlo resolution of the 10-year edge (p50 within ~0.2 y of the boundary).
    Path
    Own quantity: global ALL-GHG emissions (EDGAR excl. LULUCF + net land-use CO₂, ~58.5 GtCO₂e in 2025), not fossil CO₂, electricity or a regional peak. 'Definitively' per the framework detail: an inventory shows the peak ≥3 years back and the latest year ≥1% below it; recognised after one reporting cycle (≈ annual, measured). The TRACE all-GHG series (fastest same-outcome series, to Jul 2026) sets the 2026 rate; the shared driver fossil-co2-deceleration (GCB fossil, ~65% of the inventory) supplies the measured curvature; land use follows its own trend; non-CO₂ follows the fossil curvature by an assumed mapping. Measured clean-power displacement is the precursor. History: same-vintage inventories (EDGAR 2026 excl. LULUCF + GCB 2026 annual net land use) put 2024 (58.30) slightly above 2025 (58.20), so 2024 is an admissible peak candidate (earliest recognition 2028) and 2025 is not a measured record.
    Blockers
    • Measurement: no registered harmonised all-GHG series; inventories differ in vintage and scope; definitive recognition needs several post-peak annual totals.
    • Economic: the 2026 Hormuz-shock oil fall (IEA Oct: −2.6 mb/d) is already reversing (Gulf crude exports >75% of pre-war in September; IEA 2027 +2 mb/d); record El Niño 2026–27.
    • Technical/policy: India's emissions and emergency coal dispatch rising (weak monsoon), China's solar additions −58% Jan–Aug 2026; US standards rolled back; EU methane-rule MRV delay proposed.
    How this was assessed: the data, the benchmark and the rubric rule
    ETA method
    driver trend (shared driver fossil-co2-deceleration for fossil-CO₂ curvature; own land-use OLS trend and TRACE-implied non-CO₂ with an assumed curvature mapping) plus the framework's recognition rule, a reporting lag and a named failure scenario; one Monte Carlo distribution
    ETA calculation
    Shared driver fossil-co2-deceleration (drivers.yaml): draw i of `ledger.py driver-draws fossil-co2-deceleration --as-of 2026-10-18` (seed 20261015, n 10,000; byte-identical to the 2026-10-15 draws; a_per_yr2 lognormal p50 .00080015 = (.017320−.009319)/10 from co2-emissions-fossil-gcb 1995/2005/2015/2025 = 23.26/29.19/34.71/38.1 Gt, sdlog .50; g_2020 .0093186 and fossil_2025 38.1 fixed) is the fossil curvature in simulation draw i: fossil rate +0.452%/yr at 2026.5 centrally. Own mapping (prev's, unchanged, rule 7): net land use 2006–2025 OLS −2.203%/yr, level 4.443 (2025 obs 4.1, 2026-05-13-gcb-2025-total-co2-slightly-lower); non-CO₂ 16.0 GtCO₂e = assumed cross-inventory estimate EDGAR 54.1 (2026-09-01-edgar-2026-ghg-2025) − GCB 38.1, rate +0.614%/yr model-inferred, curvature m=1 × driver curvature (assumed mapping); per-draw common rate shift pins all-GHG 2026 to Climate TRACE Jan–Jul +0.3% ± 0.3 (2026-09-24-climate-trace-jul-2026-ghg; δ=0 centrally). 10,000 common draws; quantile year = calendar year containing it. Prev's script (notes/climate/20261015T113313Z.md) reproduced byte-identically on the 2026-10-18 series; no input changed (58 new effective events tested, none measures a modelled quantity). Bend: E=F+L+N; physical peak argmax; recognition = first t ≥ peak+3y with E ≤ 0.99·peak (framework detail) + 1 y reporting (≈ annual: 2025 inventories April/May/September 2026). History (review-1 correction; 2025 is NOT a measured all-GHG record): same-vintage 2026 inventories, EDGAR excl. LULUCF 2024 54.1/1.007 = 53.724 and 2025 54.1 (2026-09-01-edgar-2026-ghg-2025) + GCB annual net land use 4.58/4.10 (co2-emissions-total-gcb − co2-emissions-fossil-gcb) → all-GHG 58.304 (2024) > 58.200 (2025), −0.18%; 2024 enters as a peak candidate (per draw E_2024 = E_2025 × 1.001786, ratio transfer assumed), earliest recognition 2024+3+1 = 2028; 22.97% of draws peak in 2024. S2 .05 (assumed). MC: P .9505, p10/p50/p90 2031.0/2036.7/2050.3 → 2031/2036/2050 (prev 2031.4/2036.8/2050.3 with 2025 taken as the record, floor 2029: that row is now a sensitivity; 2024 1% above 2025: p10 2028.5, p50 2036.2); physical peak 2024.5/2030.6/2042.0; deterministic central peak 2030.8 at 59.1 GtCO₂e, recognition 2037.1; conditional median 2036.4. P(by end 2031) .154; P(by 2036-10-18 = made_at+10y) .5011; P(by end 2036) .511: median on the 10-year edge (MC ±0.2 y). Sensitivities (p50): all-GHG 2026 +0.5% 2039.6, −0.3% 2029.2 (new row; δ is a permanent shift, so it overstates a transient 2026 dip); m=.5/0 2038.0/2040.0; curvature ×½/×2 2043.6/2033.2; total-CO₂ curvature 2033.8; land-use endpoint 2037.5; threshold 0.5%/2% 2035.3/2038.9; zero reporting lag 2035.7; S2 .02/.10 P .980/.895. New evidence weighed, not inputs: IEA Oct OMR 2026 oil demand −2.6 mb/d (projection; ≈ −0.5% all-GHG from oil alone, but TRACE's +0.3% already spans Mar–Jul of the shock; 2026-10-14-iea-omr-oct-2026-oil-demand-fall-2-6mbd), Gulf exports back to >75% of pre-war (2026-10-14-iea-omr-hormuz-flows-sep-2026), EU H1 fossil CO₂ −2.0% (regional, 2026-09-30-crea-eu-co2-h1-2026-down-2pct), power-sector CO₂ not clearly peaked (2026-10-05-hausfather-wind-solar-avoided-23gt). Outlook cross-check (projections, not inputs): model central fossil 2050/2025 = 0.896 (38.1 → 34.14 Gt), cumulative fossil 2026–2050 901 Gt; curvature each outlook implies in the driver form, ×driver p50 (driver CDF): Exxon 0.83 ×1.23 (.65), IRENA WETO PES 0.74 ×1.57 (.81; 2026-10-13-irena-weto-2026-net-zero-only-in-1-5c), DNV 22/39 ×2.37 (.96; 2026-10-07-dnv-eto-2026-energy-co2-likely-peaked), Rystad ~0.5 ×2.72 (.98; 2026-10-15-rystad-ges-2026-fossil-co2-plateau-40gt); they decline faster to 2050 but flatten after (DNV net-zero CO₂ 2098), i.e. the a×2 and −3%/yr-floor rows at once; driver-fit remark for the owner in the notes, driver not refitted. Cross-checks: 2014–16 false plateau 34.78/34.71/34.69 then 35.26/36.00 and the 2020 rebound (0 of 2 post-1990 plateaus definitive); outlook peak dates (DNV: CO₂ likely peaked within 24 months) read with the framework rule → recognition ~2030, discounted ×1.5–3 from 2026.80 → 2031.6–2036.4, matching the model's p10–p50. Prev 2026-10-15 P .95, 2031/2036/2050: same calendar years. No external anchors listed. Foreign context only: fusion lcoe-solar-pv-irena 2010/2024 417→43 $/MWh; no mapping.
    Change
    Re-assessment on 58 new effective events (published 2026-09-28…10-18). Prev's script reproduced byte-identically; the series it reads and the shared driver draws are byte-identical to 2026-10-15. Each input was tested against the new events: none measures a modelled quantity (no new global all-GHG or CO₂ inventory; IEA's October oil-demand fall is a projection, EU H1 −2% regional, DNV/IRENA/Rystad outlooks projections, EV and heat-pump data precursors without a measured conversion), so no input changed (rule 7). Added: an all-GHG 2026 −0.3% sensitivity (p50 2029.2, with the permanent-shift caveat) and an outlook cross-check (the outlooks imply curvature at driver p80–p98; remark for the owner in the notes). Review-1 correction (input/scope): the prev/draft recognition floor treated 2025 as a measured all-GHG record; same-vintage EDGAR-2026 (excl. LULUCF) + GCB-2026 net land use put 2024 (58.304) above 2025 (58.200), so 2024 now enters as a peak candidate and the floor moves 2029 → 2028: p10 2031.4 → 2031.0, p50 2036.8 → 2036.7, P .9505 and p90 2050.3 unchanged; calendar quantiles 2031/2036/2050 and status yellow unchanged.
    Rubric rule
    RUBRIC.md v6 §4/§4.1: yellow = measurable progress on a driver and unconditional median ≤ made_at+10y (p50 2036 ≤ 2036 at calendar-year resolution); not green (median > 5 y; no funded programme covering the whole GHG transition); not achieved (no verified event of a definitive all-GHG peak).
    by assess:20261018T192714Z · 46 evidence event(s)
    Evidence and news: 46 cited by the assessment, 9 other event(s)

    Cited evidence (46)

    Other events (9)

  2. The Balance: Global net anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions reach approximately zero.Distant: net GHG ~58 GtCO₂e/yr, +0.3% Jan–Jul 2026 vs ≤2.9 needed; P(by 2100) 28% · assessed 2026-10-18 · 65 event(s)
    • Net emissions in GWP100 (the UNFCCC convention), durable removals counted; approximately zero = within ±5% of 2025 gross emissions (about ±3 GtCO₂e).
    Net human greenhouse-gas emissions are about 58 billion tonnes of CO₂-equivalent a year and still growing slightly, while durable carbon removal runs at roughly a million tonnes a year. Getting net emissions down to about 2.9 billion tonnes (5% of today's gross emissions) needs a 20-fold cut plus several billion tonnes a year of removals; extrapolating today's slowing emissions growth and a removal industry growing as fast as renewables did gives only a 28% chance by 2100 — less likely than not even then, so red. The answer hinges most on how big and how fast carbon removal can grow, and on whether methane and other gases fall along with CO₂.
    ETA
    unlikely by 2100 (P 28%; 10% chance by 2087)
    ETA cruxes
    1) Removal mapping and scale: renewables-rate transfer (r ×½ → 7%, ×1.5 → 42%), saturation K (4 → 13%, 16 → 42%) and seed (×.1, delivery below capacity as CDR.fyi's ~3%-delivered suggests → 18%); observe audited durable-removal throughput and its growth. 2) Non-CO₂ curvature mapping (m=.5 → 19%, m=0 → 0.5%); CH₄/N₂O inventories. 3) Persistence and form of the fossil-CO₂ deceleration (×2 → 50%, p10 2077; −3%/yr floor → 13%); full-year 2026–27 GCB/EDGAR; the October outlooks argue faster to 2050, slower after. 4) A harmonised net all-GHG inventory with durable removals.
    Path
    Own quantity: global net anthropogenic all-GHG emissions in GWP100 (UNFCCC convention), net land-use CO₂ included, durable removals subtracted (not natural sinks or fossil CCS) ≈ 58.5 GtCO₂e in 2025. Owner's wording (d964534): approximately zero = within ±5% of 2025 gross emissions; 2025 gross = 54.1 (EDGAR excl. LULUCF) + 4.1 (GCB net land use) = 58.2, so the target is net ≤ 2.91 GtCO₂e (reading 'gross excl. LULUCF' gives 2.71: P .27, under 2 years on p10). Drivers: the shared driver fossil-co2-deceleration (GCB fossil curvature, measured median) for CO₂, land use on its OLS trend, non-CO₂ (level 16.0 an assumed EDGAR−GCB cross-inventory estimate) following the fossil curvature by an assumed mapping, its rate model-inferred from TRACE (the fastest same-outcome series); gross emissions floored at hard residuals (assumed); removals from operating storage capacity growing at the renewables rate (assumed transfer) and saturating at an assumed AR6-anchored scale.
    Blockers
    • Measurement: no harmonised net all-GHG inventory with durable removals; removal capacity is not audited net delivery (CDR.fyi: ~3% of ~50 Mt contracted CDR delivered).
    • Technical/economic: durable removal ~0.0012 Gt/yr of operating capacity; 2026 CDR offtake value on track to halve; Kawasaki dropped DAC expansion; Bison paused; Mammoth underperforming; removal scale bounded by biomass/land, storage build-out and energy.
    • Policy: US withdrawal from Paris and power-plant standards repealed, opposition to the IMO net-zero framework, banks leaving NZBA, EU methane-rule MRV delay proposed (no gate is assumed away; no policy lag added).
    How this was assessed: the data, the benchmark and the rubric rule
    ETA method
    driver trend (shared driver fossil-co2-deceleration for fossil-CO₂ curvature; own land-use OLS trend and TRACE-implied non-CO₂) with consistent net flows, plus a removal S-curve (renewables-rate reference class, AR6-anchored saturation) and named failure scenarios; one Monte Carlo distribution
    ETA calculation
    Shared driver fossil-co2-deceleration (drivers.yaml): draw i of `ledger.py driver-draws fossil-co2-deceleration --as-of 2026-10-18` (seed 20261015, n 10,000; byte-identical to the 2026-10-15 draws; a_per_yr2 lognormal p50 .00080015 = (.017320−.009319)/10 from co2-emissions-fossil-gcb 1995/2005/2015/2025 = 23.26/29.19/34.71/38.1 Gt, sdlog .50; g_2020 .0093186 and fossil_2025 38.1 fixed) is the fossil curvature in simulation draw i: fossil rate +0.452%/yr at 2026.5 centrally. Own mapping (prev's, unchanged, rule 7): net land use 2006–2025 OLS −2.203%/yr, level 4.443 (2025 obs 4.1, 2026-05-13-gcb-2025-total-co2-slightly-lower); non-CO₂ 16.0 GtCO₂e = assumed cross-inventory estimate EDGAR 54.1 (2026-09-01-edgar-2026-ghg-2025) − GCB 38.1, rate +0.614%/yr model-inferred, curvature m=1 × driver curvature (assumed mapping); per-draw common rate shift pins all-GHG 2026 to Climate TRACE Jan–Jul +0.3% ± 0.3 (2026-09-24-climate-trace-jul-2026-ghg; δ=0 centrally). 10,000 common draws; quantile year = calendar year containing it. Prev's script (notes/climate/20261015T113313Z.md) reproduced byte-identically on the 2026-10-18 series; no input changed (58 new effective events tested, none measures a modelled quantity). Removals: S-curve, seed .0012 Gt/yr (2026-09-18-greensand-eu-first-offshore-co2-storage, 2026-09-21-adm-columbus-beccs-removal-credits), r=ln(5.15/4.457)=.14452±.05 (2026-09-21-irena-tripling-tracker-693gw-2025; transfer assumed), K~LN(8,.54) Gt/yr (assumed; AR6 WG3 C.3.5 ≈3–16 Gt/yr); floors Rc U(1,4), RN U(3,4) (assumed). Failure scenarios: S1 removal stall .10 — reference class policy-revenue-only abatement services (first unit by 1996; stall = deployment ≤10× first unit after 30 y): FGD, SCR, catalytic converters, CFC substitution, landfill gas: 0 of 5 stalls (assumed classification), Jeffreys .083 / Laplace .143; climate-only CCS as a stall 1/6 → .21–.25 (the .25 row); new market signals both ways (2026-10-02-qcintel-cdr-offtake-value-halving-2026, 2026-10-06-kawasaki-abandons-dac-plans vs 2026-10-06-cdrfyi-sept-2026-over-1mt-contracted, 2026-10-15-frontier-4401-in-situ-mineralization-offtake), no member outcome: .10 kept (sens .05/.25: Balance P .296/.233, Ceiling .184/.178); S2 decarbonisation stall .05 (assumed, <10%). Seed evidence new both ways: Gevo ND BECCS >700 kt stored since capture began (≈.00016 Gt/yr, start date assumed) and CDR.fyi ~3% of ~50 Mt contracted delivered (2026-10-08-gevo-north-dakota-beccs-10000-delivered): +Gevo row Balance .287 / Ceiling .184, ×.1 row .182 / .170; kept (log-SD 1). Balance: first t with max(Rc,G)+max(RN,N)−C ≤ 0.05×2025 gross (54.1 EDGAR + 4.1 land use = 58.2) = 2.91 GtCO₂e. Gap: net 58.5 → ≤2.91 = 20×; removals .0012 → 3.87/6.87/13.39 Gt/yr at balance (ln(6.87/.0012)/.14452 = 60 y unslowed). Deterministic central: 2100 gross CO₂ 7.0 + non-CO₂ floor 3.5 = 10.5 needs C ≥ 7.6 vs S-curve 6.9 → after 2100. MC: P .2820 → .28, p10 2087.5 → 2087, p50/p90 null (identical to prev); conditional-success median 2090.6 (not p50); P(CO₂ net zero by 2100) .316. Sensitivities (P): curvature ×½/×2 .066/.499 (p10 2077.5); total-CO₂ curvature .463; rate floor −3%/−5% .129/.255; m=.5/0 .189/.005; r ×½/×1.5 .070/.423; K 4/16 .130/.417; unbounded exponential .585 (p50 2094, needs 17/36 Gt/yr removals p50/p90, above AR6; held out); seed ×10/+Gevo/×.1 .365/.287/.182; TRACE +0.5%/−0.3% .249/.376; tolerance 5% of 54.1 .274; ≤0 .162. Outlook cross-check (projections, not inputs): model central fossil 2050/2025 = 0.896 (38.1 → 34.14 Gt), cumulative fossil 2026–2050 901 Gt; curvature each outlook implies in the driver form, ×driver p50 (driver CDF): Exxon 0.83 ×1.23 (.65), IRENA WETO PES 0.74 ×1.57 (.81; 2026-10-13-irena-weto-2026-net-zero-only-in-1-5c), DNV 22/39 ×2.37 (.96; 2026-10-07-dnv-eto-2026-energy-co2-likely-peaked), Rystad ~0.5 ×2.72 (.98; 2026-10-15-rystad-ges-2026-fossil-co2-plateau-40gt); they decline faster to 2050 but flatten after (DNV net-zero CO₂ 2098), i.e. the a×2 and −3%/yr-floor rows at once; driver-fit remark for the owner in the notes, driver not refitted. Cross-checks: AR6 WG3 C.2.4 ~30% of C3 reach net-zero GHG by 2100; DNV net-zero CO₂ 2098 and IRENA PES (net zero only in its 1.5°C scenario) have no balance by 2100 centrally; RMI announced-project growth 51%/yr (2026-10-08-rmi-new-frontiers-cdr-51pct-growth, broader scope) discounted ×1.5–3 in time = .137–.275/yr vs r .1445 (low end); discounted ×1.5–3 from 2026.80: Climate Pledge 2040 → 2046.6–2066.4 (2026-09-15-climate-pledge-report-2026-700-signatories), Germany 2045 → 2054.1–2081.4 (2026-09-23-germany-fossil-fuel-transition-roadmap), IMO 2050 → 2061.6–2096.4 (partial populations). Prev P .28, p10 2087: unchanged. No external anchors listed. Foreign context only; no mapping.
    Change
    Re-assessment on 58 new effective events (published 2026-09-28…10-18). Prev's script reproduced byte-identically on byte-identical series and driver draws. Inputs tested against the new evidence: the removal seed has new evidence both ways (Gevo's ≈.00016 Gt/yr storage would add ~13%; CDR.fyi's ~3%-delivered points to throughput below capacity), both inside its log-SD 1, so the measured proxy .0012 stays (rows +Gevo .287, ×.1 .182); RMI's proponent growth puts r at the low end of its discounted range, not outside it; removal-market and policy signals give S1/S2 no member outcome; outlooks are projections (cross-check). No input changed (rule 7). P .2820, p10 2087.5: no move; status red unchanged.
    Rubric rule
    RUBRIC.md v6 §4/§4.1: red, p_achieved < 0.5 so the unconditional median is null; no verified achievement of global net all-GHG within ±5% of 2025 gross.
    by assess:20261018T192714Z · 54 evidence event(s)
    Evidence and news: 54 cited by the assessment, 11 other event(s)

    Cited evidence (54)

    Other events (11)

  3. The Ceiling: Peak warming held below +2°C.Distant: ~1.3–1.4°C long-term, rising; must stop <2°C and hold 10 yrs; P(by 2100) 18% · assessed 2026-10-18 · 61 event(s)
    • Warming = the long-term human-induced warming indicator (IPCC method, vs 1850–1900). Achieved once it has stopped rising below +2.0°C and stayed at or below that peak for 10 years.
    Long-term human-caused warming is about 1.3–1.4°C and still rising. On today's emissions trend the remaining carbon budget that gives an even chance of staying under 2°C (about 1,020 billion tonnes of CO₂) runs out around 2051, so a model of cumulative CO₂ plus the shorter-lived gases gives only an 18% chance that warming peaks below 2°C and holds there for ten years by 2100: red. Most of the successful paths rely on methane falling fast enough to hold temperatures flat before CO₂ reaches net zero, which is the biggest uncertainty; this year's El Niño-boosted record months are weather on top of the long-term trend, not the measure itself.
    ETA
    unlikely by 2100 (P 18%; 10% chance by 2082)
    ETA cruxes
    1) Non-CO₂ curvature mapping and how far a CH₄ decline can hold the indicator flat for 10 years (m=.5 → 10%, m=0 → 0.06%; GWP* ×.7 → 16%; f_s .5 → 15%); CH₄/N₂O trends (EU methane-rule delay vs pledge delivery). 2) Persistence and form of the fossil-CO₂ deceleration (×2 → 37%, p10 2064; −3%/yr floor → 10%); full-year 2026–27 CO₂ through El Niño and the oil rebound. 3) A newer IPCC-method long-term warming estimate (IGCC) and an updated 2°C budget (AR7 timeline unresolved); whether the observed 0.36°C/decade reflects aerosol unmasking beyond the budget (aerosol +.05°C → 16%). 4) Removal scale (r ×1.5 → 21%). 5) Governed SRM beyond simulations.
    Path
    Own quantity: the long-term human-induced warming indicator (IPCC method, vs 1850–1900), ~1.3–1.4°C and rising. Framework detail: achieved once it has stopped rising below +2.0°C and stayed at or below that peak for 10 years; my reading adds that it must not have exceeded 2.0°C before (an overshoot then a lower peak is not 'peak warming held below 2°C'; relaxing it: P .21), and does not require permanence after the 10 years (achievement is terminal). Modelled with an emulator, not equated with CO₂ neutrality: warming change ∝ cumulative net CO₂ + GWP* warming equivalent of the non-CO₂ trajectory, compared with the AR6 2°C budget (sourced, rebased; GCB revision transfer assumed) and the AR6 WG3 non-CO₂ pathway it is conditioned on. The mapping of CH₄ declines onto a 10-year plateau of the indicator is assumed (GWP* coefficients sourced, aggregate application assumed). Faster temperature series (Berkeley monthly) are El Niño-boosted observations, context only. Fossil-CO₂ curvature comes from the shared driver fossil-co2-deceleration (draw i).
    Blockers
    • Physical: CO₂ emissions still ~42 Gt/yr; the AR6-based 50% 2°C budget (~1,020 Gt from 2026) runs out ~2051 on the central trend (DNV: 2052); non-CO₂ emissions still rising (+0.6%/yr implied) vs −45% CH₄ by 2050 in ≤2°C pathways.
    • Technical/economic: durable removals ~0.0012 Gt/yr of operating capacity; CDR offtake value halving in 2026.
    • Governance: SRM research-only (UK government does not support deployment; state bans such as Florida SB 56); no deployment path; EU methane-rule MRV delay proposed.
    • Measurement: no newer long-term warming estimate or 2°C budget update in the ledger; IPCC AR7 timeline unresolved after IPCC-65 was suspended.
    How this was assessed: the data, the benchmark and the rubric rule
    ETA method
    driver trend (shared driver fossil-co2-deceleration; own land-use, non-CO₂ and removal S-curve trajectories with consistent net flows) feeding a physical warming emulator: cumulative net CO₂ plus GWP* non-CO₂ warming equivalent against the sourced AR6 2°C budget and its AR6 WG3 non-CO₂ reference pathway; 10-year hold test as a definitional floor; named failure scenarios; one Monte Carlo distribution
    ETA calculation
    Shared driver fossil-co2-deceleration (drivers.yaml): draw i of `ledger.py driver-draws fossil-co2-deceleration --as-of 2026-10-18` (seed 20261015, n 10,000; byte-identical to the 2026-10-15 draws; a_per_yr2 lognormal p50 .00080015 = (.017320−.009319)/10 from co2-emissions-fossil-gcb 1995/2005/2015/2025 = 23.26/29.19/34.71/38.1 Gt, sdlog .50; g_2020 .0093186 and fossil_2025 38.1 fixed) is the fossil curvature in simulation draw i: fossil rate +0.452%/yr at 2026.5 centrally. Own mapping (prev's, unchanged, rule 7): net land use 2006–2025 OLS −2.203%/yr, level 4.443 (2025 obs 4.1, 2026-05-13-gcb-2025-total-co2-slightly-lower); non-CO₂ 16.0 GtCO₂e = assumed cross-inventory estimate EDGAR 54.1 (2026-09-01-edgar-2026-ghg-2025) − GCB 38.1, rate +0.614%/yr model-inferred, curvature m=1 × driver curvature (assumed mapping); per-draw common rate shift pins all-GHG 2026 to Climate TRACE Jan–Jul +0.3% ± 0.3 (2026-09-24-climate-trace-jul-2026-ghg; δ=0 centrally). 10,000 common draws; quantile year = calendar year containing it. Prev's script (notes/climate/20261015T113313Z.md) reproduced byte-identically on the 2026-10-18 series; no input changed (58 new effective events tested, none measures a modelled quantity). Removals: S-curve, seed .0012 Gt/yr (2026-09-18-greensand-eu-first-offshore-co2-storage, 2026-09-21-adm-columbus-beccs-removal-credits), r=ln(5.15/4.457)=.14452±.05 (2026-09-21-irena-tripling-tracker-693gw-2025; transfer assumed), K~LN(8,.54) Gt/yr (assumed; AR6 WG3 C.3.5 ≈3–16 Gt/yr); floors Rc U(1,4), RN U(3,4) (assumed). Failure scenarios: S1 removal stall .10 — reference class policy-revenue-only abatement services (first unit by 1996; stall = deployment ≤10× first unit after 30 y): FGD, SCR, catalytic converters, CFC substitution, landfill gas: 0 of 5 stalls (assumed classification), Jeffreys .083 / Laplace .143; climate-only CCS as a stall 1/6 → .21–.25 (the .25 row); new market signals both ways (2026-10-02-qcintel-cdr-offtake-value-halving-2026, 2026-10-06-kawasaki-abandons-dac-plans vs 2026-10-06-cdrfyi-sept-2026-over-1mt-contracted, 2026-10-15-frontier-4401-in-situ-mineralization-offtake), no member outcome: .10 kept (sens .05/.25: Balance P .296/.233, Ceiling .184/.178); S2 decarbonisation stall .05 (assumed, <10%). Seed evidence new both ways: Gevo ND BECCS >700 kt stored since capture began (≈.00016 Gt/yr, start date assumed) and CDR.fyi ~3% of ~50 Mt contracted delivered (2026-10-08-gevo-north-dakota-beccs-10000-delivered): +Gevo row Balance .287 / Ceiling .184, ×.1 row .182 / .170; kept (log-SD 1). Emulator (prev's, unchanged): X(t)=∫2026→t(net CO₂+WE_m) − cumWE_p, WE_m = f_s(4.53·N_eff(t)−4.25·N_eff(t−20))+(1−f_s)N_eff, f_s=.65 (AR6 WG3 C.2.3), reference non-CO₂ linear to N(8,1.82) at 2070; B2 = AR6 WG1 SPM.2 2°C budgets 2300/1700/1350/1150/900 from 2020 − measured 2020–25 247.66 − GCB revision 82.34 (2026-05-13-gcb-2025-remaining-budget-170gt; transfer assumed) → 50% 1,020 Gt = 24 y at 42.2 Gt/yr, + σ440; sampled 194/1106/2438. Test: t* = first t with max X over (t,t+10] ≤ X(t) and max X over [2026,t] ≤ B2; achieved t*+10 ≤ 2100. Gap: ~1.3–1.4°C long-term (2024-01-01-wmo-long-term-warming-1-3-1-4c, legacy); context, El Niño-boosted: C3S Sep 2026 1.63°C, 12-mo 1.50 (2026-10-09-c3s-sep-2026-1-63c-12mo-1-50c), GISS 2026 1.548 (projection, 2026-10-14-giss-gmsta-2026-1-55c-2027-1-64c); observed warming 0.36°C/decade since 2010 (2026-10-14-state-of-climate-warming-rate-0-36c) is not the indicator; it bears on the assumed aerosol term (+.05°C → P .162). MC: P .1831 → .18, p10 2082.1 → 2082, p50/p90 null (identical to prev); conditional-success median 2080.9 (not p50); t* 2058.6/2070.9/2084.7; stops 10.5–28.4 y before CO₂ net zero; 56% of successes rise again before 2100. Sensitivities (P): m=.5/0 .103/.0006; curvature ×½/×2 .040/.374 (p10 2064.1); total-CO₂ .334; floor −3% .097; f_s .50/.80 .149/.198; GWP* ×.7/×1.3 .157/.190; reference non-CO₂ 5/11 .151/.219; r ×½/×1.5 .160/.207; TRACE +0.5%/−0.3% .153/.276; no GCB revision .201; no σ440 .163; aerosol ±.05°C .162/.206; allow overshoot .209; S1 .05/.25 .184/.178. Outlook cross-check (projections, not inputs): model central fossil 2050/2025 = 0.896 (38.1 → 34.14 Gt), cumulative fossil 2026–2050 901 Gt; curvature each outlook implies in the driver form, ×driver p50 (driver CDF): Exxon 0.83 ×1.23 (.65), IRENA WETO PES 0.74 ×1.57 (.81; 2026-10-13-irena-weto-2026-net-zero-only-in-1-5c), DNV 22/39 ×2.37 (.96; 2026-10-07-dnv-eto-2026-energy-co2-likely-peaked), Rystad ~0.5 ×2.72 (.98; 2026-10-15-rystad-ges-2026-fossil-co2-plateau-40gt); they decline faster to 2050 but flatten after (DNV net-zero CO₂ 2098), i.e. the a×2 and −3%/yr-floor rows at once; driver-fit remark for the owner in the notes, driver not refitted. Cross-checks: model central cumulative gross CO₂ from 2026 reaches the 1,020 Gt budget in 2051.0 vs DNV 2°C-budget exhaustion 2052 and 2.3°C by 2100 (2026-10-07-dnv-eto-2026-2c-budget-exhausted-2052); IRENA PES warming ≥2°C; all outlook central cases fail the Ceiling, consistent with P .18; AR6 C3 needs CH₄ −45% by 2050 vs model central non-CO₂ −7%; IPCC AR7 timeline unresolved (2026-10-16-ipcc-65-suspended-ar7-timeline); SRM: UK does not support deployment (2026-09-29-uk-govt-srm-policy-paper-no-deployment), research/governance only, no success branch. Prev P .18, p10 2082: unchanged. No external anchors listed. Foreign context only, no mapping.
    Change
    Re-assessment on 58 new effective events (published 2026-09-28…10-18). Prev's script reproduced byte-identically on byte-identical series and driver draws. Inputs tested against the new evidence: the new temperatures (C3S, NCEI, GISS) are El Niño-boosted surface readings, the 0.36°C/decade study is an observed rate without an indicator estimate (it bears on the assumed aerosol term, kept at 0 with ±.05°C rows), the outlooks are projections and agree with the model (budget exhausted 2051.0 vs DNV 2052), SRM items are research/governance. No input changed (rule 7). P .1831, p10 2082.1: no move; status red unchanged.
    Rubric rule
    RUBRIC.md v6 §4/§4.1: red, p_achieved < 0.5 so the median is null; the indicator is still rising and no verified event exists.
    by assess:20261018T192714Z · 59 evidence event(s)
    Evidence and news: 59 cited by the assessment, 2 other event(s)

    Cited evidence (59)

    Other events (2)

Major Open Challenges

Beyond the framework: 35 event(s)
Latest news: the 8 most recently published of 215 events

All 215 events: the event log

Supplemental

The Knowledge Beyond

129 events · latest news published 2026-10-15 (7 days ago)news per week news per week, the 16 weeks to 2026-10-22: 0, 0, 4, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 2, 0, 3, 0, 1, 4, 1, 0

A great enabler for the future is deep understanding of our universe and the ability to manipulate it on a fine scale. Paradigm-breaking technologies like quantum computing and nanomachines, as well as new research ranging from mathematics to neuroscience (or, say, global broadband availability), may not impact any of the great endeavors directly, but they will reframe everything in the long run.

Outside the five endeavors: no KPI, milestones or challenges, so nothing here is assessed. We keep an eye on a few indicators and the notable developments.

Indicators we track

People using the Internet, share of the world (ITU)
73.6 %
2025 · source
21 annual values, 2005-12-31 to 2025-12-31; range 15.6 to 73.62005202515.6 % · 200517.2 % · 200620.2 % · 200722.8 % · 200825.3 % · 200928.4 % · 201030.9 % · 201133.3 % · 201235.3 % · 201337.4 % · 201439.9 % · 201543.6 % · 201646.3 % · 201749.4 % · 201853.9 % · 201960.1 % · 202063.8 % · 202167 % · 202269.2 % · 202371.2 % · 202473.6 % · 2025
next update due by 27 Oct 2027
Erdős problems solved
47.4 %
Sep 2026 · source
▲ +11.7 vs Sep 2025
13 monthly values, 2025-09-30 to 2026-09-30; range 35.7 to 47.4Sep 25Sep 2635.7 % · Sep 202536.8 % · Oct 202537 % · Nov 202538.9 % · Dec 202540.4 % · Jan 202641 % · Feb 202641.6 % · Mar 202643.1 % · Apr 202644.7 % · May 202644.9 % · Jun 202645.9 % · Jul 202646.3 % · Aug 202647.4 % · Sep 2026
next update due by 1 Nov 2026
Q-Day gap: qubits needed to break RSA-2048 ÷ qubits available
1020 ×
12 Feb 2026 · source
4 daily values, 2024-04-16 to 2026-02-12; range 1020 to 1e+06Apr 24Feb 261e+06 × · 16 Apr 202450000 × · 21 May 202510200 × · 5 Nov 20251020 × · 12 Feb 2026
updated irregularly
Largest synapse-level connectome (neurons)
166691 neurons
9 Oct 2025 · source
7 daily values, 1986-11-12 to 2025-10-09; range 302 to 16669119862025302 neurons · 12 Nov 1986379 neurons · 7 Aug 2013983 neurons · 18 Jul 201725000 neurons · 21 Jan 2020127978 neurons · 30 Jun 2023139255 neurons · 2 Oct 2024166691 neurons · 9 Oct 2025
updated irregularly
Highest superconducting Tc at ambient pressure (replicated)
135 K
23 Sep 1993 · source
4 daily values, 1987-04-20 to 1993-09-23; range 91 to 1351987199391 K · 20 Apr 1987114 K · 7 Mar 1988125 K · 13 Jun 1988135 K · 23 Sep 1993
updated irregularly
Fastest supercomputer (TOP500 #1, HPL)
2198.4 PFlop/s
Jun 2026 · source
▲ +456.4 vs Jun 2025
67 monthly values, 1993-06-30 to 2026-06-30; range 5.97e-05 to 2198.4199320265.97e-05 PFlop/s · Jun 19930.000124 PFlop/s · Nov 19930.0001434 PFlop/s · Jun 19940.00017 PFlop/s · Nov 19940.00017 PFlop/s · Jun 19950.0002204 PFlop/s · Jun 19960.0003682 PFlop/s · Nov 19960.001068 PFlop/s · Jun 19970.001338 PFlop/s · Nov 19970.001338 PFlop/s · Jun 19980.001338 PFlop/s · Nov 19980.002121 PFlop/s · Jun 19990.002379 PFlop/s · Nov 19990.004938 PFlop/s · Nov 20000.007226 PFlop/s · Jun 20010.007226 PFlop/s · Nov 20010.03586 PFlop/s · Jun 20020.03586 PFlop/s · Nov 20020.03586 PFlop/s · Jun 20030.03586 PFlop/s · Nov 20030.03586 PFlop/s · Jun 20040.07072 PFlop/s · Nov 20040.2806 PFlop/s · Nov 20050.2806 PFlop/s · Jun 20060.2806 PFlop/s · Nov 20060.2806 PFlop/s · Jun 20070.4782 PFlop/s · Nov 20071.026 PFlop/s · Jun 20081.105 PFlop/s · Nov 20081.105 PFlop/s · Jun 20091.759 PFlop/s · Jun 20102.566 PFlop/s · Nov 20108.162 PFlop/s · Jun 201110.51 PFlop/s · Nov 201116.3248 PFlop/s · Jun 201217.59 PFlop/s · Nov 201233.8627 PFlop/s · Jun 201333.8627 PFlop/s · Nov 201333.8627 PFlop/s · Nov 201433.8627 PFlop/s · Jun 201533.8627 PFlop/s · Nov 201593.0146 PFlop/s · Jun 201693.0146 PFlop/s · Nov 201693.0146 PFlop/s · Jun 201793.0146 PFlop/s · Nov 2017122.3 PFlop/s · Jun 2018143.5 PFlop/s · Nov 2018148.6 PFlop/s · Nov 2019415.53 PFlop/s · Jun 2020442.01 PFlop/s · Nov 2020442.01 PFlop/s · Jun 2021442.01 PFlop/s · Nov 20211102 PFlop/s · Jun 20221102 PFlop/s · Nov 20221194 PFlop/s · Jun 20231206 PFlop/s · Jun 20241742 PFlop/s · Nov 20241742 PFlop/s · Jun 20251809 PFlop/s · Nov 20252198.4 PFlop/s · Jun 2026
updated irregularly
Confirmed exoplanets (NASA)
6090 planets
2025 · source
34 annual values, 1992-12-31 to 2025-12-31; range 2 to 6090199220252 planets · 19922 planets · 19933 planets · 19944 planets · 199510 planets · 199611 planets · 199717 planets · 199830 planets · 199946 planets · 200058 planets · 200187 planets · 2002109 planets · 2003136 planets · 2004172 planets · 2005204 planets · 2006256 planets · 2007318 planets · 2008405 planets · 2009498 planets · 2010639 planets · 2011783 planets · 2012911 planets · 20131783 planets · 20141938 planets · 20153442 planets · 20163594 planets · 20173902 planets · 20184096 planets · 20194330 planets · 20204894 planets · 20215261 planets · 20225584 planets · 20235844 planets · 20246090 planets · 2025
next update due by 30 Jan 2027
Fine print: 2 input series behind the indicators above
Qubits needed to break RSA-2048 (best estimate, at 0.1% error)
100000 qubits
12 Feb 2026 · source
5 daily values, 2012-10-27 to 2026-02-12; range 100000 to 1e+09201220261e+09 qubits · 27 Oct 20121.72e+08 qubits · 6 Feb 20192e+07 qubits · 23 May 20191e+06 qubits · 21 May 2025100000 qubits · 12 Feb 2026
updated irregularly
Qubits in the largest quantum computer at ≤0.1% error
98 qubits
5 Nov 2025 · source
2 daily values, 2024-04-16 to 2025-11-05; range 20 to 98Apr 24Nov 2520 qubits · 16 Apr 202498 qubits · 5 Nov 2025
updated irregularly

Notable developments

The 10 latest of 25 major (significance ●●●) events, by event date.
Beyond the framework: 113 event(s)
Events under no current topic: 16
Latest news: the 8 most recently published of 129 events

All 129 events: the event log

Supplemental

Society and Cohesion

155 events · latest news published 2026-10-17 (5 days ago)news per week news per week, the 16 weeks to 2026-10-22: 2, 2, 3, 3, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 2, 2, 0, 2, 0, 0, 1

As humanity progresses in its great endeavors, many challenges await our society. To survive into the future, we must pass the great filters — avoid wiping ourselves out with weapons of mass destruction, align our robots (align with what?) and learn to coexist with them (a new alien intelligence), as well as keep humans in some relationships with one another and the physical world. Meanwhile, trust is breaking, alienation and polarization are growing, and simulacra are getting more attractive than the real world. But society can adapt — 40 years ago, "open source" wasn't really a concept, but we fought off massive corporate capture and it now underpins vast areas of technology and knowledge (think: Wikipedia). What are the next philosophy, sociology, and social technologies best serving humanity's future?

Outside the five endeavors: no KPI, milestones or challenges, so nothing here is assessed. We keep an eye on a few indicators and the notable developments.

Indicators we track

Doomsday Clock, seconds to midnight
89 s
2025 · source
Trust in institutions (Edelman Trust Index)
56 %
2025 · source
Trust in national government (OECD)
39 %
2024 · source
updated irregularly
World population living in autocracies (V-Dem)
74 %
2025 · source
2 annual values, 2024-12-31 to 2025-12-31; range 72 to 74Dec 24Dec 2572 % · 202474 % · 2025
People experiencing loneliness (WHO)
16 %
2025 · source
updated irregularly
US adults trusting the federal government (Pew)
17 %
2025 · source
9 annual values, 2015-12-31 to 2025-12-31; range 16 to 242015202519 % · 201518 % · 201717 % · 201920 % · 202024 % · 202120 % · 202216 % · 202322 % · 202417 % · 2025
updated irregularly

Notable developments

The 10 latest of 26 major (significance ●●●) events, by event date.
Beyond the framework: 131 event(s)
Events under no current topic: 24
Latest news: the 8 most recently published of 155 events

All 155 events: the event log